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ABSTRACT 
 
For rational theories of organisational change, organisational dysfunctionalities 
are nothing more than the inadequacy of organisations to maximise on their goals 
or lack of co-ordination of different types of inputs and processes. Usually, such 
observations are made in exclusion of the analysis of organisational realities and 
the experiences that are part of their daily realities. This thesis explores the 
experiences of organisational change in a single case of the provincial department 
of education, namely the Eastern Cape Department of Education (ECDE). Using 
the qualitative and exploratory methods of interviews and document analysis, it 
asks how and why the department was perceived to be in a state of crisis in terms 
of service delivery, eight years after its initial transformation. To explore these 
questions, the thesis looked at the interplay between context, organisational design 
and internal skills and capacities, as the triad of processes that influenced the 
patterns for organisational change in this context.  
 
Broadly, the findings revealed that issues of organisational efficiency and service 
delivery cannot be debated and analysed outside of the political processes that 
influence them. The ECDE revealed that it was caught in endless politics of 
networks of coalition which influenced the pattern of service delivery. As a result 
this thesis concluded that organisational change and service delivery debates have 
to extend beyond the rational inputs and outputs paradigms to look at the 
complexities of networks that were a coincidence of transitional politics. It 
therefore proposes a focus on relational and network analysis of organisations to 
unravel their politics and pattern of influence on service delivery.  
 
 
Key Words: organisational change, power, politics, social antagonism, networks, 
context, organisational design, skills and capacity, inefficiency, service delivery. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
The interest in this research came as a result of many influences. Firstly, issues of 
public service delivery in South Africa have become points of contestation in the 
past five years as government is criticised on poor performance and made to 
account more regarding its bureaucracies. Most of the criticism tends to come 
from the media, which highlights mismanagement, corruption and poor service 
delivery in general criticisms which intensify with every national and local 
election. The elections appear to have created a new culture where a lot of noise is 
made about all the problems that exist. This is usually met with the ruling party’s 
campaigns advocating new approaches and plans to change the system. At the 
conclusion of elections, however, things return to normal as the hype of 
electioneering disappears. In the process, organisations are forgotten until the next 
cycle starts two years later. It is this type of drama that makes one curious to find 
out what is really happening in public organisations outside of election periods, 
and to what extent the problems depicted reflect reality. 
 
Secondly, between 2002 and 2004 a range of departments in the Eastern Cape, 
Free State and KwaZulu-Natal were subjected to a national intervention 
programme (Daily Dispatch, June 19 2003). In the Eastern Cape, which is the area 
of interest for this thesis, such departments included the Eastern Cape Department 
of Education (ECDE). This department had attracted a lot of media attention 
around its maladministration and poor service delivery (Daily Dispatch Online, 12 
September 1997; Human Science Research Council Media Briefs 1998; Daily 
Dispatch Online, 20 April 2001; The Herald Online, 15 July 2004; The Herald 
Online, 12 August 2004 and The Herald Online, 11 March 2007). The 
intervention programme therefore had to address the perceived crisis of poor 
management and inefficiency. For instance, Radebe, Matomela, Moloi, 
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Schoonraad and Sekwati (2004) report refers to the intervention in the Eastern 
Cape (EC) by stating that: 
With the persistent problems in the Eastern Cape regardless of the 
numerous interventions and programmes, the President and the 
Premier agreed to deploy a multi-sectoral team to the province. As a 
result, the Interim Management Team (IMT) was deployed in the 
Eastern Cape with an urgent mandate to assist the Provincial 
Government to deal with the challenges of service delivery, back-
office support and poor discipline and ethics. The overall goal of the 
IMT was to ensure that any service delivery backlogs are addressed 
and to establish sound management (financial, human resource 
performance) and leadership throughout the provincial government 
and the four line-departments, i.e. Education, Health, Roads and 
Public Works and Social Development departments (Radebe et al, 
2004:18).  
 
Of course, this intervention was to identify what was going on and act on it, but it 
remained a point of curiosity to identify why this department was perceived to be 
in crisis. For instance, some of the questions asked were: what contributed to the 
crisis and what were its possible explanations? Juxtaposed with this was an 
interest in the concept of effecting turnarounds in huge bureaucracies. 
Turnarounds were an unfamiliar phenomenon in South African public 
organisations. The questions that came about then were: what was the nature of 
the turnaround and how was it going to be implemented?  As explained in Chapter 
Three, it became impossible to study the turnaround itself because of the politics 
that were attached to it, although other questions remained open for investigation.  
 
Thirdly, one of the challenges of teaching a post-graduate course on 
Organisation Theory at the Graduate School of Public and Development and 
Management (P&DM) at Wits University, is the glaring lack of literature that 
analyse African organisations, especially public organisations. This has been a 
contentious issue in the classes taught by the writer, as students regularly called 
for African interpretations of African bureaucracies. The students’ frustrations 
usually emanated from three sources. Firstly, there was an issue of identity 
where it was assumed that the post-colonial context should demonstrate a clear 
separation from western discourse, and if this is not possible there should at 
least be a dominant application of African scholarship to African problems. To 
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some extent, one could interpret this as part of the broad symbolism of South 
Africa’s broad change and social transformation that saw the first black 
government in power. To some of the students this symbolic shift had to be 
accompanied by the scholarship that understands African contexts as the 
previous apartheid system had relied on western models of public 
administration.  
 
Secondly, there was frustration with the transformation process itself, which 
seemed unending and required new ways of doing things. The point is that 
while at times one could argue that the transformation was gradual in some 
areas, in others it required a clean slate. This put many organisations in a state 
of flux where it became difficult to see the direction of the transformation and 
its end. Thirdly, the pressure to enhance service delivery in all public 
organisations compounded the complexity to understand and manage change. 
This meant that most bureaucracies had to balance their own learning with 
service outputs. At times this was driven more by trial and error rather than 
concrete plans. The point is that such demands were made where other contexts 
lacked the capacity to conceptualise and interprete the reform agenda. With 
such increased pressures to perform, commonsense seemed unreliable in 
providing answers to the inherited apartheid complexities. Hence, the western 
conceptualised models were perceived to be of little or no help in solving the 
complex apartheid organisational problems. The questions that arose from this 
were: what was unique, if anything, about South African public organisations? 
Did they warrant different theories for analysis? It is these types of questions 
that stimulated the interest in studying South African public organisations, and 
specifically how they were handling the transformation process initiated in 
1994.  
 
1.2 The context for public sector change  
Since the first democratic elections in 1994, all public sector organisations in 
South Africa have gone through radical changes as a result of the broader 
public sector reform programme. The reform programme set out to democratise 
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the public service through different values of access, equity, equality and 
redress. These values were meant to eradicate the apartheid practices and 
ideology that had initially permeated all public organisations. Prior to 1994, the 
public service served mainly the apartheid interests. This saw state departments 
acting racist and exclusive based on nationalist party politics and policies that 
propagated segregation. The 1994 change was meant to shift such apartheid 
ideologies and practices to create a civil service that served all South Africans, 
irrespective of their race and background.  
 
Amongst many things, the new democratic state adopted several policies that 
were central to the transformation process. To cite a few examples, these 
included the new Constitution of 1996, the White Paper on the Transformation 
of the Public Service (1997); the White Paper on Affirmative Action (1997) 
and the White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery (1997). 
At the centre of these strategies was the view that public organisations had to 
reflect the vision of a new democratic society characterised by inclusivity and a 
respect for human rights. Hence there was a lot of emphasis to change all the 
systems to be representative of South Africa demographics.  
 
Of course, South Africa’s transformation was not happening in isolation. If 
anything, the 1990s had been characterised by different global economic, 
political and cultural shifts under the umbrella of globalisation. Without getting 
into debates about globalisation, which is a huge area of research on its own, 
one point to pick up on is that in public management this came with some 
questioning of the role of the state and its bureaucracies. Such questioning saw 
the conceptualisation and adoption of different types of state reform in different 
countries. One form of reform that dominated the debates is that of New Public 
Management (NPM). Comments on NPM are made in Chapter Two. Briefly, 
the goal of NPM is to maximise state efficiency. Driven largely by economic 
imperatives, it is associated with the reduction of the state through 
restructuring, downsizing and cuts in expenditure. While NPM has successfully 
introduced the three Es of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness into public 
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reform debates, it is interesting that this discourse has little or no recognition of 
issues such as equity, access and inclusion, which are fundamental to the South 
African context. It would therefore be interesting to find out how various public 
organisations in South Africa are responding to the different calls for service 
delivery, while having to contend with global tendencies of less government, 
cost effectiveness and efficiency. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
The issue is that with these global thoughts on public sector reform in place, it 
became logical for South Africa to participate. Furthermore, it had just de-
legitimised the apartheid government and its systems through the adoption of a 
new Constitution and the national elections. It therefore required an alternative 
governance template to legitimise the new transformation. Amongst the many 
options available to do this, there is much evidence that points to international 
benchmarking and borrowing. One of the areas of such borrowing includes 
some aspects of NPM used in many developed countries like Australia, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Examples 
include the adoption of programmes like the Citizens’ Charter, which has been 
modified as Batho Pele in South Africa, the introduction of performance 
contracts, the appraisal of senior managers through the Senior Executive 
Management programme, a concept initiated in the United States and Australia 
(Ingraham, 1997). The basis is to create a new public service with a different 
orientation away from its apartheid history.  
 
However, twelve years has passed since the initial policy reforms were initiated 
in 1994 and the question is: how far have the South African public sector and 
its bureaucracies transformed? This is, of course, a broad question with a 
number of possible responses.  Taking its cue from the national intervention 
programme, this thesis remains with issues of organisational change and 
efficiency. It explores the conditions that render public organisations inefficient 
and ineffective using the ECDE as a unit of analysis. The key questions of 
interests then are: to what extent has the post-1994 transformational agenda 
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managed to create a sense of common citizenship amongst those that work 
within the ECDE? What cultural practices exist? and how do they influence 
service delivery? Unless there is clarity on these questions, the ECDE remains a 
puzzle to those that wish to maximise its administrative efficiency, something 
that is seemingly elusive already. 
 
1. 3 The research questions 
The central questions asked by this thesis are how and why the ECDE continues to 
be perceived as an inefficient organisation. To support this question, it asks: 
• What was the context for change? This question frames where the change 
started and its key drivers. Generally the literature points to the 
importance of context in organisational change. It is thus important to 
establish the role that context played in shaping the agenda for change. 
• How did the organisation respond? The assumption is that every change 
brings about some level of response. It is important to establish the nature 
of responses that the ECDE undertook and their perceived consequences.  
• What organisational challenges emerged with the change? Already it is 
stated that the organisation has struggled in many ways with the process of 
change, as it is seen to be in a continuous cycle of inefficiency and 
maladministration. It is important therefore to establish the nature of the 
levers that existed which could not support the change. 
 
1.4 Theoretical stance adopted in the study 
Organisational change research is generally the domain of modernist approaches. 
Similarly, this thesis is predominantly influenced by such approaches as it looks 
at how issues of context and internal organisational dynamics influence 
organisational change and efficiency. While there is no particular theory that 
claims dominance in interpreting these issues, one recognise the work of 
institutional theorists like DiMaggio and Powell (1991) which identifies the 
influence of external pressures on organisational change. In this case, such 
pressures are identified as emanating from government policies and regulatory 
frameworks, which shaped the different organisational design logic that the 
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ECDE adopted at different times. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) highlighted the 
significance of inter-organisational dynamics, where one looks at micro issues 
that influence the change. In this case, this informed the understanding about the 
availability and use of capacity and skills to effect change. In public 
administration, this thesis drew inspiration from the work of Frederick Riggs 
(1964) and his theorisation of bureaucracies in developing contexts. His 
conception of the sala type of bureaucracy explains that there are different types 
of bureaucracies. The sala is, of course, not the only type of bureaucracy found in 
developing contexts; rather, it is one of the many types depending on the levels of 
development.  
 
Beyond the mainstream modernist approaches, the thesis extends to include an 
analysis of power, politics and conflict, drawing mainly from postmodernist and 
poststructuralist theories. In the postmodernist approaches, power is seen in a 
relational way. Even this thesis refrains to see power as a unidirectional authority-
based exercise and rather uses it to explore the type of relations that exist and their 
consequences. The key issue communicated here is that, while both contexts and 
internal factors are useful to explain the tangible and observable patterns of 
organisational change, they are insufficient to explain the informal processes that 
organisations experience. This thesis perceives these informal processes as very 
strong ingredients of change in conflictual and interest-driven environments, as is 
the case with the ECDE. Hence it adds the concept of social antagonism, which is 
borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) conflict theory. The concept of social 
antagonism helps to explore the nature of relations that exist as a result of the 
integration of the previous fragmented education systems, created by the apartheid 
system.  
 
1.5 Aims of the study 
The aims of this thesis are to explore the nature of processes and conditions of 
organisational change in the ECDE. It sets out to shed light on why this 
department continues to be riddled with inefficiency and poor service delivery 
eight years after its inception. To unravel this, the thesis specifically: 
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• Explores the theories of organisational change and efficiency with the 
intention of developing a conceptual framework for the study. 
• Identifies the nature of context that informs public sector reform and 
organisational functioning in South Africa, including the ECDE. This is 
partly in recognition of the fact that organisations, especially public 
organisations, are politically driven and thus rely on their context for 
direction. 
• Explores the process of change through different organisational design 
types that emerged with the change and their consequences in shaping the 
organisation. The issue here is that inherent in different design logics are 
particular cultures and practices that inform and influence both individual 
and organisational behaviour. 
• Examines the nature of internal dynamics that exist and their 
consequences for efficiency, with the intention of unravelling both the 
formal and the informal processes of change. 
• Offers insights based on empirical research about organisational change in 
less stable and developing environments. 
 
1.6 Statement of the problem 
Generally, organisational change research has been the domain of developed 
countries and is in its infancy in South Africa. Common to many studies of 
organisational change in developed contexts is the study of the stabilising factors 
of change. There is always the intention of making organisations more 
manageable, predictable and controllable. As a result, the literature tends to be 
highly dominated by managerial conceptions of change, which rely on providing 
frameworks and models of change (Mintzberg and Westley (1992)). Usually this 
is accompanied by the emphasis on what and how to change organisations, with 
very little interrogation of why organisations change in particular ways and not 
others. While what and how questions give a sense that change is manageable and 
controllable, they also reduce its conceptions to a toolkit type of approach. This 
limits the broader understanding of organisational change as a social reality 
phenomenon that is contested and conflictual. Specifically, it hides the 
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complexities, contestations, interests and the politics that are inherent in it. More 
importantly, organisational research rarely ventures outside stable environments 
to look at organisations that are unstable, conflictual and inefficient. As a result, 
there is limited theoretical analysis of such contexts to draw from (Riggs, 1964).  
This lack of study of inefficient organisations, as such, creates the impression that 
organisations are generic entities whose change processes can be predictable and 
controlled, hence similar types of interventions and models are applied in a 
generic way in all organisations, irrespective of context. Because of this gap in the 
organisational change research, this study pursues issues of organisational 
inefficiency. Its purpose is to uncover how inefficient organisations attain such 
status. In the process, it seeks to understand the conditions and processes that 
drive them and why.  
 
Debates on inefficiency are not new in South Africa. They started with the 
Presidential Review Commission Report (PRC) (1998) and Provincial Review 
Reports (PRR) (1997), which examined the performances of the public sector. 
Both reports confirmed serious maladministration and inefficiencies in general. 
Understandably, this was three to four years after the first reforms. The issue, 
though, is that this situation has hardly changed for some departments, 
including the ECDE. Ten years after its inception, the department is still 
struggling with issues of organisational change and inefficiency. Interestingly, 
over this period the department has implemented about 28 different types of 
systems and process interventions including human resource systems, financial, 
filing and personnel systems. The Radebe et al (2004) report, however, stated 
that: 
If the findings of the IMT are anything to go by, the Department of 
Education had scarcely benefited from the numerous interventions 
that it was subjected to over the years. The IMT scarcely differed 
with other previous interventions in terms of its findings, chief of 
which was deep-seated mismanagement within the department in 
general and corporate services in particular (Radebe et al 2004:22).  
 
This state of affairs clearly calls for an interrogation that goes beyond the 
technical exercise. It has to ask: why does the department continue to be 
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characterised by inefficiencies and poor service delivery? Part of this means 
exploring both the external and internal dynamics that are evident in the 
organisation. While institutional theory and other management research talks to 
contextual issues, the general trend is to describe its significance rather than 
provide analysis. It is important, therefore, to explore the nature of context and 
the way it functions, in part to understand the politics that drive it.  
 
Why this is important is based on the argument raised by the thesis itself, which 
posits that organisational change is a complex phenomenon which is 
complicated by the inherited historical and structural arrangements. Similarly, 
the ECDE is seen as embedded in a particular historical context that is riddled 
with different homeland and apartheid politics. Such politics have influenced 
how power relations and decision-making systems and processes occur, and 
they in turn have led to perceived inefficiencies. To study such an organisation 
is to unravel the complexities as they are experienced and lived by the people 
that work with this department. This thesis is therefore an exploration that 
hopes to lift the layer of obfuscation around the department. It is therefore 
necessary to pose the following questions: What is the ECDE’s topography? Is 
it made up of plains and valleys or is it the rough mountain ridges that can 
never be conquered? It is this metaphor that the study carries through its 
journey to discover the complexities of organisational change. 
 
1.7 Thesis statement 
This thesis explores how the ECDE became the embodiment of poor 
organisational performance and inefficiency. To do this, it first looks at the 
contextual interplays that influenced the trajectory of change in South Africa. 
Secondly, it explores the different organisational design logics that the ECDE 
adopted between 1994 and 2002, as a response to the external pressures. Thirdly, 
it looks at issues of capacity and how they function in the ECDE context. It is 
believed that there is an interactive correspondence between context, 
organisational design and human agency in organisations that subsequently 
influence organisational outcomes or efficiency. Efficiency studies tend to focus 
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on quantifiable rather than qualitative factors. This study thus adds value in the 
sense that it looks at the qualitative process of change as experienced in an 
organisational context.  
 
The key argument raised by the thesis is that organisational inefficiencies in the 
ECDE cannot be solely explained by the inputs-outputs type of analysis as the 
linear approaches tend to suggest, nor by theory of development alone, as Riggs 
(1964) proposed. Rather, while all these factors matter in the ECDE, the thesis 
reveals that organisations are by nature politically contested spaces. The key issue 
is that, with the South African transition of 1994, there was an emphasis on 
integrating all members of the society into a unified South Africa. The transition 
put stress on assimilation, compromise and negotiation. This in turn brought in a 
different democratic approach and politics to public sector reform. While the 
thesis does not comment on the significance of this, it explores how the ECDE 
conceptualised and managed its own changes as part of the broader public sector 
reform. To do this, it builds on existing modernist analysis of organisations by 
adopting the analytical lenses of power to capture the external and internal 
interplays of change.  Through such a lens, it reveals that change and inefficiency 
are a consequence of a complex network of factors. Inherent in such complexity is 
contested issues of continuity, discontinuity and survival in a highly resource-
deprived environment.  
 
1.8 Significance of the study 
The exploration of organisational change and inefficiency adds to the debates and 
questions on why certain organisations in South Africa perform more poorly 
when compared to others. It informs practice by identifying what matters in other 
bureaucracies in the broad impetus around improved service delivery. 
Theoretically, it also improves on the assumptions about the nature and type of 
bureaucracies that exist in South Africa as it identifies the complex nature of the 
ECDE. The study should also be of particular value to professionals including 
researchers, lecturers and management consultants working in the field of public 
sector reform, organisational change and change management. This is due to the 
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fact that while public sector reform has been the feature of South African 
transformation for the past twelve years, there is very little qualitative research 
that addresses its progress. As a result, there is still a high reliance on research 
derived from developed countries to inform progress in the local context.  
  
Organisational change tends to be seen as a practice-oriented exercise applied by 
Organisational Development (OD) practitioners. While this may be so, the 
theoretical review has shown that there is still scope for theorisation of 
organisations, especially in developing contexts. The lack of theory based on the 
study of local organisations is seen to impede the development of OD practices. 
As it is, private sector terminology and models currently dominate OD work in 
South Africa. This study thus provides insights that may be useful to those 
wishing to consult in the public sector, as it points to issues that drive the sector. 
Equally, its emphasis on organisational uniqueness challenges the practitioners to 
broaden their tools of intervention to accommodate the different conditions that 
exist. It is presumed that the findings will facilitate their planning and decision-
making when dealing with unique, conflictual and politically-oriented 
organisations, as the study highlights conditions that influence such organisations 
and their experiences of change. 
 
Beyond the practitioners, the findings of this research may provide useful insights 
into various policy departments like the Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA), the National Department of Education, the ECDE and 
other provincial departments undergoing similar experiences on how to manage 
change in diverse contexts. To date, insights of organisational change and 
transformation are largely derived from policy documents. Unfortunately, such 
policy tends to be generic and does not accommodate contextual differences. This 
study therefore brings to the fore issues of provincial and departmental 
uniqueness with the hope that it will help to facilitate better policy 
implementation and change management strategies.  
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1.9 Definition of key concepts 
Organisational Change 
The concept of organisational change is used in this thesis to identify a process of 
change by which an organisation has been able to transform itself conceptually 
and in practical terms from one state of functioning to another newly 
conceptualised way of doing things.   
 
Service Delivery 
The use of the term service delivery is derived from the South African public 
sector debates that look at the organisational capacity to ensure that it delivers the 
required services to the correct constituents within the stipulated time cycles. 
 
Organisational Inefficiency 
Organisational inefficiency is seen as the organisation’s inability to service its 
clientele and constituency as expected.   
 
Context 
Context refers to both the external (national and regional) and internal 
(organisational) contexts.  
 
Organisational Design 
The concept of organisational design is used to encompass both the structural and 
conceptual side of organisational change. It represents more what other 
organisational researchers call a configuration than an organogram type of 
analysis. 
 
Capacity and Skills 
This refers to the knowledge and ability of personnel to contribute effectively to 
the goals of the organisation. Such contribution is seen to be driven by 
information, attitudes and knowledge that may be both tacit and skills-based. 
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1.10 Structure of the thesis  
Chapter One serves as background to the thesis. It provides direction on the aims 
and the rationale for the thesis, and situates the reasons for conducting this study. 
In the process it highlights the key arguments and the questions that drive the 
study. Chapter Two examines existing theoretical underpinnings of organisational 
change in management theories and research. It identifies a three layer type of 
analysis of organisational change that includes context, internal organisational 
dynamics and the individual or group dynamics. Chapter Three narrates the 
methodology that influenced the study, and reflects on the process of conducting 
research in sensitive sites. Chapter Four looks at the role that context played in 
shaping the organisational dynamics of the ECDE. By context is meant both the 
macro provincial and national conditions that directed change after 1994. The 
argument raised is that context as interplay of various forces of power and 
influence has had an influence on the existing conditions of inefficiency and 
dysfunctionality in the ECDE. Chapter Five focuses on a micro-exploration of the 
processes of organisation design as a consequence of the external pressures of 
transformation and reform. It traces how different logics of reorganisation and 
redesign influenced the ECDE in its efficiency and effectiveness. It argues that 
while reorganisation and its side tools of restructuring are championed as good 
managerial strategy for organisational change, they are neither a neutral nor a 
politically free exercise. Rather, they are value-laden and highly political tools 
that can be variously used by different interests to achieve different goals that may 
well exclude efficiency. Chapter Six looks at the internal organisational dynamics 
that perpetuate organisational change inefficiency. It argues that unless the ECDE 
addresses its politics of leadership fragmentation, its leadership instability and 
lack of capacity and skills, it cannot experience any significant cultural shift and 
change nor improve its service delivery to the required levels. The ECDE is found 
to be a complex network of fragmented leadership and fragmented spaces of 
influence. This means that any change in such an environment has to consider the 
nature of these fragmentations – how they are organised, how they function, and 
how they affect skills organisation and co-ordination for use in the organisation. 
Chapter Seven provides concluding thoughts on the empirical findings made. It 
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first provides the summary of the key findings and subsequently draws some 
implications for theory and practice.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the literature on organisational change in management and 
organisational research. Management research covers both the public and private 
sector domains. However, it is important to note that due to the extensive 
literature on organisations, only that considered relevant for this study was 
selected. Most of the literature reviewed is drawn from western countries, as 
organisational theory is a relatively new discipline in management schools, 
especially in developing contexts like South Africa. To cover reasonable ground 
in a highly disjointed field, this review firstly looks at the broad emergence of 
efficiency paradigms in management research covering the early classics to 
contemporary debates. It identifies the key theoretical constructs that emerged 
within the paradigm, its strengths and weaknesses. Secondly, it looks at the 
progress made in the public administration field, including the New Public 
Management. Thirdly, it draws a conceptual framework for this study.  
 
2.2 The management research and efficiency paradigms   
Classical approaches 
The genesis of modern organisational research on change starts with the classical 
approaches of the early twentieth century. This is the period where modernism 
was synonymous with the development of knowledge and the advancement of 
science and technology. Science and technology were the key tools in the 
discovery of ‘neutral’ knowledge, which was largely seen as the ‘truth’. In 
retrospect, this led to the development of positivism, rationalism, reason and logic 
as the basis of scientific inquiry. Such tradition continued even in the study of 
organisations, where ‘maximising efficiency’ became the focus of many 
researchers. As Silverman (1970:2) states, ‘the twentieth century took ‘efficiency’ 
as its problem and concentrated on explaining why organisations were or were not 
satisfying their goals’. Early influential organisationally-related studies at the time 
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included Frederick Taylor’s scientific management in the United States, Henri 
Fayol’s principles of management in France and Max Weber’s analysis of the 
bureaucracy in Germany. For Taylor and Fayol, there was an emphasis on 
identifying specific variables that maximise organisational performance. Some of 
these identifiable variables included: 
the structure and activities of formal, or official, organisation. Issues 
such as the division of work, the establishment of a hierarchy of 
authority, and the span of control were seen to be of the utmost 
importance in the achievement of an effective organisation (Cole, 
1996:2). 
 
Using such variables, they would use organisational experiments and scientific 
rationality to determine what worked. This to some extent led to codified 
principles that were seen as generic and applicable to all organisations, hence the 
development of scientific management principles. Similarly, when working on 
change, change is seen as a definable goal-oriented process with clear stages of 
operation. As Felkins et al (1993:60) explain: 
The focus is on change as an external reality – a measurable, directed 
process with clear causal relationships that can be quantified and 
analysed in a logical, objective way. The function most often is 
prediction, control, and improved efficiency within carefully defined 
limits and focus. Change comes through the manipulation of specific 
variables and conditions in order to achieve a verifiable effect or 
result. In most of the rational and behavioural models of change and 
development, consistency, conformity and order are emphasized more 
than innovation and creativity. There is a strong focus on efficiency 
and effectiveness in the internal organization, precise measurement of 
results, and coordinated stability and growth over time (Felkins, 
Chakiris & Chakiris 1993:60). 
 
Inherently the idea is to always create stability and order in organisations. With 
this in mind, change becomes a ‘thing’ that is a problem and needs to be solved. 
Usually this would follow familiar techniques of isolating specific variables that 
create instability and work on those. These could be leadership, culture, resources 
or any other factor that could be manipulated for efficiency.  
 
While scientific management is still a popular knowledge base and method of 
studying organisational change, it has limitations because of its diagnostic 
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techniques that focus on identifying symptoms to be isolated and treated to make 
the organisational functional. Cole articulates this better: 
Scientific management theories took a purely ‘rational’ approach to 
job design and pursued technical efficiency single-mindedly. The 
result was highly simplified, short-cycle jobs that consisted of 
performing the same activity over and over again. The worker in this 
was relegated to little more than a cog in the machine: he or she was 
studied and analyzed, and prodded in a manner that many found 
increasingly demeaning and unacceptable (Cole 1996:256). 
 
Despite this, scientific management continues to influence organisations and their 
conceptions of change and efficiency. Public administration is but one of the 
many discourses that strongly subscribe to scientific management and its 
rationality.   
 
Systems theory 
Over time, and with the obvious limitations of scientific management theory, 
organisational theory saw the emergence of systems and contingency theories in 
the 1960s. Technical efficiency was now not only seen as a subject of specific 
internal organisational factors but also inclusive of environmental factors. As 
Clegg (1990:51) explains:  
In the systems framework the organisation is conceptualised as having 
a definite boundary through which flow environmental inputs and 
outputs. It strives to maintain this boundary in order to ensure its own 
distinctive survival as an entity. The entity is composed of a number of 
system components which exist together in a state of dynamic 
interdependency, processing throughputs and reflexively monitoring 
their environment through the re-entry of outputs as new inputs, a 
process known as feedback (Clegg 1990:51). 
 
By this time, organisations were being viewed as dynamic entities that functioned 
in a fluid environment. The chain of integration between the inputs, throughputs, 
outputs and the environment thus became fundamental to organisational 
efficiency. Some of the cited research using systems and contingency theories 
include that of the Tavistock and Aston group in the United Kingdom, who work 
with technology and people; Katz and Khan’s study of social systems (1978); 
Harvard researchers Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in the United States and Burns 
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and Stalker (1961) in the United Kingdom who work on structure and the 
environment respectively. These are cited in Cole (1996) and Clegg (1990). One 
person that has popularised systems theory in the last two decades is Peter Senge 
in his work on Learning Organisations. The basis of systems theory is to test the 
relationships between structural, technological and environmental factors. In 
short, one could say that their contribution was the recognition of the environment 
and the acknowledgement of the interconnection between various elements inside 
and outside the organisation.  
 
Contrary to scientific management, which had studied organisations as closed and 
self-sufficient entities whose survival was dependent on their internal 
arrangement, systems theory identified the complexity of relationships that are 
internal and external to the organisations. Organisations were now studied on the 
basis of how well they could adjust and adapt to their environments. Internally, 
such adjustment could be seen through a process of gaining equilibrium. 
Organisations had to strive for equilibrium. This reductionism of the equilibrium 
indirectly promoted order and stability, limiting organisational analysis to 
rationalistic tendencies. There could, of course, be arguments that chaos and 
complexity theory have been improvements to the traditional systems theory. For 
instance, these theories advance path dependency and multi-finality (Warren et al, 
1998). However, one contends that they still operate within the rationalistic 
modes of interpretation of social reality. Organisations are still expected to 
achieve specific identifiable goals and equilibrium but with greater emphasis on 
alignment of systems, structures, personnel and the environment.  
 
Critique of the efficiency paradigms 
Generally, while efficiency paradigms are useful in highlighting specific variables 
that are identifiable and can be changed in an intervention exercise, this limits the 
understanding of the organisation to what is recognisable, thus excluding 
complexity. Their technicist approach to organisations as such forces the 
application of generic, unitary, apolitical, value-free principles in complex and 
differentiated environments, thus eliminating agency, difference and contextual 
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uniqueness. Equally, their reliance on positivist quantitative methods of enquiry 
and the pursuance of absolute truths makes them biased towards certain forms of 
knowledge that discount other organisational realities like interplays of power, 
class, race and gender in organisations.  
 
This applies to systems theory as well, with its adaptational logic and reliance on 
static conceptions of organisations. Silverman’s book on Theory of Organisations 
(TO) (1970) provides a critical departure from systems theory as the discourse of 
organisational analysis in the United Kingdom. Parker and Hassard (1994:xi) 
summarise Silverman’s intention of the book well: 
[Silverman] charts the move from Parsonian functionalism and 
abstracted empiricism to a theory of organizing that was informed by 
the notion of social action. Rather than seeing action as an epi-
phenomenon of system needs, Silverman saw social actors as reflexive 
about their strategies to achieve their own goals within the context of a 
formal organization.  
 
Silverman explains his thinking at the time : 
I was trying to develop a theoretical, non-functionalist basis for 
research. In particular, what I wanted to argue was that we could look 
at organizations analytically without assuming that what happened in 
social life arose from some supposed needs of the social system. What 
I tried to do in TO was to develop a version of organizations, not as 
some version of clear, fixed reality, but as a set of legitimated 
rhetorics. For instance, there seemed little doubt that people often talk 
about the goals of the organisation when they are pursuing their own 
sectional interests. One clever thing to do, when you want to achieve 
something politically, is to pretend that it is in the general interest: and 
one way to do that is to say ‘what I’m doing serves the goal of the 
organisation (Silverman 1994:3). 
 
His interest was to look at ‘the kinds of political strategies used in organisations 
and the ends that people were actually pursuing rather than the officially defined 
ends’ (Silverman 1994:3). He acknowledges the weaknesses of his work at the 
time which he attributes to the lack of a clear theory and lack of clear 
methodology; the dangers of romanticising subjectivism at the expense of 
structural constraints; and his limited view of power. At the time, he conceived 
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power as coercive rather than enabling and only located within the structural 
arrangements of an organisation. 
 
In spite of these limitations Silverman’s work had influenced many other writers 
as evidenced by the Keel conference papers of 1991. The conference was in 
celebration of Silverman’s work and it is this conference that led to the production 
of an additional text called Towards a New Theory of Organizations. The theme 
of the papers largely centres on critique of theory, through the use of sociological 
approaches. What is fundamental is that Silverman’s work is characteristic of the 
1970s where ‘the problematics order’ was challenged and replaced by the 
‘problematics of domination’ where social and political processes are seen as the 
sources through which power is mobilised and legitimated. As Reed (1992:11) 
states: 
Instead of concentrating theoretical and methodological strategies 
around the establishment of causal relationships between 
environmental contingencies and formal organisational designs, the 
focus of the attention shifted to unearthing of the political and 
ideological manipulations which operated behind the public façade of 
stability and order. The power of non-decision-making and 
institutional bias became the orienting themes in organisational 
analysis (Reed, 1992:11). 
 
The research on power and politics in organisations has since expanded and is 
largely located in the post-modernism genre, and will be further examined as the 
review progresses. For now, one has to ask: how did such critiques further the 
debates on organisational change? Undoubtedly, the challenge to systems theory 
and other rational approaches broadened the theoretical field in the United 
Kingdom as Marxist labour process theory and post-structuralism began to 
dominate organisational analysis. This cannot be said of the United States, where 
the literature on change is still dominated by rationalist interpretations of 
organisations.  
 
2.3 Theoretical debates of change and efficiency after the 1980s 
The challenge to systems theory of the 1960s saw an emergence of varied 
theoretical dispositions ranging from adaptational theories such as the ecological 
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approach (Hannan and Freeman, 1984); the cultural approach (Schein, 1985); the 
institutional approach (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott and Meyer, 1991, 
Zucker 1991); resource dependency theory to radical critiques of labour process 
theory (Braverman, 1974) and post-modernism (Clegg, 1990). All these theories 
provide different lenses to understanding organisations. Between these there are 
even different frameworks proposed on how to study organisational change. 
Examples of these come from Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) in the United 
States. They provide a useful summation of the state of the field by the 
millennium. While they do not provide a comprehensive listing of all publications 
in the field, they at least put order in a highly disjointed field. They have 
organised the literature into three themes as in (i) content research (ii) context 
research (iii) process research and (iv) criterion variables as defined by outcomes. 
Within each theme they focus on new propositions on methodology, models, and 
other variables that provide new insights on change.  
 
In summary, content research tends to focus on ‘alternative strategic orientations, 
organizational structures, and performance-incentive systems’ and targets for 
change and their contribution to organizational effectiveness (Armenakis and 
Bedeian, 1999:295). Some of the researchers in this area include Burke-Litwin 
(1992) and Vollman (1996). Context on the other hand focuses on forces and 
conditions that exist in an organization’s external and internal environments. 
These include governmental regulations, technological advances, competition, 
and employees’ experiences with change Barnet and Carroll (1995) and Pettigrew 
(1990). With regard to process research, the fundamental issue is looking at 
‘actions taken to implement changes within organisations and the nature of 
employee responses to such efforts’ (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999:295). Such 
work would include (Lewin, 1947; Judson, 1991; Kotter, 1995). On outcome 
variables, such research targets workers’ commitments, attitudes and reactions to 
change. Some of work in this area includes Kanter (1991). All these 
classifications are indicative of the existing points of focus in a highly diverse 
field. After reviewing the state of organisational change at the millennium, they 
concluded that future research on change should: 
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(a)  evaluate content, contextual and process issues to make predictions about 
how and why organisations change; 
(b)  include longitudinal studies; 
(c)  study behavioural and attitudinal reactions to change; 
(d)  Tap into other cognate areas, especially research that looks at readiness for 
 change in other fields; 
(e) Extend the use of qualitative methods. 
 
Similarly Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron (2001) in the United Kingdom 
advocate for the use of the contextualist approach to organisational change. They 
state that: 
One variant of this contextualist approach was the view that 
theoretically sound and practically useful research on change should 
explore the contexts, content, and process of a change together with 
their interconnections over time (Pettigrew et al, 2001:698). 
 
In the process they suggest a framework that should include the:  
(a)  examination of multiple contexts and levels of analysis in studying 
organisational change;  
(b)  inclusion of time, history, process, and action; 
(c) link between change processes and organisational performance outcomes; 
(d) investigation of international and cross-cultural comparisons in research 
on organisational change; 
(e)  study of receptivity, customisation, sequencing, pace, and episodic versus 
 continuous change processes, and  
(f)  partnership between scholars and practitioners in studying organisational 
change (Pettigrew et al, 2001:697-698). 
 
While such frameworks are interesting, they rely on long-term research, which 
may not always be possible, particularly in developing countries where 
sponsorship for such studies is limited. Mintzberg and Westley (1992) cited in 
Weick and Quinn (1999:362) are cautious of framework-work heavy 
environments as they state that the ‘sheer sprawl of the change literature is a 
continuing challenge to investigators who thrive on frameworks’. But for a study 
 24 
like this the issue lies with the applicability of such frameworks in transitional 
environments. For instance, one could ask: how useful are they in capturing 
complexity in rapid and sometimes chaotic change, although the answer to this 
lies in empirical work beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Nonetheless, amongst the many theories cited earlier, this thesis finds both the 
institutional theory and process research interesting due to their focus on 
employees responses to change and the significance of the internal and the 
external environment. However, the following paragraphs comment on the 
institutional theory due to its current dominance of the field. 
 
Institutional theory and change 
The pioneers of this theory in the United States include people like Meyer and 
Rowan (1991); Powell (1991); DiMaggio and Powell (1991a); DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991b); Scott (1991) and Zucker (1991). Other writers include Friedland 
and Alford (1991); Brint and Karabel (1991); Goddin (1996); Offe (1996) and 
Silverman (1970) in the United Kingdom. However, with the diversity that exists 
in this field, it is important to take heed of Scott’s (1987:493) view as quoted by 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) that ‘the beginning of wisdom in approaching 
institutional theory is to recognize that there is not one but several variants’. 
These variations include old institutionalism, neo-institutionalism and new 
institutionalism where old and neo-institutionalism predominantly look at internal 
and external organisational processes respectively, while new institutionalism 
claims to combine both levels of analysis (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
Because of these theoretical variations, this thesis extrapolates the most accessible 
interpretations of change across different points of analysis.  
 
The environment and change 
Pertinent to institutional theory is the exploration of what stimulates change in 
organisations and what drives organisational configurations and behaviours. For 
most of the researchers, the answer lies in the exogenous consequences of the 
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environment, which is believed to sanction organisational behaviour through 
instruments like legislation and market forces. As Greenwood and Hinings state: 
Institutional theorists declare that regularized organizational 
behaviours are a product of ideas, values, and beliefs that originate 
in the institutional context. To survive, organizations must 
accommodate institutional expectations, even though these 
expectations may have little to do with technical notions of 
performance accomplishment (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996:1023). 
 
What becomes important in the study of organisations and change, therefore, is 
the exploration of the relationship between contexts and organisational sectors or 
fields. Through context, the emphasis is put on levels of convergence 
demonstrated by organisations as a response to the institutional context’s 
pressures or demands for change. Convergence is seen as a way in which 
organisations seek legitimacy and ‘increase their probability of survival’ 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996:1025) by adopting templates of configurations, 
values and belief systems that are presented by the institutional context. Hence 
organisations are seen to have similar cognitive and structural arrangements.  
 
Underpinning most investigations, however, is the establishment of relations 
between homogenisation, variation and legitimacy that exist; of which earlier 
studies have focused on homogenising factors rather than variation. As DiMaggio 
and Powell state: 
… we ask instead why there is such startling homogeneity of 
organizational forms and practices, and we seek to explain 
homogeneity not variation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:64). 
 
Essentially, the researchers using this approach would argue that the structural 
change in organisations is neither driven by competition and the market nor by the 
need for efficiency; instead they advance that   
Bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change occur as 
the result of processes that make organisations more similar without 
necessarily making them more efficient. Bureaucratization and other 
forms of homogenisation emerge, we argue, out of the structuration 
(Giddens, 1979) of organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991:64). 
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How do they see this structuration happening? The same authors see this as 
possible in four ways, namely through (a) an increase in interaction among 
organisations in the field; (b) the emergence of inter-organizational structures of 
domination and patterns of coalition; (c) increased information load and (iv) 
awareness of the common enterprise. For them, it is these forms of structuration 
that lead to homogenisation of the organisational field. The processes of 
homogenisation are seen to be a result of: 
(a) Coercive isomorphism: this is where organisations are seen to change due to 
external pressure that may come from other organisations in the field or due to 
broader societal expectations. These may include government regulations or new 
technologies that are available in the environment. 
(b) Mimetic Processes: in this instance organisations model themselves on other 
successful or legitimate institutions. Modelling may be due to uncertainty and in 
order to seek legitimacy ‘to demonstrate that they are at least trying to improve 
working conditions’. 
(c) Normative pressures: this refers to the degree of professionalisation in the 
organisation. This will come through formal training and education and other 
cognitive bases and it may also be a result of the influence of the broader elite on 
the discourse and trends in the field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:69). 
 
The point with the external focus is to identify the logics that facilitate legitimacy. 
The essential point is that organisations constantly seek legitimacy from their 
context whether they do this through either benchmarking and modelling or 
professionalisation. The consequence of this is that any subsequent organisational 
change though will be conditional on how tightly coupled the organisation is to an 
adopted template. As Greenwood and Hinings explain; ‘the greater the 
embeddeness, the more problematic is the attainment of radical change’ 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996:1028). 
 
Change and internal organisational dynamics  
Beyond the external or exogenous concentration, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) 
advocate for a framework that includes the analysis of intra-organisational or 
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endogenous organisational dynamics, which had been the focus of old 
institutionalists like Selznick (1949). By endogenous dynamics they refer to 
organisational interests, power dependencies, and capacity action. To understand 
how these work, they have framed them under two organising constructs namely 
the precipitating dynamics and the enabling dynamics. Precipitating dynamics 
refer to ‘interests’ and ‘value commitments’ that exist to facilitate change. For 
instance, one may look at the nature of competing interests that exist, their level 
of influence and how are they acted upon. Similarly the idea of value 
commitments establishes levels of convergence and differentiation in the 
organisations which may also determine the extent of change. Some of the areas 
to study in this case include the: 
(a)  Status quo commitment which looks at the extent to which groups are 
committed to the prevailing institutionalised template-in-use; 
(b)  Indifferent commitment where groups are neither committed nor opposed 
to the template-in-use.  
(c)  Competitive commitment is where some groups support the template-in-
use, whereas others prefer an articulated alternative. The articulated 
alternative would have its origins in the institutional context. 
(d)  Reformative commitment is where all groups are opposed to the template-
in-use and prefer an articulated alternative (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996:12).   
 
The assumption is that the study of such commitments will determine the level to 
which the organisation will respond to change.  
 
Working in tandem with this are issues of power and capacity for action which 
form what is known as the enabling dynamics. While neither of the concepts are 
theorised, they are at least seen to play a role in organisational change. For 
instance, the two authors argue that: 
Radical change cannot occur without the organization’s having 
sufficient understanding of the new conceptual destination, its having 
skills and competencies required to function in that new destination, 
and its having that ability to manage how to get to that destination 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996:1039). 
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The issue of skills and capacity is sometimes overlooked by change programmes, 
which assume that change brings automatic cognitive learning to employees. 
There is, furthermore, an assumption made that with the mention of change 
people will simply throw out what they know and have learnt over years to 
accommodate the newly proposed change, which is not always the case.   
 
To further examine these internal organisational dynamics, one may look at Offe 
(1996), who suggests that institutional change is a product of four conditions, 
namely  
(a)  stability  
(b)  founding  
(c)  breakdown, and  
(d)  critique.  
 
By stability, he implies that organisations are influenced by ‘path dependency’, a 
mechanism of ‘identical reproduction’ (Offe, 1996:208). Path dependency 
suggests an historical linkage. The concept of identical reproduction therefore 
means that: 
institutions generate vested interest in their own preservation, 
sometimes to the extent that the endogenous rise of effective 
preferences for an alternative arrangement becomes virtually 
inconceivable (Offe, 1996:208). 
 
Implicit in this is the question of choice, which suggests that organisations may 
not necessarily want to change because inherent in change is a question of vested 
interests and possible power interplays that have a history to them. This then 
brings to the fore the questions of why organisations should change and in whose 
interest they should change? These questions are fundamental, particularly in 
South Africa where transformation is taken as a commodity of great value. What 
tends to escape planners of change, however, is the fact that institutions may be 
more interested in their own preservation than in creating new identities.  
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Offe’s account holds further interest, when he speaks about the identification of 
hidden curricula in institutions that may advance or deter change programmes. He 
explains that inherent within these institutions is the notion that as:  
man-made, but also men institution-made they are socialised by the 
educational or h`idden curriculum’ effect of institutions into the 
values, norms, and rules embodied in them, and as a consequence they 
know, expect and anticipate that institutions can be relied upon and 
reckoned with (Offe, 1996:208). 
 
Reliance has many connotations that include belonging and stability. Implicit in 
this is that they encapsulate some form of identity, hence the reliance. The 
question of the hidden curriculum thus becomes critical because – unless one is 
clear about the nature of organisational grammar that is peculiar to the 
organisation – it may well be difficult to understand the inherent institutional 
dynamics. Perhaps the tricky part to this is how one gets to access that grammar. 
The added value with this is that it looks beyond change as technical efficiency to 
include the embedded political and cultural politics of the organisation. 
 
Another concept that Offe introduces is that of founding  
designed institutions suffer from a dual handicap: They have an 
architect and they are successors. Two conclusions can be drawn from 
the discussion of this dual liability, from which the activity f`ounding’ 
institutions suffers, hyper-rationality and the long arm of the past 
(Offe, 1996:219).  
 
What comes to mind with this concept is that organisational change is usually 
framed within existing frames of reference where the past has little or no 
significance. What is clear here is the issue of continuity and discontinuity. The 
point is that organisations are constantly evolving and as successors they carry 
certain experiences with them. This information may, of course, create a sense of 
pessimism in rationalist planners of change. This is most likely because historical 
pathways are not usually taken into account in planning change, and if anything 
the long arm of the past is sometimes dismissed as irrelevant to the new change. 
Inherent in the concept of hyper-rationality is that planned change or 
interventions have less chance of success because of their inherent rationality, and 
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unless one understands what this means for each organization, it is important to 
recognise that ‘you cannot will what cannot be willed’ (Offe, 1996:215).  
 
Offe’s other two conditions, namely breakdown and critique, are perhaps the most 
common points of reference in change. For instance, it is much easier to advocate 
for change where an organization demonstrates failure to inculcate the norms and 
preferences that condition the loyalty of members. Change may also be as a result 
of the manifestations of failure in performance. Similarly, it is common practice 
that organisations engage in critical enquiry about the validity and the relevance 
of their organisational purposes and outcomes, mainly to instigate institutional 
change and redesign (Offe, 1996). 
 
What is interesting about Offe’s analysis is that he recognises variance in 
organisations. The concept of path dependency presupposes organisational 
uniqueness. Equally, when he advocates that institutions are not built on tabula 
rasa but on memories that have set expectations and assumptions based on 
previous experiences, this creates the space to critically engage with that 
discourse. This is equally a point of emphasis for culturalist theorists, who would 
advocate that changing organisations should be a collaborative effort that takes 
into consideration people’s values and experiences about the organisation, 
(Felkins et al, 1996). However, contrary to culturists who would use such 
experiences as the basis for initiating change in a constructive way, Offe (1996) 
and Patterson (1996) take a more radical approach by suggesting that in the event 
of redesign, such experiences should not be validated. For example, Offe states: 
…The more the situation conforms to a notion of tabula rasa, and the 
more the old routines are explicitly deprived of their validity, the more 
readily and easily will the newly designed set of institutions win the 
loyalty of constituents and unfold its ultimately beneficial functions 
(Offe, 1996:219). 
 
Perhaps this would depend on whether the change needed is transformational or 
adaptational. With radical transformation, one would expect a complete 
eradication of previous practices, while in adaptational situations, it is usually an 
adjustment to identified factors that matters. In the context where radical 
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transformation is necessary, Patterson’s (1983) article on Bureaucratic Change 
through Cultural Revolution is an interesting account of what needs to be taken 
into consideration. Perhaps his use of the military metaphor of war and the battle-
field may be a discouragement for some change researchers, but it does provide a 
radically different view of change for those interested in asserting a new 
organisational ‘grammar’ while getting rid of the ‘hidden curriculum’. The point 
for Patterson is that it is essential to understand that Organisational Development 
types of intervention tend to work better in already well functioning good 
organisations. But if one were to work with dysfunctional organisations it is 
imperative to identify and isolate the ‘skeletal props’ that support their 
dysfunctionality. Part of this is to understand the cultural politics that sustain the 
informal ways of doing things. To change such organisations thus requires a much 
more aggressive intervention technique that attacks the cultures that exist in the 
process of establishing new values. Of course his underlying influences come 
from Sun Tsu (490 BC), Musashi (1644) Clausewitz (1832) and Mao (1936)   
 
Significance of institutional theory  
Generally, while institutional theory has been useful in bringing to the fore the 
relationship between organisations and their environments, it has been criticised 
for its deterministic view of the environment on organisations and for focusing 
mainly on macro institutional developments while excluding variations of local 
contexts (Kim, 2004). More importantly, however, its focus on structuration has 
limited the focus on agency. Instead, organisations are perceived as conformist 
entities lacking initiative and thus eliminating the agency that is considered useful 
for entrepreneurship in management studies.  
 
Despite such criticism, institutional theory has found its way to developing 
countries even though still in the early stages. For instance, Mavima and 
Chackerian (2001) have tried to incorporate theories like institutional theory into 
the study of public administration reforms. Similar to other institutionalists, they 
examine universalism and convergence in public administration, but more 
importantly they argue that the success of administrative reforms is dependent on 
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the existing local institutional arrangements. Their research is based on 
Zimbabwe, where they interviewed a number of interest groups and stakeholders 
involved in reform projects in that country. Unfortunately, the scope and depth of 
the interviews is not well-explained, and this may be problematic for the 
generalisations they make.  
 
Nonetheless, their findings identified critical factors for administrative reforms 
that may escape common-sense. These include: 
(a)  the role of local political and administrative systems and their ability to 
commit to the proposed reforms; 
(b)  the system of governance in operation, how power is dispersed and where 
it is located; 
(c)  the history of institutional development including colonial legacies, the 
influence of liberation movements and the ideology adopted thereafter. A 
significant point is that civil service tends to serve different roles with 
different dispensations. For instance, with the colonial state it was a 
master rather than a servant, and the question is: how does it see itself 
post-independence?;  
(d)  the inherent conflict between formal regulative structures and the informal 
normative and cognitive institutions; 
(e) the extent of corruption and graft; 
(f) balancing structural and technical change with behavioural change; 
(g) understanding how civil servants interpret their role in administration and 
in society (Mavima and Chackerian, 2001:105-107). 
 
What is interesting about Mavima and Chackerian’s (2001) research is that it is 
one of the few that tries to work outside structural adjustment programmes. 
Instead of focusing on the failures of structural adjustment programmes per se, 
they explore factors beyond the implementation of any specific programme. But 
more so, their observations are critical to the study of organisations in developing 
contexts. However, like all other writers using rational perspective they hardly 
question what creates the context and why.      
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Organisational development and change  
Further to the mainstream management theoretical research on change and 
efficiency, is the practice of Organisational Development (OD), largely used by 
management consultants to diagnose or identify points of organisational 
inefficiency. Grieves’ (2000) monograph highlight the origins of OD and the 
various themes that are addressed by the field. Put simply, OD is a process of 
institutional change using external consultants. Fundamentally, it has its roots in 
rationalistic disciplines where organisational problems are diagnosed clinically 
through a process of research and subsequent prescriptions are made on what to 
implement to ‘cure’ the organisational problem.  
 
Even though OD does not engage with theory, it has become a popular discipline 
for organizational change. This may be due to the excessive faith that many 
organisations have in management consultants. More importantly, however, there 
is an assumed overlap between OD and programmed approaches to change such 
as Total Quality Management (TQM) and Business Process Re-engineering 
(BPR). Grieves (2000) highlights the differences between the two as follows: 
the differences are related to methodology, approach taken, the 
analysis of interest groups, the nature of development in terms of 
learning or training, the approach taken to organizational culture, 
promotion of values, the mode of intervention (Grieves, 2000).  
 
Generally OD is traced to the functionalist sociological developments of the 
1960s. It is seen as process-oriented, promoting humanistic values and 
encouraging learning. On the other hand, programmed approaches are seen to be 
top-down and task-focused and associated with the late 1980s downsizing projects 
that many organisations adopted as part of modernisation. Unfortunately, change 
programmes are associated with more failures than successes. This may be due to 
the narrow focus, as Edmonstone explains: 
Change programmes and projects have been seen to be distinctively 
different from the ongoing process of managerial life. “Bracketing-
off”, a problematic aspect of management into a change programme 
with different management arrangements, has been seen as the 
conventional wisdom. Taking place in large bureaucracies, it has 
 34 
embodied and enacted many bureaucratic assumptions. Thus, change 
has proceeded typically in “cascades” from top management to middle 
management, through junior management and then to the workforce. It 
has also focused on “infrastructure” matters (policies, structures and 
systems). Finally, it has assumed (in a good democratic tradition) that 
change is best brought about by “normative/re-educative” strategies, 
whereby individuals (most usually through education and training 
experiences) are encouraged to re-examine their values and attitudes, 
change them and hence modify their behaviour at work (Edmonstone, 
1995:16). 
 
The bottom line is that fundamental to these programmes is the agenda to raise 
productivity in the workplace. While the emphasis could be on efficiency per se, 
there is a whole rhetoric about enhancing organisational performance through 
humanistic and normative terms like value-driven organisations and teamwork. 
Interestingly, these programmes tend to be generic and also claim universal 
successes. Equally, they are usually de-contextualised and de-politicised. 
 
One of the reasons that such programmes have received global coverage is 
because technical rationality has been equally fashionable in the late twentieth 
century. Some developed countries like the United States have led and defined the 
meaning of success through popularised movements like the Excellence 
Movement. Grieves (2000) states that the ‘excellence debate’ was enhanced by 
arguments for innovation and entrepreneurship and the need to think ahead of a 
post-capitalistic society. More importantly, he summarises the influence of the 
Excellence Movement in this way: 
The excellence writers tell a story similar to the script-writers of a 
contemporary soap-opera. This is not intended to demean their work 
but to indicate the mechanics of writing a moving plot. Thus, if the 
central theme is the place of humanity in an organizational drama that 
occurred over the twentieth century and which was essentially 
characterised by the bureaucratic, modern, machine culture, which we 
now refer to as Fordism, then this story is told through a simple plot 
and exemplifies through numerous examples that celebrate the plot, 
(Grieves, 2000:356) 
 
Central to the Excellence Movement plot are customers, innovation, treating 
employees as resources rather than costs, and leadership. Of course, the plot has 
not shifted a great deal in the modern debates. Rather, it still stipulates the 
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absolute truths that are confirmed and validated through research of various 
‘successful’ companies. Subsequently, such truths have become the rhetoric that 
is found in many private and public sector organisations today. Almost all 
organisations that are responding to this global phenomenon of change-speak use 
the common language of downsizing, right-sizing, core business, outsourcing, 
teamwork, strong leadership, vision and mission and managerial accountability. 
The common language does not in any way suggest a common way of doing 
things, although the common thread is that of organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
 
Nevertheless, Edmonstone (1995) finds these programmes limited in the sense 
that they  
(a) focus on global and longer-term issues which are not always perceived to 
be in the short-term “critical path” of the organization; 
(b) rely heavily on educational and training methods which encourage 
representational learning (through acquiring a new management language, 
complete with jargon, catch-phrases, etc) rather than behavioural learning 
(through doing); 
(c)  are driven by an exclusive core group who are seen to be the sole or main 
owners of the problem (and therefore of its solution); 
(d) are often insensitive to the history, culture and priorities with sub-parts of 
the organization; and all this serves to set up a tension between the 
“rhetoric” and the “reality”, (Edmonstone, 1995). 
 
Despite such criticisms, programmes like TQM and BPR are increasingly popular 
in many organisations that undergo change. One explanation for this could be the 
close relationship between the worlds of consulting and management. As 
Burgundy, cited by Grieves (2000:365) states: 
In particular I am concerned that the relationship between the 
managers and consultants has changed. As managers have been forced 
to face increasingly turbulent and capricious business environments, 
they have come to rely, more and more, on the advice and guidance of 
management consultants. For example, we have seen managers turning 
to consultants for advice on issues such as total quality management 
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(TQM) “reengineering” and empowerment, to name but a few. Yet 
with management increasingly reliant on consultants for advice, 
innovation and support, the traditional relationship between power 
broker and messenger seems to have flipped so that nowadays it seems 
that the consultants are the key power brokers in the relations, with the 
result that the messengers now shoot the managers (Burgundy, 
1996:28). 
 
One cannot, of course, discount that such relationships may have positive spin-
offs for many organisations. Usually consultants are expected to have updated 
knowledge on the new trends in the field. However, one cannot escape the fact 
that at times the approaches adopted can be highly mechanistic and recipe-
oriented. This is compounded by the fact that management consultancy is 
presently a highly marketable industry which is ‘accelerated by the growth in the 
number of “recipe books” which, while helpful in demystifying some of the more 
arcane aspects of OD activity, also portray OD as the application of problem-
solving tools and techniques’ (Edmonstone and Havergal, 1995:31) cited in 
Grieves (2000:366). This is a perception that will remain as long as OD is seen as 
synonymous with change programmes. 
 
2.4 Public administration and efficiency 
The discourse of public administration and public management owe their original 
thought on organisational performance to earlier management traditions of 
scientific management. As Kettl (2000) states: 
Following the way charted by Frederick Taylor (1911), analysts sought 
the “one best way” to perform administrative work, a way to seek 
efficiency free from the meddling of partisan politics. As Roscoe 
Martin (1952) described, public administration built a mechanistic 
approach to match the emerging private-sector scientific management 
models…. Advocates of the scientific management approach to public 
administration saw virtually no barrier to its ability to improve 
government – if only government administrators could be protected 
from political meddling (Kettl, 2000: 9).  
 
The issue of the separation of administration from politics has, of course, been an 
issue as early as the 1800s, through public administration pioneers like Woodrow 
Wilson. Central to the debates was the need to maximise efficiency. Hence it was 
important that the bureaucracy had clear principles to adhere to, such as those 
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scientific management principles that were being propagated. Kettl (2000) draws 
some key influences from Wilson’s argument, namely that:  
(a)  it established the importance of the execution of public policy quite apart 
from its creation;  
(b)  it was based on the notion that management could and should do well. In 
this case, government effectiveness was seen as sine qua non to 
professional administration and strong management capacity; and  
(c)  since management was an identified factor, they established a reform 
tradition for the twentieth century.  
 
Looking at the literature to date, one could argue that there has been very little 
shift from these original ideas. Nonetheless, one of the interesting works to 
emerge in this public administration genre came from the development 
administration research. This is the work of Frederick Riggs who developed a 
model ‘particularly designed to illuminate administrative problems in developing 
countries’ (Riggs, 1964:vii). Using an ecological approach, he argued that public 
administration inefficiency in transitional contexts was a result of complex inter-
relationships between cultural values and administrative and economic problems. 
To explain the complexity of such inter-relationships he proposed a theory of 
prismatic societies.  
 
The basis of this theory is that modern societies operate from a fused, prismatic 
and defracted continuum. The fused society is predominantly found in pre-
modernised traditional settings, where the traditional structures like that of kings 
and chiefs tend to be responsible for governance. The prismatic society is largely 
defined as a society in transition, where both the traditional and modern modes of 
governance and administration overlap in a heterogeneous way. It is this overlap 
that tends to complicate the scenario for administration, as western traditional 
administrative techniques are not geared for dualistic tendencies. In defracted 
societies, government administration is taken as the norm and there is a clear 
separation of roles and structures that serve multiple interests. This situation is 
also advanced by the level and extent of modernisation. 
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Riggs’ (1964) analysis for transitional society is based on the prismatic model, 
which is the intermediate phase where most post-colonial countries tend to 
operate. As societies, these countries are dealing with various dualisms like an 
urban and rural divide; tribal- and constitution-based governance; traditional 
administration systems; and legalistic and judiciary-based systems. While Riggs 
does not suggest an automatic progression or graduation from one state to 
another, his view is that societies can remain prismatic and may not necessarily 
move to another stage: 
The prismatic experience is not a synthesis based on the dialectical 
model, nor a stage on a moving belt advancing from tradition to 
modernist; rather, it is an enduring dilemma for peoples trapped 
between two different worlds, a trap that generates its own dynamics, 
its own inescapable logic and onerous contradictions. Although the 
results may be lamentable, they can also be attractive. The traditional 
norms or structures that persist may be humane and situationally 
sensitive, whereas the externally imposed standards may be more 
efficient but arbitrary and rude. The prismatic model strives for a 
synergy composed of these contradictory elements. They may not be 
reconciled, however. Instead, they may be held together in perpetual 
tension (Riggs, 1964:15).      
 
Riggs thus focuses on the consequences of such contradictions and their 
implications for administration. He then analyses the factors that facilitate public 
administration inefficiencies in prismatic contexts. Contrary to technical models 
that assume bureaucracy as a given tool for administration, he questions the role 
and usefulness of bureaucracy in transitional and post-colonial contexts. His basic 
premise is that bureaucracy in developing contexts is flawed and perhaps does not 
exist, and explains that: 
…it is one thing to talk about the creation of such systems and how 
they might work, and quite a different thing to assume that they do 
exist in actual societies. It is dangerous to act as though their existence 
has been established… But neither can we assume that the effective 
existence in these societies of the formal market and the bureaucracy, 
however we might regard them as necessary or desirable, despite the 
apparent willingness of modernizing elites to adopt such institutions 
by fiat. We must first find out what kind of administrative practices 
actually prevail (Riggs, 1964:9-10). 
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The issue here is that bureaucracies are not an automatic feature of administration 
as their existence is part of the broader social progress. Hence he proposes an 
exploration of both the context and the administration. The assumption is that the 
progress between the two happens in tandem. This may be contentious to those 
that see management theory, particularly change management, as generic and 
applicable to all contexts. But what is interesting with Riggs’ work is that he 
provides an alternative theoretical understanding about bureaucracies in 
transitional societies. His theory is centred on four propositions.  
 
Proposition 1: the weight of bureaucratic power varies inversely with 
administrative efficiency. The issue here is the extent to which the bureaucracy 
exercises power in the organisation. It is therefore important to identify (i) the 
locus of power, (ii) the sanctions available and (iii) the extent to which 
bureaucrats determine their own goals, which he calls bureaucratism. He sees 
bureaucratism as a high contributor to dysfunctional administration.  
 
Proposition 2: prismatic structures reinforce bureaucratic prodigality. A number 
of issues need to be explored in this case, namely (a) the role of social status and 
personal influence in determining the benefits of service delivery; (b) the way the 
scale of benefits works. Are they based on hierarchy or performance?; (c) the 
extent to which power and influence determines budgets approval; and (d) the 
nature of the relationship between the bureaucrats and their clientele. Riggs 
contends that where such a relationship is too structured it promotes violation of 
rules rather than the execution of law. For example, administrators would devise 
procedural delays and technical obstructions to service delivery to promote the 
payment of bribes. 
 
Proposition 3: Bureaucratism and elite recruitment promote administration 
prodigality. The key issue here is nepotism. Some of the areas providing clues to 
this are: (a) recruitment which is usually not about recruitment procedures but 
more about who gets recruited. Riggs contends that recruitments in prismatic 
conditions serve loyalty purposes to superiors and/or are for possible future 
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political mobility to elite status; (b) the formation of clects, which he describes as 
a branch, sector, or stratum of a bureaucracy, whose members are recruited from a 
given community to safeguard the interest of that particular community. To quote 
directly from Riggs (1964) he states that: 
The clect is a surrogate family; its members treat each other as they 
would relatives. The leader of the clect is regarded as a father 
substitute. Sala men are treated like adopted children. Others suitably 
take the role of courtesy uncles and godparents. To discipline or 
discharge an incompetent sala official is, therefore, like disinheriting 
an erring son; it may be better done in extreme cases, but is normally 
avoided at all costs – better to put up with him and conceal his 
shortcomings than to expose the clect to a traumatic experience of 
cutting one of its members (Riggs, 1964:276). 
 
In tandem with the formation of clects is an issue of (c) interagency co-ordination, 
power struggles and turf protectionism. His view is that bureaucratic salas are 
likely to fail, largely due to power struggles and turf protectionism. 
 
Proposition 4: Poly-normativism and dissensus in the Sala results in 
administrative inefficiency.  The issue here is about the lack of ground rules for 
operation. Riggs contends that in the sala model, there is very little agreement 
about ground rules and norms for operation. Instead, ‘new set of norms, political 
formulas, and myths, based on foreign experience, are superimposed on the social 
order which continues to adhere, in large measure, to older traditional norms, 
formulas and myths’ (Riggs, 1964:277). The implications of this are dissensus, 
polynormativism, and normlessness. In such situations the bureau: 
abandons attempts to reform and seeks rather to cope with situations as 
they arise, pulling wires, paying what must be paid, and hoping to 
survive somehow; one seeks, if possible, to gain access to some of the 
spoils of the system. Objectivity and truth dissolve, leaving the victim 
with no option but to judge that validity of purported information by 
the status of its sources, not by its basic truth and consistency (Riggs, 
1964:279).  
 
Of course, as Riggs (1964) indicates, this state of affairs does not mean that 
decisions are not made and that power ceases to exist. Rather, as a consequence of 
this, condition outputs suffer. Another feature to normlessness and dissensus is 
the issue of disengagement of authority and control. His view is that power in the 
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sala is neither centralised nor localised but rather highly equivocal and dispersed 
in the organisation. The lack of delegation thus is due to the inability to make 
subordinates accountable, as the sanctions are poor or non-existent. Riggs’ view is 
that efficient administration requires a balance of power so that it is neither highly 
concentrated or nor highly dispersed. For example, he states that high 
concentration contributes to poor communication and decision-making. As he 
explains: 
A few individuals at the apex of the pyramid find themselves 
challenged to make quickly a range of decisions, which would require 
superhuman capabilities. The result is necessarily either 
procrastination and long delays, or inept and inadequate policies. But 
extreme dispersal of power is equally dysfunctional since it reduces 
the capacity of a bureaucracy to reach agreement on basic policies and 
to insist on their implementation (Riggs, 1964:282). 
 
From this it sounds logical that any organisation that wishes to be effective would 
ensure this balance of power. In reality, though, this is difficult to achieve, 
especially where self-interests dominate. Overall then, while public management 
in general tries to explain how bureaucracies work, Riggs’ work provides an 
interesting illumination into why public organisations in different contexts 
perform differently. To some extent this removes the myth of the existence of 
only a single type of bureaucracy, namely the Weberian bureaucracy, as he 
introduces the sala type of bureaucracy. The inverse of this is that his work can be 
deemed to be separationist and pessimistic of other contexts, especially  
developing countries whose administration tends to be associated with chaos. 
Despite that, the theory of prismatic societies provides an interesting analytical 
lens to administrative inefficiency. 
 
Public management after the 1980s 
Shifting to public management, one can argue that while management theories 
and organisational theory in particular have seen a plethora of theories that 
emerged in the 1970s, public administration also saw its efficiency message 
coming full circle with the introduction of New Public Management (NPM). NPM 
has its origins in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. To 
date, it has found its way into some European countries through the Organisation 
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for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Developing countries are 
also adopting NPM to transform their public service, for example, some Asian 
countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and some African countries which 
include South Africa. It may be argued that developing countries have less choice 
in adopting this tool, as many of the reforms in such countries are donor-driven. 
Whatever the reasons, NPM is now a major tool for institutional transformation 
and institutional reform.  
 
To understand its thesis, one has to trace its links with other global discourses. At 
a global political and economic level, it is associated with neo-liberal market 
ideology that has changed the nature and the role of the state. There has been a 
definite shift from state welfarism to a market-oriented state in developed 
countries. The new state is about public choice and entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship is synonymous with a whole process of re-organising, 
restructuring and re-engineering governments. The consequences of this have 
included the development of a new technically-oriented, efficiency-driven 
vocabulary of downsizing, de-layering and de-bureaucratisation of public sector 
organisations.  
 
The knowledge tools for the advancement of this type of management have been 
popularised in the United States by consultants like Osborne and Gaebler (1992) 
who coined the concept of reinventing government. Reinventing government is 
about propositions to create entrepreneurial governments, but more importantly, it 
is also a suggested tool for the 
fundamental transformation of public systems and organizations to 
create dramatic increases in their effectiveness, efficiency, 
adaptability, and capacity to innovate (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997:13, 
cited in Downes, 1998:8).  
 
Since then, there have been various interpretations of how this could happen. For 
instance, Osborne and Gaeblers’ (1992) text on Banishing Bureaucracy identifies 
at least ten characteristics of such a government. Osborne and Plastrik (1997) 
identify at least ‘90 tools reinventors can use’ to change their bureaucracies 
(Downes, 1998:2). The significance of this work has been the development and 
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adoption of tools like the National Performance Review (NPR), which was to 
enhance bureaucratic performance and accountability in the United States. 
Similarly, other countries have had reviews and commissions set up to investigate 
their state of government. As a result, there are a number of projects that have 
been adopted in a range of other countries like the United Kingdom, which 
adopted programmes like the Next Step and Citizens’ Charter as the basis for 
government reform. 
 
In academic debates it is seen as a product of public policy schools. It emerged at 
the time when both the fields of public management and public administration:  
have often been lured into intellectual cul-de-sacs; public management 
into a psycho babble of leadership without authority, public 
administration into the original sin of separating administration and 
politics (Lynn, 1998:7). 
 
NPM thus concretised authority in public management. Kettl (2000:11) believes it 
has played a much more significant role, which is that of providing a ‘critique of 
traditional administrative practice, which was not providing alternatives to 
traditional public administration theory and practice’. This is, of course, 
contestable, as NPM neither questions nor provides theoretical analysis of 
existing administrative thought. Rather, one can argue that all it does is to provide 
a revisionist logic that accentuates the superiority of management in 
organisations.  
 
Over the years it has taken different shapes and forms as demonstrated in the 
models by Ferlie et al, (1996) quoted in Quinlivan and Schon (2002). These 
models demonstrate the key themes of NPM. 
 
Model 1 is the ‘efficiency drive’ of the mid-1980s, which imported models from 
the private sector. 
Model 2 is termed downsizing and decentralisation. The key point of this is 
management by contracts. 
Model 3 is termed in ‘Search of Excellence’ and is closely linked to Peters’ and 
Waterman’s (1981) work derived from the book with the same title. 
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Model 4 is ‘Public Service Orientation’. It strives to fuse private and public 
management ideas, whilst preserving a distinct public service mission. There is an 
emphasis on public values of participation and accountability.  
 
These models are incremental rather than distinctive, and one would expect that 
different countries extrapolate from different models at different times, or else 
combine them as they see fit.  
 
An additional factor is that NPM is packaged and marketed well. The language of 
technical efficiency and effectiveness is appealing to many organisations. There 
are very few people, if any, that want an association with chaotic and crisis-ridden 
organisations. It is thus an instant hit with those that want to be seen to be 
increasing organisational efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
NPM also has unique attributes inherent in its programmes. Some of the 
identifiable features include: 
(a) Simplicity.  NPM is devoid of the abstract theoretical debate and its focus is on 
management. Its slogan as indicated earlier is ‘let the managers manage’. In the 
process, it provides direction or prescriptions, either through principles or some 
‘to do’ list. 
(b) Success orientation. Successful organisations and successful leaders (mostly 
in business) are used as examples to be emulated. An association with successful 
leaders is definitely a psychological boost for those that walk the path. 
(c) Urgency of performance. It creates a sense of urgency through words like 
outcomes, speed, results, performance, entrepreneurship and basis for action.  
(d) Cost-cutting. Where there has been doubt about government policies on 
expenditure, it clearly demarcates boundaries about what is worth spending on 
and cutting out. 
(e) Commercialisation. It is beautifully packaged in the sense that it advances 
notions of quality and innovation through modern technology. There is a sense of 
creating a ‘state-of-the-art’ government that matches successful  enterprises. 
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Justifiable or not, it is these kinds of characteristics that make NPM appealing for 
managers. It gives a sense of control, authority, order and a clear direction on 
what works in organisations. Besides, it concretises management for those that are 
looking for practical toolbox kits on managing in the public sector.  
 
A transcending factor is that within the logic of NPM institutional change, sine 
qua non is applied to the following key principles: 
(a)  Results over process; 
(b)  Focus on outputs; 
(c)  Steering rather than rowing; 
(d)  Empowering rather than serving; and 
(e)  Earning rather than spending, (Argyriades, 2002:11). 
 
This directs the advancement of entrepreneurship in all sectors of public 
management, whether hospitals, universities, schools or churches. To date, many 
organisations have had to contend with all the jargon of management by 
objectives (MBO), strategic planning, the balanced score-card and other similar 
tools so that they can prove to themselves they are in control and managing 
efficiently and effectively.  
 
There are few public organisations that have not experimented with NPM. Many 
organisations are using business models to benchmark their designs, systems, 
structures and processes. There is now more emphasis on managerial excellence 
and performance, usually exercised through performance appraisal systems. 
Equally public organisations are expected to design strategic systems that are 
results-oriented and measurable. Furthermore, organisational efficiency has meant 
de-bureaucratisation and delayering that has seen a lot of employee downsizing 
and privatisation of non-core activities in favour of those that are manageable and 
relevant to ‘customers’. The connecting thread in all this is managerialism which 
is nothing else but a philosophy that puts faith in managers. Management is thus 
modelled on the principles of business, which is perceived as being superior to 
public management. Some of the commentators on managerialism include 
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Argyriades (2002); Maor (1999); Paine (1999); Reed (1999); Pollitt (1993; 1998) 
and Yeatman (1993).   
 
There are, naturally, critics of this approach which include Argyriades (2002); 
Paine (1999) and Pollitt (1993). In the main, they are critical of the fact that NPM 
is devoid of a theoretical discourse. It is apolitical and a contextual. 
Fundamentally, it is seen to marginalise debates on democracy and undermines 
issues of inclusion and equity through its over-emphasis on the 3E’s of 
Efficiency, Economy and Effectiveness. To conclude, one could say that NPM is 
just an example of how conceptions of administrative efficiency have evolved in 
organisational studies. It is thus another tool based within the rationalistic logic 
that attempts to put order into organisations by making sure that managers are in 
authority and in control.  
 
Public management and organisational change in developing contexts  
The review of the literature in developing countries shows very little theorisation 
of organisational change. There is, in fact, a glaring lack of theorisation about 
public sector organisations in general. Instead many writers tend to take a critical 
stance in their evaluation of public sector developments and reforms. Such a 
critical stance is largely due to experiences of development failures in Third 
World and developing countries, which have been initiated through structural 
adjustment programmes by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
 
The tendency then is to advance critical debates about structural adjustment 
programmes and their failures, rather than theory. For instance, Mukandala (1992) 
identifies at least three camps that attempt to analyse these failures in African 
contexts. These are the (i) IMF school which attributes failures to wrong policy 
choices and ineffective and inefficient post-colonial governments; (ii) the 
indigenists who base their line of analysis on conditions external to developing 
countries and which constrain effective development and (iii) the neo-Marxists 
who attribute the problems to the class in power, where African governments are 
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seen to be pursuing their own private class interests rather the interests of the 
masses. Unfortunately, most of these theories do not address organisational issues 
directly, much less questions of change.  
 
In cases where one could draw inferences about organisational change, there is 
very little deviation from western conceptions of organisations. Organisations are 
described and analysed using rational tendencies. As a result, as with 
organisations in the West, there is a preoccupation with maximising their 
efficiencies and effectiveness. For instance, there is a strong belief that current 
public sector inefficiencies are due to archaic structures and processes, hence 
there is a call to speed up their modernisation. Modernisation in this case ranges 
from the adoption of new human resources techniques, new operational systems 
and new technology. Much of the modernisation agenda is, of course, based on 
borrowed models and technologies from the developed Western countries.  
 
Within the South African context, one could argue that scientific management 
dominated public administration thoughts and research before 1994. A partial 
diversion from this came with the Mount Grace conference of 1992 where 
different scholars reviewed the future of the field. While ‘Mount Grace’ became 
an inspirational shift towards public management and policy discourses, there is 
very little research that challenges and develops theory in the field. This applies to 
organisational change literature as well. In fact, public management 
organisational change research is still in its infancy in South Africa. Even so, this 
also applies modernist lenses of analysis and remains descriptive. 
 
2.5 The general critique of the rationalist paradigms  
The review so far has been dominated by research within the rationalist approach, 
hence the focus was on different factors presumed to influence change. While this 
is useful, the reliance on factors and variables of change of efficiency has limited 
the broad theorisation of organisations. This has resulted in such studies being 
criticised as being apolitical, atheoretical and for ignoring contextual differences. 
Most of these critiques come from the post-modernist genre. Some of the leading 
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writers include scholars like Clegg (1990); Hassard and Parker (1993); Reed 
(1993) and Burrell (1998).  
 
The basis of post-modern conceptions of organisations is to locate organisational 
dynamics within the broader social theory paradigms. While they do not write on 
change per se, their starting point follows on the sociological pathways of Weber. 
However, unlike rationalist interpretations, they use sociological theories to 
provide analytical thoughts of social reality, including that of organisations. In the 
process they reject the universalist nature of knowledge offered by the scientific 
management and other functionalist perspectives. While not discounting the 
achievements of functionalism in organisations as depicted in Morgan (1993), 
they reject the notions of order control and stability, of objective and absolute 
truths inherent in this tradition. Instead, they pursue the notion that knowledge is 
contestable and loaded with values power and politics. This is why, from the 
1970s onwards, they have been arguing for the opening up of the management 
and organisational theory field to enhance pluralism. To date, various theoretical 
paradigms are being incorporated into organisational analysis.  
 
Despite the fact that post-modernism does not address institutional change, the 
post-modernist trend has brought some levers for analysis in the organisational 
change discourse. Some of these include the introduction of a reflexive approach 
to knowledge. They also call for the deconstruction of theory and the 
deconstruction of the text. This is to enhance the critical examination of contexts, 
their origins, their underlying assumptions, beliefs and means of domination. 
Implicit in domination are issues of power and politics, which are rarely 
acknowledged in adaptational and rational theories. Their approach to power thus 
tends to explore different structural and systemic conditions that facilitate unequal 
power relations. The dominant approach is to study different forms of 
organisational domination, subjugation and resistance inherent in the managerial 
discourses used in organisations (McKinlay & Starkley, 1998).    
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One must, of course, be aware that even post-modernists can see power in a 
‘particular dimension of an imbalanced relationship between two parties’ 
(Leflaive, 1996:2). Power in this case subsumes notions of hierarchy, dominance 
and obedience. For example, feminist writers would write on the domination of 
masculinity in modernist paradigms. But the most referred definition of power 
comes from Michel Foucault (see Phillip, 1985). Foucault’s conception of power 
explores power as both disciplinary and relational. It is seen as disciplinary in the 
sense that it tends to be invested in institutions that implement particular codes of 
conduct like prisons, hospitals, schools and courts of law. It is also disciplinary in 
the sense that it can assume a surveillance position to those inside the 
organisation. To explain this, Foucault uses the metaphor of the prisons and the 
panoptican where individuals automatically discipline themselves through 
different organisational surveillance techniques like performance appraisal 
(Findlay & Newton, 1998) as if they were under the gaze of the panoptican. The 
point is that the panoptican, by its nature, monitors movement and subject order 
and control in a symbolic way.  
 
Juxtaposed to the disciplinary power of the panoptican is the notion of relational 
power (see Foucault cited in Phillip, 1985). Power is seen to have multiple-
sources and is not located at a specific point. It is rather dispersed, unstable and 
reversible. As Phillip (1985:74) explains, ‘power operates to constrain or 
otherwise direct action in areas where there are a number of possible courses of 
action open to the agents in question’. This means that while power is forceful so 
is its opposite, namely resistance. Resistance as such is power in reverse. This 
thesis does not look at resistance. The critical issue to take from post-modernists 
is to recognise that power has agency due to its relational nature and can be used 
in different ways in the organisation. Instead of assuming a hierarchical, top-down 
and authority-based approach to power, it is seen as dispersed and accessible at 
different points in the organisation. Indirectly, this means power can also be 
organised differently depending on the interests at play. What comes to mind here 
are issues of networks and coalitions in organisations. Post-modern research does 
not look at group activities as they focus on individual patterns of self-
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mobilisation. Despite that, it is argued here that such analysis of power could be 
extended to include groups to understand how they use power and why.   
 
Despite the intellectually stimulating nature of post-modern research, it is still 
outside mainstream debates, which remain dominated by rational and behavioural 
approaches due to the dominance of the field by business schools (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 2002). Besides, while others see the critiques provided by post-
modern research as its strength, some see this as a weakness due to their anti-
foundational stance on knowledge. Their relative conceptions of knowledge are 
seen to promote what Scheurich (1997) calls ‘might makes right’. Post-
modernism is also assumed to undermine emancipatory struggles and 
epistemologies. As Scheurich states: 
those who make this critique… argue that relativism undermines 
factual or empirical determinations that social groups, such as women 
or people of colour, are oppressed or have less power or are exploited 
(Scheurich, 1997:37).  
 
Again, such criticism is largely based on how different people view power. The 
harshest criticism in the same line of thought comes from Donaldson (1994). He 
argues that the critiques expounded by post-modernism and its sister theories like 
radical structuralism and radical humanism have nearly destroyed the school of 
positivist organisational research: 
Each author writes an essay which is mainly a critique of positivist, 
functionalist organization critique (often largely the same critique) and 
calls in sketchy terms for some bold new research programme which 
largely never accentuates in terms of solid empirical research. Yet this 
hardly seems to matter to the critical organization theorist for whom 
the important point is the doing of critique (Donaldson, 1994:192). 
 
While advocating for what he calls a liberal revolution in organisational theory, 
he labels post-modern analysis of organisations as part of the illiberal political 
agenda that is theoretical and ideological. In his view, this does not benefit 
organisational theory and organisational analysis in contemporary society (1994): 
For organisational theory to embrace post-modernism, as if it is a new 
theoretical system with an important message, it is to reveal itself as a 
dullard who cannot see the joke. Post-modernism is therefore bankrupt as an 
avenue of new organisation theory (Donaldson, 1994: 94). 
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Donaldson’s comments must, of course, be taken in context as coincidentally his 
paper is also pushing for a particular ideology.  
 
Despite such criticism, post-modern research adds valuable contributions to 
organisational change discourses. Organisational change studies, especially those 
that advance rational tendencies, have failed to challenge themselves to advance 
knowledge beyond the obvious. Post-modernism as a result brings a refreshing 
analysis into the stalemate of the modernist trajectory. This is despite the fact that 
it does not put forward new theories of social reality, but its rejection of absolute 
truths makes it critical to review knowledge in different ways. Equally, its call for 
reflexivity makes it impossible to take knowledge for granted, but to rather 
subject it to critical engagement like any construct embedded in the social realm. 
 
2.6 Conceptual framework for the study 
This review has shown attempts at conceptions of institutional change. While 
some of the theoretical discourses do not address change directly, they have 
nevertheless shown how organisational efficiency has become a dominant theme 
in organisational studies. Starting with the earlier theories of scientific 
management, there has been very little progress towards the development of 
alternative theories outside the philosophy of modernism and its rationality. As a 
result, the research using these theoretical foundations is driven by empiricism, 
where findings are usually generalised in a prescriptive way. Greenwood and 
Hinings (2002) are naturally critical of this, as they see such approaches as 
responsible for the reduction of organisational analysis as research becomes 
preoccupied with managerial technologies of effectiveness and efficiency. This 
they attribute to the dominance of economists and functionalist paradigms located 
in most business schools. Despite the limitations of the modernist paradigms, this 
study finds a number of concepts that are useful for this research. These are (a) 
context or environment; (b) intra-organisational dynamics; and (c) power and 
politics.   
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Context  
From systems theory to institutional theory, one has identified the significance of 
context and the environment on organisations For instance, while systems theory 
sees the environment as something to adapt to, institutional theory looks at how 
and why organisational fields respond they way they do to their environments. 
While neither of the theories questions the environment, institutional theory does 
at least identify some agency in it. It is this recognition of agency in the 
environment that is particularly useful in this study. Due to the nature of the 
study, which looks at a single case study, it is not possible to make comparisons 
across fields of education departments, as institutional theorists do. Instead, this 
study will examine the role the environment played in shaping the ECDE as a 
single entity. Of importance is to identify how the department responded to the 
contextual shifts informed by the social and political transformation agenda. To 
do this, one has to look at both the macro- and micro-organisational responses. By 
macro-responses is meant responses due to external conditions like the regulatory 
frameworks. Micro-responses refer to the internal structural and cultural shifts 
that were due to contextual influences.  
 
Internal organisational dynamics  
Management research and organisational change literature tends to focus on the 
internal processes and dynamics. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) call these intra-
organisational dynamics or endogenous organisational dynamics. Depending on 
the theoretical position one takes, these dynamics many include specific tangible 
variables like resources, culture and leadership, as well as the less tangible factors 
like culture, commitment, capacity for action, power and politics. Of these factors, 
the less tangible tend to receive less attention, except for culture, which has grown 
into an extensive field on its own. This study focuses on the less tangible factors 
of change as it examines the processes that influenced the ECDE journey of 
change. For analytical purposes, it extrapolates from different management 
theories, especially Riggs’ theory of the sala type of bureaucracy. As a co-
existence to prismatic and developing societies, Riggs (1964) associates sala 
bureaucracies with chaos rather than order because of the broader lack of 
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institutional rules to govern them. This study does not intend to convey a message 
of chaos but rather wishes to explore internal responses as part of the complexity 
of the transformation process in a transitional environment. The internal 
organisational dynamics thus reflect on internal challenges of skills and capacity 
for action (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) to include the nature of relations that 
exist.  
 
Power and politics  
The criticism of management literature for its neglect of power and politics has 
seen these two concepts steadily being infused into the debates. The literature 
indicates, however, that there is still very little interrogation of what these 
concepts mean and how they are used in organisations as management literature 
has generally treated them in a pessimistic way. Power and politics were seen as 
unnecessary in management due to the perceived negativity they are assumed to 
hold. However, post-modern research has shown their significance in 
organisations. While post-modernists provide interesting ways to examine power 
in organisations, their approach as indicated earlier tends to be dominated by 
critique of structural conditions through deconstruction. While this is useful in 
many ways, this study uses power and politics as exploratory lenses. For instance, 
while using the same key themes of context and intra-organisational dynamics, it 
examines how power and politics are used in the organisation to support or reject 
change and its consequences.  
 
The point pursued here is that change is a contested phenomenon and riddled with 
conflict because of the multiple interests that are usually involved. It is assumed, 
therefore, that the analysis of politics and power will accentuate the understanding 
of how the ECDE functions in general. This makes power and politics the heart of 
a diagnosis of the change process. Without any particular method prescribed on 
how to study these two phenomena, their use remains exploratory throughout the 
thesis.  
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Social antagonism 
While power and politics provide a good barometer of any organisation, other 
conceptual tools can enhance their strengths. Since this study is looking at change 
in a complex conflictual and fragmented setting, it found it useful to bring in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of social antagonism. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) are 
popularly used in political theory. The basis of social antagonism is to depict the 
conflicts inherent in change. Norval and Stavrakakis provide a useful 
simplification of this concept, which is otherwise a dense interpretation from 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985), who state that: 
Social antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to attain 
fully their identity. Thus, an antagonism is seen to occur when ‘the 
presence of [an] “Other” prevents me from being totally myself. The 
relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of 
their constitution. This blockage of identity is a mutual experience for 
both the antagonising force and the force that is being antagonised: 
‘Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. 
But, nor is the force that antagonises me such a presence: its objective 
being is a symbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed 
by a plurality of meanings which prevent it being fixed as full 
positivity (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000:10). 
 
Equally, it is the view of this thesis that with the plural nature of identities that 
exist in the EC context, change would not be an easy process. Instead it is seen to 
be characterised by conflict as different groups, previously racially and ethnically 
categorised by apartheid, try to assert themselves in the new dispensation of 
change. The point is that change in this environment, as in many parts of South 
Africa, was largely dominated by negotiated settlements. This resulted in the 
creation of representative bureaucracies. This is different from mergers, which 
usually are a result of takeover or assimilation of one company by the other. 
Contrary to this, representative bureaucracies are built on consensus and 
consultation. Research on representative democracy and representative 
bureaucracies is wide (Dresang, 1974; Riccucci and Saidel, 1997; Kelly, 1998; 
Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999). The underlying principle from this literature 
is that representative bureaucracies ensure that different community interests are 
protected and given voice, whether they are racially, ethnically, class, gender or 
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geographically based. It thus becomes a measure of equal opportunity and access 
to decision-making (Riccucci and Saidel, 1997).  
 
Unfortunately, inherent in this consensus-seeking process are conflicts and battles 
that are based on perceived differences of the ‘imaginary’ identities (Howarth, 
Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000:15). Depending on their intensity, these 
‘imaginaries’ emphasise difference, where people begin to think of themselves in 
terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. If anything, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ phenomenon becomes 
the basis to associate, organize and mobilize. Usually the ‘us’ qualifies one for a 
particular community with a common conscribed identity. Indirectly, such 
belonging assumes collaboration and co-operation, while the reference to the 
‘other’ may represent a threat to the acquired ‘stable’ identities, and thus would 
either be rejected or treated with suspicion.  
 
Similarly, in this case study it is assumed that due to the long history of apartheid, 
issues of imaginary identities could facilitate different types of antagonisms as 
people remain trapped in the apartheid categorisations. This is why the theory of 
antagonism is carried from political theory to organizational analysis. This to 
some extent adds a different angle to the study of organizational change theory, 
since change analysis rarely leaves the jurisdiction of management and 
organization theory genres to incorporate external theories. Like power and 
politics, social antagonism is used here in an exploratory way to illuminate how 
the organisation has evolved from the discourses of apartheid identities to a new 
consensus-oriented bureaucracy, if at all. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the literature on organizational change. It traced how the 
debates on change evolved with the management research on efficiency. The 
review started with the classical approaches of scientific management where 
organizational goals and their efficiency were a central preoccupation. Taking 
cues from Taylorism, this literature identifies specific variables to enhance 
organizational performance. Generally management studies have hardly moved 
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out of this genre, and still rely on the principle-based approaches to provide 
answers to organisational performance and change. While scientific management 
studies have paved the way for the study of organizations, they are highly 
criticised for their approach, which is rationalistic.  
 
While such criticism has seen the development of other approaches like systems 
theory and institutional theory, rationalistic approaches have continued to 
dominate the field. Of interest is that both systems and institutional theory took 
cognisance of the role of the environment on organisations; systems theory 
emphasises adaptation and institutional theory acknowledges agency respectively. 
The key argument is that the environment determines how organisations behave. 
While this is a significant contribution, both theories have been criticised for their 
environmental determinism. Despite such criticism, each theory, especially 
institutional theory, has become a major point of influence in organizational 
studies. Some of the people that write on this paradigm include DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991); Scott and Meyer (1991), and Zucker (1991). Of interest is their 
study of how organisations attain legitimacy in their contexts and their organising 
fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:69). This indirectly tells us why organizations 
choose certain templates for change over others. 
 
Over and above management theories, the review looked at public management 
debates. Again, there is very little difference that is accounted for by this field. 
Rather, it follows the same types of discussions and thoughts that exist in the 
broader management field that studies private organisations. This is despite the 
proclaimed internal differences that exist within the field of public administration 
that pull the debates between administration and politics. In view of the general 
lack of progress in theory, this research tapped into an old theory by Riggs, whose 
theory of prismatic societies emerged in the field of development administration 
(1964). The basis of the theory involves the classification of society and its 
bureaucracies in a continuum of developed, prismatic and pre-modernised 
traditional settings. The basic assumption is that the more developed a society is, 
the greater the chance that it will have a well-developed and well-adjusted 
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bureaucracy. This is seen as a consequence of a long history of development and 
time. What is interesting about Riggs’ theory is his attempt to explain different 
bureaucracies and their behaviour. He also explains the sala type of bureaucracy 
that is a coincidence of prismatic societies or developing societies. The review 
identified at least six propositions that are characteristic of such bureaucracies. 
While Riggs’ theory of the sala bureaucracy provides a possible lens for analysis, 
especially in complex and chaotic contexts, his theory is largely seen as 
pessimistic of developing contexts. 
 
Beyond Riggs’ 1960s theory of prismatic societies, as indicated earlier, public 
administration has made little theoretical progress in general. However, the 1990s 
have seen the emergence of the New Public Management (NPM). Emanating 
from the same genre as scientific management, it re-emphasised the essence and 
the importance of management in organisations. Like all its predecessors it 
brought the efficiency debates into the mainstream as it pushed for outcome- and 
results-oriented performances. There is generally a lot of research that responds to 
NPM, mainly critical of its neglect of other organisational values like equity and 
access due to its emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness and economy (Argyriades, 
2002; Maor, 1999; Paine, 1999; Pollitt 1998; Reed, 1994; Pollitt, 1993 and 
Yeatman, 1993). Despite such criticism, NPM continues to dominate the field. 
 
Besides these rationalist approaches, the review looked at post-modern research 
and its contribution as a critique to existing organisational research and theory. 
Central to such research is its call for the exploration of means of domination in 
organisations, hence the emphasis on power and politics in organisations. While 
post-modern research is still outside mainstream debates, its reflective approach 
to knowledge pushes the debate beyond the identification of specific variables to 
influence change. It promotes the understanding that change, like all social 
constructs, is part of the broader politics of social transformation and change and 
cannot be isolated from the other social realities that exist. The emphasis on 
power and politics is thus but one interesting contribution they make to 
organisational research, largely because to explore change is similar to exploring 
 58 
relations of power and politics in terms of how they are used and how they shift 
with the transformation. 
 
Finally, the review makes comments on the conceptual framework used in the 
study. This is primarily focused on themes extrapolated from the research namely 
(a) context; (b) inter-organisational dynamics; and (c) power and politics. While 
context and inter-organisational dynamics become key analytical themes adopted 
for this research, power and politics remain the analytical lenses. One of the 
reasons for using power and politics this way is based on their ability to unravel 
the conditions of conflict, struggles and contestations that may be missed with an 
ordinary descriptive exercise. It was also indicated that the study borrows from 
external theories like the Laclau and Mouffe (1985) theory of social antagonism. 
This theory explains how conflicts are exacerbated by perceived differences 
amongst different interest groups during change or social transformation. It is 
useful, therefore, in illuminating the complexities of power and politics.  
 
While the review has fostered an understanding of how change is conceptualised 
in general, it has also shown that there are serious theoretical gaps. Very few 
studies are dedicated to organisational change per se. Instead, change debates 
become subsumed in other themes, including the efficiency debates. But also 
where it becomes the focus it remains within the rationalist paradigms. To date, it 
remains the stronghold of Organisational Development (OD), which is practice-
oriented and finds solutions to diagnosed organisational problems. To depart from 
such a linear conception of change, this thesis starts from the premise that change 
is a complex phenomenon unique to different localised conditions. Its outcomes 
are thus a result of negotiated conditions that are consequential to various push-
and-pull factors brought into play by different interests. To demonstrate such 
complexity, this thesis uses power, politics and social antagonism to clarify the 
inherent contestations of change and their consequences for organisational 
performance and progress. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed conceptual understanding of organisation change 
and inefficiencies. It went on to identify the post-modern analytical conceptions 
of power and politics as instrumental to this research due to their general neglect 
by the efficiency paradigms. While post-modernism is good at providing 
analytical levers for analysis and interpretation, it has not developed any unique 
research methods outside the scientifically accepted theoretical constructs of 
quantitative and qualitative paradigms. Instead, researchers tend to use similar 
methods defined and adopted under such paradigms with more emphasis on 
reflexivity as post-modernists believe that ‘there is no methodology capable of 
achieving an unmediated objective representation of facts’ (Kilduff and Mehra, 
1997:464). Equally, while this thesis is highly inclusive of certain theoretical 
constructs from the post-modernist/post-structuralist research it remains within 
the qualitative paradigms. This chapter then looks at the process of research 
design and the methods of data collection and analysis adopted by the thesis.  
 
3.2. The qualitative approach  
The study adopted a qualitative approach. Qualitative research is based on the 
assumption that ‘reality is constructed by individuals interacting with their social 
worlds’ (Merriam, 1998:6). This is contrary to quantitative research which tends 
to adopt positivism, rationalism, reason and logic as the basis of scientific inquiry. 
Qualitative research as such challenges positivism as a one-way approach to 
knowledge. As Usher (1997) states, the task in social sciences is to interpret social 
meaning and is not a search for scientific truth. The basis of this is to understand 
the social world as constructed by those that experience it. Knowledge is thus 
seen to be contextual and limited by how it is understood, perceived and 
interpreted. Patton, quoted in Merriam, usefully summarises qualitative research 
as: 
 60 
an effort to understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a 
particular context and the interactions there. This understanding is an 
end in itself, so that it is not attempting to predict what may happen in 
the future necessarily, but to understand the nature of that setting - 
what it means for participants to be in that setting, what their lives are 
like, what’s going on for them, what their meanings are, what the 
world looks like in that particular setting - and in the analysis to be 
able to communicate that faithfully to others who are interested in that 
setting (Patton, 1985:1), quoted in Merriam (2001:6). 
 
Equally, this study had no intention of predicting what may happen in the future. 
It focused on the current realities as experienced, defined and interpreted by those 
who worked with the ECDE. While working with meanings and interpretations 
can be seen as a subjective, bias- and value-laden exercise, qualitative approaches 
remained the best methods to illuminate this organisation’s experiential accounts 
and narratives of change for many reasons. One of those is that change as a 
concept is intangible, whose meaning remains with those that apply it. To 
concretise that meaning becomes, therefore, as much an exercise in constructing 
or attaching meaning.  Nonetheless, scientifically, researchers like Gillham (2000) 
state that qualitative research enables one to: 
1) Carry out an investigation where other methods - such as experiments - are 
either not practicable or not ethically justifiable. 
2) Investigate situations where little is known about what is there or what is 
going on. More formal research may come later. 
3) Explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more ‘controlled’ 
approaches. 
4) ‘Get under the skin’ of a group or organization to find out what really 
happens - the informal reality which can only be perceived from the 
inside. 
5) View the case from the inside out: to see it from the perspective of those 
involved. 
6) Conduct research into the processes leading to results (for example, how 
reading standards were improved in a school) rather than into the 
‘significance’ of the results themselves (Gillham, 2000:11). 
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In considering these points, qualitative research is seen to address issues of 
complexity, lack of familiarity of context and perspectives, which cannot be 
predictable. It is precisely this lack of predictability which makes it important to 
talk to the people. Similarly, with an inherent curiosity to find out why the ECDE 
was perceived to be one of the worst public organisations with regard to service 
delivery, it seemed logical to talk to those involved in it and ‘get under the skin’ 
of what was really happening inside the organisation. It therefore became 
important to ask how they understood the perceived crisis of inefficiency, and 
also to find out how it had come about.  
 
Talking to these managers and their counterparts who were external to the 
organisation was part of the broader understanding that organisations are social 
entities whose meaning is continually constructed and mediated through space 
and time. Theoretically this aligns the research with social constructionist 
approaches. As Terre Blanche and Durrheim state: 
Social constructionist methods, like their interpretive counterparts, are 
qualitative, interpretive and concerned with meaning. But where those 
working within the interpretive tradition focus on the subjective 
understandings and experiences of individuals or groups, social 
constructionist researchers want to show how such understanding and 
experiences are derived from (and feed into) larger discourses. 
Interpretive approaches (sometimes referred to as ‘romantic 
hermeneutics’) treat people as though they were the origin of their 
thoughts, feelings and experiences. Social constructionist approaches 
(sometimes referred to as ‘critical hermeneutics’) treat people as 
though their thoughts, feelings and experiences were the products of 
systems of meanings that exist at a social rather than an individual 
level (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 1999:148). 
 
Equally, this study sees change as a social construct whose interpretation resides 
within each organisation. This means that each individual account is seen as part 
of the social meanings that exist in the ECDE’s context. The interpretations in the 
thesis are seen to illuminate not just individual accounts but how one organisation 
in the public sector understood and managed public sector reform and 
transformation. Of course it would be an exaggeration to think that this research 
provides all the answers about change and transformation. On the contrary, what 
the informants say is often convoluted and disjointed. Equally, the quality of 
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responses is itself a comment on the problems of transforming the ECDE. If 
anything, many people struggled to articulate the dilemmas they faced as they 
were propelled into very difficult circumstances with insufficient education and 
management training.   
 
3.3  The case study approach 
As indicated in most sections of this thesis, this study focused on a case study of 
the ECDE. There are various interpretations of what case studies are and the 
purposes they serve (Yin, 1994; Bassey, 1999; Merriam 2001; Stake, 2003; 
Hartley 2004). While many approaches to case studies depend on the different 
theoretical positions researchers adopt, Merriam (2001) contends that generally 
those that define case studies tend to perceive them as either units of study, as a 
process or even as a product or outcome. Whatever the case may be, case studies 
are generally chosen because researchers are interested in ‘insight, discovery, and 
interpretation rather than hypothesis testing’ Merriam (2001:28-29). As a result, 
common to many definitions of case studies is an emphasis on their contemporary 
nature (Yin, 1994) and context (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2001; Merriam, 
2001 and Yin, 1994). For instance, Yin simply describes a case study as an 
empirical inquiry that: 
Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994: 13). 
 
Similarly in this case study, issues of public sector reform, and particularly issues 
of organisational change and efficiency and effectiveness, were perceived as 
contemporary when taking into account the public debates about enhancing public 
service delivery. To study one organisation that was deemed to be inefficient was 
in fact as much about trying to understand the complexity of public sector reform, 
and to shed some light on the conditions that may be unique to certain 
organisations in other contexts.  
 
There are various types of case studies. For different classifications, one can read 
Bassey (1999); Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000); Merriam (2001); Scott 
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(1991); Stake (2003) and Yin (1994). Scott, for instance, states that case studies 
are chosen either for typicality or for explanatory purposes. Usually typical cases 
tend to draw broad-based generalisation while explanatory cases tend to test 
theories, but sometimes researchers use another type, the third style which is: 
Where the researcher is not concerned with notions of 
representativeness, as they acknowledge the uniqueness of each case, 
but they are interested in how the workings of particular processes are 
illuminated by single cases (Scott, 1991:149). 
 
This thesis subscribes to the third style as it neither tested an existing theory nor 
was it interested to draw broad-based generalisations. Rather, taking into 
consideration that organisations are unique entities, it focused on at least one 
organisation to illuminate its change complexities. The point is that the ECDE had 
been made unique by its integration of six departments of education that were 
different in culture, history and practice. Its struggles to transform itself were 
therefore equally struggles of integration and incorporation, and it is these unique 
struggles and complexities of change that were seen to be central to this research, 
since it was assumed that stable environments were over-researched and were 
likely to provide generic answers. Scott’s categorisations are in accord with 
Bassey’s (1999) classifications. Bassey identified that case studies can adopt a (a) 
theory-seeking and theory-testing approach; (b) story-telling and picture-drawing 
approach; and (c) an evaluative approach. Amongst these three different styles 
this research would fit most into the story-telling approach. As he says: 
Story-telling is predominantly a narrative account of the exploration 
and analysis of the case, with a strong sense of a time-line (Bassey, 
1999:62). 
 
While time-lines are important, they cannot be treated as being rigid, since much 
of a story or time-line depends on how it is remembered or perceived by the 
narrator.   
 
3.4  Negotiating access 
The story of gaining access into the ECDE fits no standard interpretation. Usually, 
research theory describes technical formalities and procedures to follow. 
However, the experiences drawn from this research are that while formalities help 
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to some extent, research is as much about drawing on informal networks, 
depending on how sensitive the site is.  
 
This researcher went to the ECDE after the initial correspondence, phone calls 
and fax messages elicited no response.  Time was of the essence as data had to be 
collected within a specific period in order to meet the institutional deadlines of the 
project. It therefore seemed logical to walk in and talk to the officials directly, but 
many senior officials were said to be away at workshops or work appointments. 
After a week of attempts, an appointment was secured with the Acting Head of 
the Department, who subsequently referred the request to the Director of 
Communications. This was effectively a gatekeeping exercise (Hartley 2000) as 
the writer was then referred back to Wits for a trivial exercise on supervision 
issues which were outside both the jurisdiction of the department’s concern, and 
the objectives of the meeting. Automatically, this limited possibilities to speak to 
the departmental officials as entry had been declined in the most diplomatic way 
on issues of additional supervision. The delays were compounded by the fact that 
at the time the department was going through enormous pressures, with much 
media coverage on its lack of service delivery. This made people highly sensitive 
as they did not know who to trust. 
 
Despite the challenges, it was important to remain in the region should new 
opportunities arise. An alternative plan was formulated, to approach known 
networks. These were people known to have worked with the department as 
consultants and trainers or had worked in senior positions within the department 
in the period under review. The intention was to start working from the outside to 
the inside, while still negotiating entry. This turned out to be a fruitful strategy as 
many of these external networks became points of reference and information. 
More importantly, they provided useful contacts with knowledge and experience 
of the departmental transformation. Some people thus recommended were not 
ideal to use in the study as they did not meet all the criteria, particularly regarding 
length of service, while others that met the criteria proved less knowledgeable 
depending on the roles they had played in the transformation process. All these 
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factors influenced people’s perceptions of events and how they explained them to 
the interviewer.    
 
Overall, the outside-inside approach facilitated a lot of interviews as permission 
was only given by the department after six months.  It was important to inform all 
internal staff about the research and to highlight that their participation was 
optional. In cases where they agreed to participate, it would have been preferable 
to conduct interviews in a neutral space, since working environments tend to be 
highly formal and experience many interruptions. Politically, a neutral venue 
would have reduced any sense of guilt about being in the department without the 
official approval. Interestingly, all the officials preferred to be interviewed in their 
offices, despite some levels of discomfort.  
  
It is important to explain why the ECDE is termed a sensitive site. This study was 
done when the ECDE was going through a difficult time with both internal and 
pressures being exerted on it. Internally it was experiencing teacher union protests 
and strikes due to non-payment of teacher salaries and gratuities, which resulted 
in external pressures from both the media and political spheres. For instance, the 
media at the time was reporting a lot on internal departmental inefficiencies, 
financial mismanagement and other administrative failures. This on its own 
created a great deal of pressure for departmental officials. The department also 
felt itself under siege with the arrival of a task team from the national Department 
of Education in Pretoria, which had been sent to the province to address perceived 
crises. The presence of the task team may also have been motivated by the 
forthcoming elections of 2004, with the state wanting to be seen to be in control 
of the Eastern Cape. As it was difficult to ascertain who belonged where, every 
outsider became a threat that could expose the department to the media, and the 
presence of both the media and the official intervention structures contributed to 
the difficulties in accessing interviewees.  
 
Sensitive sites are, by their nature, largely not receptive to external observation 
and research for various reasons, some of which include the need for anonymity 
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and protection of identities from any type of scrutiny, more especially in time of 
crisis. This translates into closed doors and a refusal to participate in research for 
fear of retribution and of breaking the internally set laws and regulations. In spite 
of this tense atmosphere, it was possible to conduct research in the region as the 
network approach remained useful throughout.   
 
3.5 Methods of data collection 
Besides Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2001) who emphasise observation as the 
main criterion for case studies, many writers argue for the use of different 
methods to collect evidence commonly referred to as triangulation of methods. 
For this study, however, there were limits to the type of method that could be 
used, partly because the nature of the research focused on past experiences rather 
than active reality that could be observed. Furthermore, even where it may have 
been useful to observe the national intervention taking place at the time, this was 
deemed a highly political exercise and access was limited to official appointees. 
As a result, interviews and documents became the major sources of evidence. 
Other than the contemporary and usually post-modernist researchers that question 
the theoretical underpinnings behind interviews, mainstream research books 
describe interviews as a scientific objective and rational process where the 
interviewer determines both the plan and process to access knowledge from the 
identified sources. There are thus various definitions of interviews. Amongst these 
they are interpreted as ‘conversations with a purpose’, usually between two 
people to get information about a particular subject that the interviewee may have 
knowledge of (Dexter, 1970:136, quoted by Merriam 2001: 71). Similarly, Patton 
explains: 
We interview people to find out from them those things we cannot 
directly observe….We cannot observe feelings, thoughts, and 
intentions. We cannot observe behaviours that took place at some 
previous point in time. We cannot observe situations that preclude the 
presence of an observer. We cannot observe how people have 
organized the world and the meanings they attach to what goes on in 
the world. We have to ask people about those things. The purpose of 
interviewing, then, is to allow us to enter into other persons’ 
perspectives (Patton, 1990:278 quoted by Merriam, 2001:72).  
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To enter into other people’s perspectives usually takes a planned series of 
structured and unstructured questions depending on the nature of the study, and 
there are many publications that discuss interviewing processes. Of course, the 
whole sense of relying on other people to recall past experiences means that 
interviews are not neutral tools for data gathering. Rather, as a subjective process 
they remain negotiated experiences. For instance, Fontana and Frey see them as 
‘active interactions between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, 
contextually based results’: 
each interview context is one of interaction and relation; the result is as 
much a product of this social dynamic as it is a product of accurate 
accounts and replies (Fontana and Frey, 2000:646).    
 
What this means is that interviews are not true replicas of reality, they are 
reflections of selected experiences, some of which could have been distorted with 
time as they are bound to memory, hence Scheurich’s (1987) emphasis on their 
indeterminacy. Arguing against the rationalistic tendencies of interviews, he states 
that ‘in an interviews there is no stable ‘reality’ or ‘meaning’ that can be 
represented’ (Scheurich, 1987:73). Rather, what occurs is ‘contingent on the 
specifics of individuals, place, and time (Mishler, 1986 quoted by Scheurich, 
1987:62). In retrospect, this means one has to acknowledge their subjectivity, 
especially epistemological subjectivity and power plays inherent in the interview 
process. Such power plays could be represented in different discourses of 
hierarchy, gender, race, language and social status (Fontana and Frey, 2000). It is 
noteworthy that the writer, as a black female and a lecturer at Wits University, has 
herself not escaped any of these power relations. As Denzin (189a:116) quoted by 
Fontana and Frey (2000) warns that ‘gender filters knowledge’. Expanding on 
this, they explain: 
the sex of the interviewer and that of the respondent do make the 
difference, as the interview takes place within the cultural boundaries 
of a paternalistic social system in which masculine identities are 
differentiated from female ones (Fontana and Frey, 2000:658). 
 
While this may be the case, one can only speculate as to how gender dynamics 
may have played themselves out in the interviews, since no female managers were 
interviewed. There may well have been some filtering of knowledge or 
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recollection, given that the officials were under tremendous pressure from the 
media which would have led them to exaggerate their heroic roles in 
transformation and change over time or even displayed themselves as victims to 
defend their integrity. With all such possibilities, it was especially useful to have 
interviewed different people as the stories could be corroborated in many ways by 
different interviewees even though the details differed.  
 
Interviews are indeed also about power games. As indicated, many interviewees 
agreed to participate after some name-dropping using established local networks 
and respected internal colleagues. A particular contact was especially useful, as 
she appeared to be very influential amongst her senior managers. The only 
apparent explanation for this influence is located in the position she holds in the 
finance department, which obviously exercises considerable power over the 
officials regarding their expenditure. Her role was to renegotiate where the writer 
had failed to secure an appointment from a hard secretary or made to turn up at an 
empty and usually locked office. The writer’s personal knowledge of the region 
and the language was also very useful in facilitating interviews, which often 
started on a tense note and then became more relaxed as soon as the local 
language was employed.  
 
The process 
The purpose of the interviews was to elicit as much of the stories as was possible. 
The key question was how these officials, ex-managers, and consultants had 
experienced change at the ECDE in the period from 1995 to 2002.  The responses 
were thus different reflections of different change experiences and challenges 
over that span of time. To do this, one had to rely more on unstructured 
interviews, which, unlike structured interviews that look for ‘precise data of 
codable nature’, attempt ‘to understand the complex behaviour of [organisations] 
without imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the inquiry’ (Fontana 
and Frey, 2000:653).  To understand the complexity of what was going on in the 
department thus meant that one had to give as much space as possible to the 
interviewees to give their own accounts of change, with the interviews therefore 
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ranging from forty five minutes to three and half hours in length, depending on 
the individual and the time available. Besides the formal interviews, there were 
informal conversations with different people that amplified some of the 
experiences. Any otherwise unclear points were followed up through telephone 
interviews with the same officials, except for one case where a referral was made 
to a colleague who was deemed to have knowledge about the political choices 
made on retaining Bisho as a capital.    
 
The process of interviews was done in two stages. The first stage was highly 
exploratory as people were made to tap into the memories of change they had of 
the department and the challenges they had faced. The second stage of interviews 
was built on the interpretations of the first interviews, since the initial interviews 
revealed a number of generic management factors that were perceived as 
rendering the institution inefficient and ineffective. This subsequently presented a 
new challenge, which was to find other possible explanations that could account 
for the perceived inefficiency and maladministration. The point is that it became 
important to go beyond the what questions to look at how and why the 
organisation was struggling with transformation. These additional interviews were 
meant to go deeper and clarify further how organisational change worked in this 
context with the hope of revealing the complexities that exist.  
 
Generally the nature of the interviews was largely conversational and based on the 
interviewees’ ability to recall past experiences. These often evolved into 
narrations of historical accounts and personal experiences of change that ranged 
from forty-five minutes to three hours. The idea was not to ‘establish the 
proportional representativeness of the views’, (Porpora, 2001:6, quoted in Archer 
(2003), but rather to elicit people’s interpretations of their own context. This stage 
aimed to get as much information as possible to illuminate the context of change 
and transformation, which could not have been as deeply understood if the writer 
had been in a different location. Overall, the study ended with twenty interviews. 
While it was hoped that more people could be interviewed, the sensitivity of the 
context precluded this. Furthermore, the high mobility of the public servants in 
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general and the high turnover in this particular organisation meant that some of 
the highly experienced people who could have contributed valuable insights to the 
study could not be accessed as they had either retired or taken jobs in other 
departments and provinces. 
 
Sampling 
The people participating in the study included people in the department itself, in 
the districts, other departments like public works and treasury, parastatals and 
consulting. As indicated earlier, the only criterion for participating was that the 
interviewees should have been with the department for at least five years, which 
was deemed an adequate length of time to have experienced transformation and 
change. It was also important that they had some level of management capacity 
and/or were involved in decision-making structures of the department at some 
time, or had worked closely with the department. Overall, a sample of twenty 
people participated in the interviews. The first set of seven interviews took place 
at the beginning of the Interim Management Task Team’s Intervention around 
March 2003 while the other twelve were interviewed around May of 2004. The 
last interview was conducted in November 2004. Generally, these interviews 
happened during two-week periods of the writer’s research visits to the Eastern 
Cape.    
 
Theoretically, the research resembled a snowball/chain type of approach. As 
Cohen explains: 
In snowball sampling researchers identify a small number of 
individuals who have the characteristics in which they are interested. 
These people are then used as informants to identify, or put the 
researchers in touch with, others who qualify for inclusion and these, 
in turn, identify yet others – hence the term snowball sampling. This 
method is useful where access is difficult. The task of the researcher is 
to establish who are the critical or key informants with whom initial 
contact must be made (Cohen et al, 2000:104). 
 
Indeed, with no sign of the necessary permission to enter the organisation in sight, 
the referrals proved highly essential. In fact, the process of being referred softened 
a lot of people with whom the writer spoke, as they had been approached via their 
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known and trusted networks. This made the atmosphere more receptive than when 
attempting to access these officials directly through the usual official channels.  
 
While the network approach proved highly useful in the circumstances, it has 
certain limitations, some of which may include bias, selectivity and exclusion. For 
instance, bias can be seen where those that participate end up being powerful 
males in certain positions of authority, rather than a general spread of managers in 
the organisation. Similarly, there was a leaning towards high-ranking male 
officials which was not only a consequence of referrals but also a reflection of 
bias on how senior appointments are made in general. Nevertheless, the lessons 
from this study revealed that research into sensitive sites defies conventional 
straightforward research approaches using scientifically pre-planned methods. In 
fact, such sites by their nature throw out tradition and conventionality as quickly 
as possible as a researcher tends to rely on ad hoc opportunities and instinct most 
of the time.  
 
Documentary evidence 
Complementing the interviews was an accumulation of documents that included 
departmental annual reports; departmental strategy documents for the period 1995 
to 2002; government gazettes; internal policy documents; international agencies 
reports; organisational development reports and consultants’ reports, and media 
reports. Most of the internal documents came from the legislature, which was 
more accessible during the research. Merriam (2001) highlights some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of using documents in data collection. Some of the 
advantages are that they are easily accessible, [mostly] free, and contain 
information that would take time to investigate, but more importantly, data in 
documents: 
can furnish descriptive information, verify emerging hypotheses, 
advance new categories and hypotheses, offer historical understanding, 
track change and development, and so on (Merriam, 2001:126).  
 
The point is that documents are a stable form of information as once written and 
published they seldom change. Of course, if there are doubts about their quality, 
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authenticity and accuracy of information, this becomes a disadvantage. 
Documentary evidence does not simply end with easily accessible pre-packaged 
booklets but has to be integrated with intensive internet searches. While the 
internet search has its advantages due to its expanded networks of information, it 
has limitations as most documents tend to be on purchase lists which limit their 
accessibility.  
 
3.6  Data Analysis 
One the most difficult processes of this research was data analysis. Part of this 
had to do with the fact that stories tend to be less structured than quantifiable 
research. Nonetheless, data analysis started with the transcription of the 
interviews, a long process since some of the interviews were more than three 
hours long. The idea of using transcripts was based on the conviction that they are 
perhaps more reliable than summaries and capture more detail. However, like all 
other research tools they are bound to have their own weaknesses. Some of these 
are highlighted by Cohen et al who argue that transcriptions are: 
Decontextualised, abstracted from time and space, from the dynamics 
of the situation, from the live form, and from the social, interactive, 
dynamic and fluid dimensions of their source; they are frozen (Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison, 2000:281). 
  
While the point being made is that words alone cannot capture the dynamics of 
the interactions and thus it is important to add other dimensions like the tone of 
voice, the inflection of the voice, interruptions, the speed of the voice, the 
transcriptions were used as the main source for data analysis.  
 
Coding 
Following transcription, data became subjected to coding. Simply put this is a 
process to categorise and sort data for analysis (Bryman and Burgess, 1994:5). 
Categorisation would either be based on labels decided in advance or in response 
to the data that has been collected (Cohen et al, 2000). This study followed much 
of the latter route. The whole process involved going through each transcribed 
text and identifying points of emphasis and elaboration. These were compared 
across different transcripts to identify points of convergence or ‘clustering’, if one 
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uses Hycner’s (1985:285) scientific concept. The clustering process thus leads to 
building central themes for interpretation and analysis. This is a technical process, 
but is also time-consuming and requires separating the major themes from the 
minor ones, a process which involves a continuous revisiting of data.  
 
Application of theory 
As Merriam states: 
One of the dilemmas to resolve in writing up qualitative research is deciding 
how much concrete description to include as opposed to analysis and 
interpretation and how to integrate one with the other so that the narrative 
remains interesting and informative (Merriam, 2001:234).  
 
Indeed, this became a challenge throughout the writing of the analysis chapters. If 
any balance was achieved it came through a process of several drafts and mainly 
through critical comment from peer reviewers. Central to such comment was the 
emphasis on using further data to validate the case.  
 
While the focus on data was important, it was also critical to engage in an 
interpretive exercise, and for this the study borrowed from different management 
theories, not least from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) conflict theory, to expand on 
both the social and the discursive practices that operated within the organisation. 
Generally, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) are associated with discourse analysis. 
Drawing largely on post-structuralism, discourse analysis examines how different 
structural arrangements and practices acquire their meanings and how such 
meanings become entrenched as cultural norms in different contexts. This they do 
through the analysis of the text using deconstruction. While this could have been 
an exciting exercise to engage in, it would not fit the nature of the study as 
deconstruction tends to be highly theoretical. Besides, as Phillip and Jorgen 
(2004) indicate, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) were never involved with empirical 
work, and they therefore recommend creativity when working with empirical 
studies. 
 
Rather than relying on a formula, therefore, what this study did was to look at the 
analytical tools that can be applied to the ECDE context. Taking cues from the 
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data which identified issues of power, politics and identity as instrumental to the 
discourse of organisational change in this department, it seemed appropriate to 
use their conflict analysis as a lens for analysis. While Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
are rarely used in organisation studies, their use here was motivated by their 
analysis of social change. The point is that organisational change in South Africa 
in the mid-1990s was happening in tandem with the broader social reform 
processes. This meant that many changes at an organisational level reflected the 
broader context. To understand this complexity, it was necessary to adopt 
theoretical triangulation rather than remain within the descriptive rationalistic 
discourses which management theory promote.  
 
There is an awareness of the limitations that may arise when transporting one 
theory into another context, which may give rise to misinterpretation. To limit 
this, different texts were examined that simplified Laclau and Mouffe to ensure 
accuracy of interpretation, including the Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) text on 
Discourse Analysis: As Theory and Method; and Howarth, Norval and 
Stavrakakis (2000) on Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, 
Hegemonies and Social Change. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe (1985), however, 
who study social change in general, this study remains organisationally oriented 
using only relevant tools from their theory for analysis. 
 
3.7  Validity and Reliability 
The debates on validity and its use in qualitative study are as broad as the many 
authors that write on the topic. Generally there is consensus about its relevance 
even though there are different interpretations about what it means and how one 
achieves it in interpretive research. Such different interpretations may emanate 
from the fact that the concept owes its existence to quantitative research and thus 
its application outside that context varies, depending on how different authors use 
it. There are, nonetheless, authors that provide guidelines and criteria that can be 
used in qualitative research. While it would be easier to tick off what was done, it 
would be a misnomer to give such a neat picture of process. Rather, in recognition 
of the iterative nature of the process, one uses Angen’s (2000) concept of 
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validation to explain the processes that were involved in putting this study 
together. For Angen (2000), validation represents an ongoing process of 
establishing the truth. This is contrary to validity that almost has fixed 
interpretations of how one arrives at the truth. Validation is thus a more open 
process and recognises the different interpretations of reality that may exist. 
Angen identifies two types of validation – the ethical and the substantive. In 
summary, ethical validation is concerned with the moral assumptions that we 
carry into the research process which subsequently affect how we interpret the 
research, while substantive validity looks at the substance of the enquiry. For 
instance, ethical validation speaks to the need for equitable representations of 
voices, and as a result the researchers are called to be constantly conscious about 
how they respond to difference and ambiguity.  
 
Of importance to this study is the issue of representation of voices. As much as 
the research literature emphasises this, it is also true that it is not always 
achievable. For instance, the first point of exclusion started when the writer could 
not have access to all sections of the organisation due to the sensitivity of the 
context. It is thus presumed that a wider access to the broader organisation in a 
less tense environment could have enhanced opportunities for equitable 
representation. Secondly, of the twenty people interviewed, only two were 
women, of which one was a member of the department. Even then she was not 
part of the senior management team. The advantage is that she was a powerful 
member of the union with much experience in the department. It must be noted 
that the ECDE is in general a male-dominated organisation, especially at senior 
levels and unfortunately the only female senior manager who had worked in the 
department for more than five years in different positions declined to be 
interviewed. A key area of emphasis relates to the point made earlier – that 
managers themselves varied in terms of positions of influence and experience; 
this affected their ability to conceptualise and interpret some of the complexities 
that existed. All these factors explain why certain voices dominated over others. 
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Besides equity, ethical validation emphasises the value added by the research, in 
terms of the educative, empowerment or transformative nature of the research. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make claims about the extent to which any research 
can achieve all this as they are all subjective matters whose value is subject to 
individual interests. Nevertheless, one may contend that the educative value of the 
research lies in its potential to contribute to new understandings of organisational 
change in complex environments. Given that the study of organisational change is 
still in its infancy in South Africa’s public administration, one assumes that such a 
study contributes to the debates about organisational transformation and service 
delivery.  
 
Coming to substantive validation, Van Manen (1990) quoted by Angen 
(2000:390) asserts that it is important that researchers show ‘how they have done 
justice to the complexity of their chosen topic by bringing into play all the 
various, present and historical, inter-subjective understandings’ of the subject. 
This partly calls for reflections on understandings that emerged during and after 
the research. This research began with the conventional review of the literature on 
organisational change and efficiency. While the initial idea was to study the 
Gauteng Department of Education (GDE), this changed as the ECDE was 
reported as being one of the more inefficient provincial departments in the public 
sector. This stirred interest in investigating what was happening in the 
department, and since the literature review was going in circles due to lack of 
theoretical analysis in general, one had an opportunity of engaging a number of 
colleagues, who advised a perusal of Riggs’ theory of prismatic societies and 
other development administration material. Riggs’ theory provided interesting 
propositions that could be tested easily in such a context as it was transitional and 
also in a developing state. Additional influences came through the PhD and 
Masters social theory course which added post-modern thoughts as a possible 
analytical paradigm.  
 
Before any concrete theory choices could be made, the events in the Eastern Cape 
moved ahead with the introduction of the task team. It seemed logical then to go 
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to the field so as to experience developments directly. Armed with Riggs’ 
propositions, the first thing was to design the questions around these. This 
approach was, however, suspended as it became clear that the context was too 
volatile and required a different approach. This meant that instead of rushing in 
with textbook-type questions, it seemed better to ask for reflections of change and 
transformation in the department. Where possible and where the conditions were 
less intimidating, Riggs (1964) was incorporated without any intention to prove or 
disprove his theory but rather to facilitate a critical reflection. This attempt at data 
collection happened in the midst of various interpretations by the media, which 
had also invaded the province for the sensational stories of government 
maladministration and lack of service delivery. Undoubtedly, at least in the initial 
stages, the media shaped and informed how one saw the department. The 
challenge then was to move beyond such sensationalised interpretations and look 
at the underlying factors that had contributed to the crisis.  
 
It is important to note that the department itself did not display any obvious signs 
of chaos and crisis. The staff engaged with their workdays normally, and this in 
itself gave pause for thought, and influenced the views of the writer, who had 
expected to see the picture of chaos as conjured up by the media. As one spoke to 
the officials, it became clear that chaos was not just an event but was rather a 
process whose origins lay in the long history of integration and poor management 
of the transformation process. The challenge was to corroborate the stories told.  
Without immediate access to departmental records it became necessary to look 
outside the department. Fortunately the legislature was keen to assist and provided 
copies of all reports in its possession. The writer also obtained access to four 
comprehensive research reports that were conducted on the ECDE at different 
times between 1997 and 2003. Two of these reports were baseline studies of the 
IMBEWU project, a funded partnership with an international agency. This project 
worked with the ECDE on various district and school improvement programmes, 
and had a good understanding of the state of the department, having conducted 
two baseline studies covering 1994-1997 and 2000-2002 respectively.  
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Further documentation included records of the Interim Management Task Team 
(IMT) intervention in 2003. One report outlined the department’s administrative 
conditions, its challenges and the proposed model for intervention. The other 
report was more of a qualitative synthesis of interviews with members of the IMT 
and its incorporated structures, on their experiences of working on the turnaround. 
These studies increased the authenticity and validity of the data collected, as 
various data could be compared and confirmed.  Furthermore, most of the 
officials interviewed welcomed follow-ups and this was done telephonically to 
clarify issues.  
 
While one could enhance the content validity of the interviews through cross 
reference and confirmations, this is still insufficient as qualitative researchers are 
as equally concerned about issue of reliability. Reliability like validity is a 
phenomenon of quantitative research as a result it is difficult to establish clear 
criteria of what it entails in qualitative studies. As a result Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison (2000:120) summarise its significance to include: 
fidelity to real life, context and situation-specificity, authenticity, 
comprehensiveness, detail, honesty, depth of response and 
meaningfulness to the respondents.  
 
All these words have inherent subjective, relative and bias connotations about 
them. Nonetheless, the issue is to eliminate bias as much as possible. There are 
various propositions to this. For instance Silverman (1993) quoted in Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison encourages the (a) use of consistent words and questions 
for each respondent through structured interviews, (b) the piloting of the interview 
schedule and the (c) training of interviewers. Guba and Lincoln (1985;219,301) 
ibid, emphasise (a) triangulation of (methods, sources, investigators and 
methods); (b) peer debriefing; (c) prolonged engagement in the field, (d) 
persistent observation and (e) member checking. Similarly, Yin (1994:90-99) 
advocates for (a) use of multiple sources of evidence; (b) a creation of a case 
study data base; and (c) maintenance of chain of evidence. The comments made 
her thus refer to what was achievable within the specified period of data 
collection. It is important to note that due to the sensitivity of the environment it 
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became impossible to stay longer to observe the different processes in the 
department.  
 
However, to eliminate inconsistencies in questions and words used, the researcher 
conducted all the interviewees herself. The questions were piloted with the first 
interview and they got revised due to the sensitive nature of the environment. 
Such a revision, (and contrary to Silverman’s proposition of creating closed 
questions), changed the nature of questions to be largely open-ended and 
exploratory. Inspite of that there were broad generic questions asked to all 
managers like: how long had they worked in the ECDE? what  experiences of 
change did they go through with the department since they were appointed? what 
forms of interventions (internal and external) did they experience? and why did 
the organisation need them? What lessons could they share about changing 
organisations? For those that were external to the organisation it was important to 
understand their perceptions about the department and the roles they played in the 
transformation of the department.  It was thus through probing that one could 
collaborate the stories told mainly to enhance their credibility and avoid what 
Silverman (2005:211) calls the anecdotalism which is possible as one focuses on a 
particular evidence that confirms one’s assumptions. Beyond this one engaged in 
various methods of peer debriefing which included identifying a selected group of 
academics who read the different analytical chapters. But also the school’s 
internal seminars and PhD committees created a platform to present this research. 
The feedback from all different scenarios enhanced the required attention to detail 
as one had to revisit the data back and for further illumination. At another level, 
the interviewees were invited to add any information they see appropriate to the 
study or point out any instances of misrepresentation. It is important though to 
acknowledge that the use of a deviant case could have enhanced the analysis 
about what was unique to the ECDE compared to other organisations in the same 
context (Silverman (2005 and Hartley, 2004). Nonetheless, the researcher has 
created a broad database on this case which cab be used by other researchers and 
has equally maintained a clear chain of evidence as it cites and refers to a range of 
specific documents and interviews.      
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3.8 Learning and changing  
The experience of writing a thesis is a mixture of emotions. Frankly, it was more 
like skydiving on a misty day, where even though the winds push you in different 
directions, you are still certain to land because you are aware that gravity will take 
over anyway. But the real writing experience resembles the floating mid-air zone. 
It is an unsettling experience, as one never knows where and when they will land. 
My floating experiences began with much enthusiasm while working with data 
after my initial interviews two years earlier. Before one knew, this turned to out to 
be a difficult exercise, with volumes of material to go through. The question of 
what to exclude and include became almost overwhelming, as one tried to make 
sense of the material. At times this was complicated by the struggle to maintain 
objectivity as empathy took over. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the Eastern 
Cape context was a personal and familiar one, and the struggles could be 
identified with easily.  
 
Besides the material and the meanings, the process of identifying key themes 
became another cycle of trial and error which became costly in terms of time and 
deadlines. The process for this saw minor themes collapsed into others, or even 
excluded, as one tried to focus on dominant issues of emphasis across the 
interviews. The thesis was eventually organised along the key themes that include 
context, organisational identity and internal organisational dynamics. While these 
themes emanated from the data, they were also shaped by the literature. Generally 
then, putting this together was an intimidating skydiving attempt where the 
experience became the actual learning. 
 
At the level of personal change, it has been a long journey from the time the 2002 
Masters of Management students challenged the writer to conduct research on 
South Africa’s organisations. For them, of course, this was partly to force debate 
away from western concepts of organisations. At first the challenge was seen in 
the form of small research projects, but later changed to a commitment to a PhD 
project. It was quickly realised that although very little research was available on 
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organisations in South Africa, this was a huge field internationally. What made 
things worse was the disparities in how researchers studied organisations. 
Management discourses dominated the field and the challenge was to look beyond 
the toolbox kit type of interpretation of organisational behaviour to more 
theoretical analysis. This quest for theoretical analysis as such facilitated volumes 
of literature search and reading that took more than a year to complete. While this 
delayed the research process, it helped to enrich the teaching at the time and to 
build confidence as one became acquainted with the state of the field. Becoming 
acquainted with the existing knowledge discourses did not, however, reduce the 
stress inherent in conducting research.  It became clear that crafting a research 
project of this nature would be an iterative process, as context was equally 
elusive. As a result one had to learn on the field most of the time.  
 
The point is that prior to commencing this project, the writer had no experience of 
working on sensitive sites; this contributed to a learning experience of itself, since 
the conventional research tools had to be put aside most of the time and different 
approaches taken to fieldwork, such as limited success in obtaining interviews, or 
managing different fears about participation. Nonetheless, the experience itself 
was enriching as one got to learn about how organisational bureaucracies function 
in the new democratic dispensation. Perhaps more importantly, one learnt that 
people in organisations are a contingent of multiple identities, which makes 
bureaucracies fragmented spaces rather than the unitary entities assumed in 
management research. It also became clear that there is no single public 
management discourse out there but rather multiple discourses as bureaucracies 
are constantly engaged in their own internal struggles to make sense of their 
worlds. At times these internal struggles seem to supersede the transformation and 
its regulatory frameworks that hope to enforce consistency and compliance across 
the public sector systems.         
 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter is a reflection on the research processes embarked upon while 
conducting this project. While not disregarding entirely the established tradition 
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of writing methodology, it is true that the chapter borrowed heavily from 
reflexivity as a method to give account to the process. Reflexivity helped to not 
only acknowledge the learning that took place, but also to raise the writer’s 
awareness about the subjectivities that had infiltrated the study. Overall, 
conducting research is not an easy exercise as it is bounded by its own power and 
politics. For instance, the difficulties with regard to access were a clear 
demonstration that organisations are powerful entities in their own right, and 
because of that power they can easily filter knowledge and limit the access of 
researchers. Interestingly, with this case one learnt that power does not 
necessarily reside within the organisation but is expanded into all types of 
networks, given that some of the networks used were external to the organisation. 
At the mention of such networks, the internal controls were easily disregarded. 
While it was difficult to obtain entry to the organisation, the writer remained 
sympathetic to the department and its officials as they continue to work under 
highly challenging circumstances. The next three chapters are in many ways 
evidence of this.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN FRAMING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE  
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Generally the management literature highlights the need to include context on 
change analysis (Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron, 2001). However, this is 
usually devoid of debate about what this means. Rainey states that while there is a 
lot of attention given to organisational environments ‘the management field 
provides no exact science for analyzing them, in part because the concept is 
complex and difficult in various ways’ (Rainey, 2003:79). In spite of that, this 
thesis contends that organisational change that is based on broad contextual 
political decisions not mindful of, and adapted to, context and local conditions, 
will have limited success. Hence it is deemed imperative to look at the role that 
context played in shaping the organisational dynamics of the ECDE. By context is 
meant both the provincial and national conditions that directed change after 1994.  
 
The argument raised is that context as interplay of various forces of power and 
influence has had an influence on the existing conditions of inefficiency and 
dysfunctionality in the ECDE. This is premised on the view that public 
organisations usually get their cues for change from the political context. To 
support this argument this chapter  
(a)  examines briefly the South African political, economic and administrative 
milieus pre-1994;  
(b)  maps the terrain for public sector reform after 1994; and  
(c)  locates the ECDE changes within the broader discourse for change.  
 
The central questions asked are: what is the nature of environment under which 
the ECDE operates; what is the nature of interface between the two; and what are 
the organisational responses to this? These questions are, of course, raised for 
illumination purposes rather than to serve as directives to the discussion. The 
chapter rather focuses on broad themes. Firstly, it sketches the macrocosm of 
South Africa’s change. Secondly, it looks at the politics of social organisation pre-
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1990. Thirdly, it explores the politics of social organisation post-1994. Fourthly, it 
reflects on the legislative context of 1994 to 1999. Fifthly, it looks at public 
administration beyond 1999.   
 
For analytical purposes this chapter draws from management theories where 
appropriate, the interviews and departmental documents such as year reports, 
strategic plan documents and consultant reports. Beyond this it draws from other 
literature such as Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) theory of antagonism to illuminate 
on existing, albeit it sometimes not so obvious, but significant differences that 
impact on the change. While Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of social and political 
reality tends to be limited to political theory, this thesis finds them useful for 
organisations as well. For instance, in their book on Hegemony and Social 
Strategy (1985) they explore issues of hegemony, antagonism and logic of 
difference that are seen to have prominence in this context. Amongst many 
existing definitions of hegemony, this is limited to contingent political 
articulations, which shape issues of ideology and identity. Equally, antagonism is 
limited to Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis’s simplified explanation of 
antagonism. Interpreting Laclau and Mouffe (1985), they state that: 
Social antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to attain 
fully their identity. Thus, an antagonism is seen to occur when ‘the 
presence of [an] “Other” prevents me from being totally myself. The 
relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of 
their constitution. This blockage of identity is a mutual experience for 
both the antagonizing force and the force that is being antagonized: 
‘Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. 
But, nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective 
being is a symbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed 
by a plurality of meanings which prevent it being fixed as full 
positivity (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000:10). 
 
Equally, it is the view of this thesis that the plural nature of identities that exist in 
the EC context, creates spaces for conflict as different groups try to assert 
themselves in the change process. Hence, the theory of antagonism is carried from 
political theory to organisational analysis. This to some extent adds a new 
dimension to organisational change theory as usually the analysis of change rarely 
leaves the jurisdiction of the organization itself to incorporate analysis of relations 
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external to it. However, since this theme of antagonism is carried throughout the 
three chapters, its use is limited to relevance and thus will be used where 
appropriate, while in other cases management theories will dominate.   
 
4.2 Sketching the macrocosm of South Africa’s change. 
South Africa’s transition to a democracy in 1994 had been awaited with mixed 
emotions of apprehension and excitement. It was going to be a process of 
unfolding new experiences and practices. On a large scale, the new political and 
economic changes were expected to radically transform the existing apartheid 
structure in all sectors. While this was indeed possible, there were bound to be 
limitations. The new government was based on partnerships, with no outright 
winners in the long conflict for majority rule. A political brokerage which had 
occurred through negotiation and co-operation led to the formation of a 
Government of National Unity (GNU).  The GNU was a multi-party form of 
governance comprising three parties which had obtained 5% or more of the 
popular vote. As Marais (1998) suggests, this is where shared political decision-
making and consensus-building became formalised, in the hope of creating 
stability. At hand was not replacement of the old by the new, but assimilation 
(Marais 1998). In any event, as Marais explains: 
The settlement and the launch of the transition depended on an 
activated awareness of ‘common interests’ between the old order and 
the popular movement on an acknowledgment that friend and foe have 
to pass through a gateway of concessions and compromises in order to 
avert disaster for their respective agendas. The principle of inclusion 
became the central ideological tenet of the new South Africa. Not only 
were all South Africans deemed equal in one nation-state, but the 
reconstruction and development of society would become presented as 
a common endeavour, hence the intense pressure on the popular sector 
to ‘exercise restraint’ in its demands and pursuit for change. The 
transition proceeded on the basis of mechanisms and structures that 
attempt to ‘reconcile’ – even transform – conflicting interests into 
inclusive policies, projects and programmes (Marais, 1998:94).  
 
Not only was the underlying theme about finding pathways of convergence, but it 
implied a reduction of scope and depth in radical change. The assumptions about 
what to change and how to change became highly debated and contested, as 
vested interests emerged with different agendas.  
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Economically, the new government was inheriting an economic system limping 
from previous recessions, sanctions and general ineffective economic 
management policies. For instance, Albedal, Spar and Cousins (2002) show the 
differences between what had been anticipated for economic growth and the 
actual performance over five years. This is reflected in Table 4.1 below.  
 
Table 4.1: GEAR-Targeted vs. Actual Results (annual percentage change, 
except where noted) 
Targeted Results of GEAR  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Real GDP 3.5 2.9 3.8 4.9 6.1 
Private Investment 9.3 9.1 9.3 13.9 17.0 
Employment (non-agricultural) 1.3 3.0 2.7 3.5 4.3 
Inflation (CPI) 8.0 9.7 8.1 7.7 7.6 
Change in Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
-8.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Budget Deficit as percentage of GDP -5.1 -4.0 -3.5 -3.0 -3.0 
      
Actual Performance       
Real GDP 4.2 2.5 0.6 1.9 3.0 
Private Investment 6.1 4.7 -2.9 -4.4 5.0 
Employment (non-agricultural) -0.7 -1.7 -3.7 -3.2 -2.9 
Inflation (CPI) 7.4 8.6 6.9 5.2 5.3 
Change in Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
-6.3 6.4 -9.2  -5.1 -2.9 
Budget Deficit as percentage of GDP -4.9 -4.6 -3.3 -2.6 -2.4 
Sources: Extracted from the Harvard Business School Case Study on Remaking 
the Rainbow Nation: South Africa 2002.  
 
Although Table 4.1 reflects relative successes in the management of inflation and 
the budget deficit in the period 1996 to 1998, there were struggles with the GDP, 
private investment and employment registering losses or little gains of 0.6, -2.9 
and -3.7 respectively. Of course, many will argue that such economic tendencies 
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were not unique to South Africa but portrayed trends in emerging markets more 
generally. While this may be the case, this nevertheless suggests caution about the 
expected benefits of change and the importance of context to change. But more 
importantly it suggests the need to look at organisational change not only as an 
isolated concept that resides within the controls of organisations per se but as a 
condition of external pressures and challenges as well. It is a fact that poor 
economic growth has significant implications on the nature and speed of changes 
that could be achieved in a given time, especially when such changes are 
dependent upon specific resources from outside the organisations themselves. 
 
Juxtaposed with this, the new government inherited high levels of poverty from 
the apartheid government. For instance, the UNDP Report on Human 
Development (2000) indicates the extent of poverty in South African provinces. 
This is reflected in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2 Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap in South African Provinces, 2003  
Province Rate1 Gap2 
Limpopo 
Eastern Cape 
Mpumalanga 
KwaZulu-Natal 
North-West 
Northern Cape 
Free State 
Gauteng 
Western Cape 
60.7% 
68,3% 
54,8% 
50,5% 
56,5% 
54,4% 
59,9% 
20% 
28,8% 
23,5% 
27,9% 
20% 
18,9% 
21,9% 
19,6% 
20,3% 
7,9% 
8,5% 
Source: Adelzadeh (2003a) UNDP, South Africa Human Development Report 
2003.  
 
                                                 
1
 Rate is the percentage of the population below the national poverty line of R354 per month adult 
equivalent in 2002.  
2
 Gap is the mean shortfall below the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the national poverty 
line. 
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Interestingly, the Eastern Cape is one of the two provinces with nearly 70% of its 
population living in poverty. Inevitably this is an issue in discussion of the 
management of change debates. People’s lives are extremely precarious. The 
established patterns of earning their living in a context of neo-patrimonial 
networks long established in the former Bantustan administrations makes resisting 
potential threats to their livelihoods a matter of life and death. For this study these 
kinds of statistics force theory and practice to be grounded in the external 
realities, and question the nature and extent of possible change. It may also be 
assumed that a closer examination of these realities can illuminate the reasons for 
organisations choosing certain pathways rather than others, especially when there 
is little to be gained. In the next section, brief flashbacks will be used to outline 
the administrative terrain that became the building blocks for the new public 
sector reform.  
 
4.3. The politics of social organisation pre-1990 
The nature of the apartheid state is well-documented and there is no reason to 
repeat it here (Davenport, 1987; Bienhart, 1992,; Lodge 2002; Worden, 2000 and 
Allen, 2005). However, it is important to highlight that underlying such a state 
was a philosophy that aimed to create an unequal society in both race and class 
terms. Race as such was the key tool to classify populations as White, Coloured, 
Indian or Black. This type of societal classification and arrangement resulted in 
huge disparities in both economic and social terms, determining access to 
resources and all other economic benefits in the broader South African society. 
Whites by virtue of allocation at the upper end of the economic and political scale 
thus became more prosperous, benefiting also from a highly resourced education 
system. With regard to the other groups, preference was given to Coloureds and 
Indians, while Blacks had to survive on the minimal resources provided 
(Thompson, 1995).  
 
While there were different types of opposition and protests to this type of social 
arrangement, sometimes resulting in bloody conflicts with the state, this did not 
stop the apartheid machinery from churning out even more detrimental policies 
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like the Population Registration Act (1950), Bantu Education Act (1953) and the 
Group Areas Act (1950). These policies created their own crises as they 
exacerbated economic, social and cultural differences amongst the various 
populations groups. For example, with the Group Areas Act of 1950 came forced 
removals where scores of black communities were dumped on patches of arid dry 
land so that better land and space could be made available to the white population. 
These dumping grounds were characterised by a lack of infrastructure, few job 
opportunities and little capital that could sustain communities. In tandem, the 
Bantu Education Act (1953) ensured that blacks were educated only at a low level 
to fulfil the menial tasks allocated to them to service the white economy (Christie 
and Collins 1982) under the job segregation regime. Unfortunately, as each policy 
rolled out it became a key component of other mechanisms that were intended to 
paralyse the growth and development of the majority of South African society. 
 
A more significant development came in the 1970s and the 1980s when four 
Bantustans – namely Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (the TBVC 
‘states’) – were granted independence from South Africa while another six black 
territories opted for self-governing status as shown by Figure 4.1 below.  
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Figure 4.1 South African Boundaries before 19943 
 
The six self-governing states included Gazankulu, Kangwane, KwaNdebele, 
KwaZulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa. The formation of these homelands and self-
governing states became realised as a result of the promulgation of the Bantu 
Homelands Citizens Act of 1970. This Act compelled all blacks in South Africa to 
become a citizen of the homeland that responded to their ethnic group. This was 
regardless of whether they lived there or not. Partly this was to ensure the 
reservation of land for the white groups and also these homelands were to protect 
the “white’ South Africa against Marxist-inspired governments and liberation 
movements’ (Jones 1999:513). This forced classification of blacks into various 
ethnic groups subsequently came with forced relocations in both rural and urban 
settings (Pickles and Woods 1992). The Surplus People Project on these removals 
                                                 
3
 Nel, E. and Binns, T. (2000) Rural self-reliance strategies in South Africa: community initiatives and 
external support in the former black homelands. Journal of Rural Studies, 16, pp.367-377. 
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and relocations estimated that 3,548,900 people were removed, resulting in a 
homeland population increase of 69% between 1970 and 1980 (Thompson 1995). 
By agreeing to these forms of homeland governance and self-governing territories, 
blacks became even more marginalised as the new structures and political 
authorities were deemed responsible for their welfare.  
As for the state, Southall explains that the objective of the Bantustan programme 
was not merely to ‘divide and rule’ but also:  
To create a collaborative African petty-bourgeoisie within each of the 
homelands. Indeed as the Bantustan strategy took off, the deliberate 
intent became to build up a set of dependent ethnic states along the 
neo-colonial model wherein emergent auxiliary elements would rely 
for their material prosperity and political privileges upon the favours 
of the separate development and would accordingly co-operate with 
the white rulers in the repression and control of the migrant proletariat 
whose role was to oscillate between the white core and the ethnicized 
peripheries (Southall, 1982:182). 
 
One example of such collaboration was through the policies of influx control and 
pass laws. Pass laws were documents granted to Africans as ‘permission 
documents’ to be produced on demand by security forces when travelling in urban 
areas (Thompson, 1995). The significance of these documents was in their 
emphasis of temporality in time and space as migrant labourers became regulated 
through time by these documents. For those in control, the documents served as 
instruments of power, authority and control while for others they symbolised 
powerlessness. But more importantly, these documents symbolised the duality of 
identity and tensions that sustained the homeland project. The homelands as 
‘reserves’ produced the cheap labour needed for the white economy, particularly 
in the mining industry, (Pickles and Woods 1992 Thompson, 1995; Jones, 1999) 
while also reinforcing the logic of ethnic identity that deeply segmented social 
life. In retrospect, it is apparent that this was reinforced by the fact that homeland 
governments relied on budget allocations made in Pretoria, hence their political 
collaboration with the Nationalist government.  
 
The point is that the apartheid state had to ensure that the race ideology was 
sustained to advance white supremacy through a vibrant economic and social 
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programme. In partnership with the state were secret societies of strong idealists 
like the Broederbond. Picard (2002) would argue that the Broederbond comprised 
ardent white male Afrikaner Nationalists, who dominated the senior appointments 
in the public and civil service at the time, particularly after 1948. They were 
ideologically bound to remove all forms of Milner’s Anglicisation of the public 
services in earlier decades (Picard, 2002), but also aimed to entrench Afrikaner 
culture and identity as mainstream culture in the public service and in the broader 
society. As Thompson suggests:  
For many Afrikaners, ethnic identity was more important than 
occupational and class differences. The Broederbond, the Federasie 
van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (Federation of Afrikaner Cultural 
Associations), the Afrikaner churches, the Reddingsdaadbond (Rescue 
Association), and the National Party combined to mobilize Afrikaner 
cultural, economic, and political power (Thompson, 1995:183). 
 
This type of racial and cultural collaboration created an ideological vanguard that 
protected and sustained apartheid thinking and its implementation, and this 
subsequently further isolated other ethnic groups outside the white classification.  
 
The homelands of Transkei and Ciskei  
The homelands of Transkei and Ciskei were a realisation of the Bantu Self 
Government Act of 1959 which focused on separate development, territorial 
divisions and ethnic revival (Jones 1999). Through the homelands the state 
organised the black groups in a peripherial discourse by assigning them to 
fragmented ethnic identities. Both the Transkei and Ciskei thus were part of the 
broad apartheid social plan which saw two Xhosa groups divided using the 
tribal and geopolitical boundaries of the Kei River spaces. At the centre of this 
homeland discourse was the need to create unique national identity and national 
culture that befits each group.  Transkei was the first homeland to be granted 
independence in 1976 and Ciskei followed much later in 1981. The history of 
these homelands is well captured by researchers like Peires (1992); Thompson 
(1995) and Southall (1998). The emergence of these homelands divided the 
Eastern Cape into four major boundaries, the Transkei, Ciskei, and South 
Africa’s Border and Eastern Province. Without any sense of economic 
developments in place, the homelands generally depended on South Africa for 
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their financial survival. For instance Transkei received at least about R200 
million per quarter from South Africa to help sustain its ‘independence’ (Peires 
1992).  
 
The first leaders of these homelands were Chief Kaiser Matanzima in the 
Transkei and Chief Lennox Sebe in the Ciskei. They were direct appointments 
by the Pretoria nationalist government, which reinforced the separatist ideology 
of the apartheid state by creating mythical identities of separate Xhosa nations. 
Such identities were manifested by the revival of chiefdoms, which categorised 
clans into specific entities. Interestingly, with the granting of independence the 
Kei river that runs through the two homelands assumed a new status, where it 
not only served as the border that separated the two ‘states’ but also became a 
point of identity, and the side of the Kei River that one came from became 
either a point of unity or difference. As these homeland regimes crystallised 
their separatist identities, so did the animosity between the two sides increased 
which later resulted in physical confrontations (Peires 1992). There is a whole 
argument that Sebe, the president of Ciskei, ‘battled to fabricate a distinctively 
Ciskeian national identity which could compete with the broader African 
nationalism of the ANC and the pan-Xhosa tribalism of Matanzima’s Transkei’ 
(Peires, 1992:377). Whatever the case, the creation of these homelands was 
nothing more than an extended illusion of ethnic differences.  
 
By the mid 1980s the struggle for political liberation intensified in the black 
townships of South Africa. Such struggles easily spilled into the homeland 
territories, especially Ciskei which struggled to build an ethno-nationalist 
agenda in its territories. One of the reasons for this is that unlike Transkei that 
was a composite unit in terms of its geographical location, Ciskei was made up 
of fragmented township spots within the major towns of South Africa’s 
Queenstown, King Williams Town and East London and their rural 
communities. But more important Peires (1992) identified the differences 
between the two homelands as follows: 
Transkei is largely rural with a traditional peasant population subject 
to powerful chiefs, Ciskei is heavily urbanized and industrialized 
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with a largely proletarianized population which scarcely respects 
chiefs and tradition (Peires 1992:377). 
 
To some extent this indicates the extent to which the two chiefs could exert 
influence and control over their subjects. Transkei relied on its emphasis on 
tradition and culture and the chiefs to maintain control and order, something 
that Ciskei struggled to achieve. Besides, Ciskei had inherited highly political 
and unionised environments whose loyalties remained in different class and 
political struggles.  
 
By 1986, Kaiser Matanzima had stepped down as the Prime Minister and 
handed the reins to his brother George Matanzima. Unfortunately, George 
Matanzima’s reign did not last due to allegations of corruption. He was 
subsequently ousted through a coup d’ etat by General Bantu Holomisa of the 
Transkei Defence Force (TDF). The internal struggles which facilitated the 
coup d’ etat ranged from discontentment within the TDF to ethnic and tribal 
succession politics of the Thembuland of which the Matanzima’s, the 
Mandela’s  and Holomisa’s belonged. Such struggles and contestations are 
dealt with in detail in Peires (1992). The important thing is that following the 
coup in the Transkei, Holomisa aligned himself with the African National 
Congress (ANC) going to en extent of unbanning its activities in the homeland.  
 
With Transkei under the military rule, it was not long that Sebe also got ousted 
by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo in 1990. There is a notion that Sebe orchestrated his 
coup so that his son could be the President of Ciskei (Peires 1992). 
Unfortunately, the plan backfired as Gqozo became the new chief through the 
assistance of South Africa. Gqozo, born in the Free State outside Ciskei, started 
on a similar pattern as Holomisa by freeing political prisoners. In the process he 
promised to ‘dismantle the tribal authority systems and introduce democratic 
representation’ (Rembe, 2005:45). While Holomisa remained true to his 
association with the ANC until the first democratic national elections in 1994, 
things turned out differently in Gqozo’s Ciskei. He turned against the ANC and 
its allies as he consolidated his power around a network of South Africa’s 
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military intelligence (Peires 1992). The peak of this poor relationship resulted 
in the Bisho Massacre in September 1992, where protest marchers organised by 
the ANC were killed by the Ciskeian police.  
 
Fundamentally, this thesis argues that these apartheid systems of ethnic 
classifications created the basis and myths of what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
call imaginary identities. It is these ‘imaginary identities’ that became the point 
of contestation and difference in the old South Africa which would thus affect 
integration in the new dispensation. To change the context of South Africa’ 
political landscape thus would require the eradication of these ingrained 
perceptions of difference at both ethnic and racial levels, as such perceptions 
have a potential to create antagonistic relations in the newly formed structures.  
 
4.4  Political and social re-organisation post-1994: The Integration of 
Eastern Cape  
 
With the negotiation between the African National Congress and the National 
Party for a political settlement in 1991, it became inevitable to discuss the new 
system of governance that would be inclusive of all South African. At a political 
level, the Convention of Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was established to 
iron out areas of political difference and to forge levels of political consensus that 
would help create a new democratic society. The politics of CODESA and its 
challenges are well articulated in Marais (1998). Nevertheless, albeit the 
negotiation challenges, the issue of regionalism got to the table in 1992 when the 
ANC, the National Party, the Democratic Party Kwa-Zulu Government and the 
South African-Tswana forum, released their regional proposals for South Africa 
(Muthien and Khosa 1995). Again it is interesting how different political 
groupings conceptualised the formation of new regions (read Muthien and Khosa 
1995). At the centre of the proposals were issues of self-interest, power and 
continuity. For instance, with regard to the future of the Transkei and Ciskei 
homelands, Muthien and Khoza (1995) went on write that: 
The Ciskei government, for example proposed a Border/Kei region that 
would exclude the Transkei…Business interests in the Eastern Cape as 
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well as the DP and the NP, were adamant about splitting the larger 
Eastern Cape into two regions (Muthien and Khoza 1995:311).   
 
Even within the Transkei, there were voices that wanted Transkei not to be 
incorporated as part of the EC (Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 November 2003). 
Peires (1997) quoted by Jones (1999) argues that those voices, particularly in the 
Transkei, were part of the reactionary factions of the former elite who wanted ‘to 
defend and extend their privileges and patronage of the Bantustan era’ (Jones, 
1999:512). Such patronage ranged from low taxation to include various perks that 
came with working for the state. Beneath this were insecurities about job losses 
and possible lack of influence in the new networks of power (Interview S, Port 
Elizabeth, 18 May 2004 and Interview P, King Williams Town, 20 November 
2003). Whatever other reasons there were, theoretically the new government 
never entertained the idea of the tenth province. The point is that the ANC at the 
time wanted to destroy all apartheid structures and myths of separatism, which 
were meant to reinforce tribal and ethnic divisions. Nonetheless the new structural 
configuration thus saw the incorporation of the two homelands of Ciskei and 
Transkei into the broader Cape Administration as shown by Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2 The newly integrated Eastern Cape Provinces which incorporates 
the Ciskei, Transkei and the Cape Provincial Administration4   
 
The new structures thus brought with them different political and economic 
histories. Politically, the ANC appointed a 72 year old veteran Raymond Mhlaba 
as premier of the province. He managed the province for at least three years and 
retired in 1997 to be replaced by the nationally deployed ANC treasurer and chief 
whip in the National Assembly, Reverend Makhenkesi Stofile. The Mhlaba era 
was the most challenging in terms of administrative transformation as he had to 
oversee the integration of homelands and the fragmented Cape Province 
Administration (CPA). His departure was equally highly contested by some of his 
supporters like Holomisa (Gumede 2005). However, as a ‘hard core communist 
he had become a liability at the time when the government was throwing its 
weight behind GEAR’ Gumede (2005:143). But also he was seen to be 
                                                 
4. Lemon, A. (2004) Redressing School Inequalities in the Eastern Cape. Journal of Southern African 
Studies. June 30, pp.269-290 (22). 
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overwhelmed by the challenged to integrate the provincial administration which 
was chaotic, incompetent and corrupt (Southall 1998; Hawker 2000; Rembe 
2005). Stofile’s reign had its own challenges administratively, leading to the 
national intervention by the Interim Management Team, (IMT) in 2002/3. This is 
when four departments namely, social development, education, health and public 
works were put under a national intervention programme to help change their 
processes to facilitate service delivery. Unfortunately, by the time Stofile left the 
province in 2004, there were still reports of maladministration including 
corruption (Allan, Mattes and Millie 2002; Hyslop 2005).   
 
The choice of the capital 
Already at the time of the political changes and the re-drawing of boundaries for 
integration purposes, it became inevitable that contestations about who was to 
govern who would surface. This is because, by 1994, the province had functional 
white cities of Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown and East London which appeared 
sufficiently viable to host the new democratic capital. Figure 4.2 shows the cities. 
However, all these cities lacked the infrastructure necessary to run a government, 
such as parliament, the legislature, the high courts and other administration 
buildings, which were available in homelands as a result of previous self-
government politics of the apartheid era. At the time of the elections it seemed 
logical to choose either Umtata or Bisho, the capital towns of Transkei and Ciskei 
respectively, which already had the necessary infrastructure. This turned out to be 
a highly contested issue in a large array of competing interests (Siyongwana, 
2002). However, there were administrative guidelines set to facilitate this process 
as indicated by Hattingh (1994) quoted in Siyongwana (2002). Some of the things 
that were to be considered included the following: 
• The administrative and infrastructural availability and capacity: The 
former relates to the availability of human resources in terms of 
administrative skills, while the latter is directed to such aspects as the 
office space; 
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• Accessibility of the provincial capital city: This relates to geographical 
accessibility encompassing communication and infrastructural 
connections, for example, air, land, water links, communications etc.; 
• Centrality: This takes into consideration the geographical location of the 
capital city in relation to the population of the province; 
• Natural resource base: This relates to aspects including the availability of 
land for future expansion of the provincial capital city, water supply for 
domestic use, to mention but a few; 
• Acceptability of the proposed provincial capital by the community at 
different levels: This relates to people’s positive perceptions, attitudes, 
and feelings as well as aspirations with regard to the city. Cities which 
tend to bear deep imprints of the colonial past are not favoured to qualify 
as provincial capital cities of South Africa; 
• The economic viability: In this regard the provincial capital city should 
have the potential for economic growth, especially the industrial sector 
(Siyongwana, 2002:5).  
 
Indeed all contending cities used these outlined factors to justify their individual 
cases for consideration. Grahamstown pulled out of the race to retain the supreme 
court (Siyongwana, 2002). Without going deeply into the process, the results saw 
Bisho retained as the capital of the new Eastern Cape for the following reasons: 
• The availability of the infrastructure that the administration and the 
legislature could use; 
• Its centrality in relation to other parts of the province; 
• Accessibility of the town regarding its proximity to the railway and the 
national roads; 
• The availability of land for future development (Siyongwana, 2002:9). 
 
While all these reasons seem viable, this discussion lacks the analysis of the 
political reasons that influenced this choice. These were captured by two 
interviewees in the following way:  
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• Firstly, due to the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) in 
the border region and its neighbour Ciskei, Bisho was a familiar territory 
and thus a comfortable political home for the ruling party, which had 
absorbed most of its politicians from this region;  
• Secondly, Bisho was a small administrative entity with no history of 
political activism, and thus more susceptible to change and with minimal 
resistance and contestation compared to the highly established Transkei; 
and  
• Thirdly, the history of Transkei as a powerful political house had 
implications for the new government, literally its political muscle and size 
would have swayed the new government into homeland practices; 
(Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 2005; Interview Ra, 
Telephonic Interview, 15 November 2005).  
 
Of course what these interviews highlighted is the existence of interests in highly 
contested spaces. But more importantly, one cannot ignore the fact that implicit in 
the choice of the capital were issues of access to power and influence, 
marginalization and isolationism and the will to retain exclusive identities. The 
following quotations are indicative of the inherent tensions that came with this 
change. 
There was a move you remember when people wanted the offices – the 
headquarters – to be in Umtata. When they failed with that they 
wanted the capital of the Eastern Cape to be Umtata and when they 
failed with that they said they wanted the 10th province, you 
remember. You see those were attempts not to be here [Bisho], you 
know. When they failed to convince whomever, I believe they actually 
sabotaged the new government and we were not vigilant enough also 
to counter that… (Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 November 2003).  
 
What I think was dominant was a perception that people from Transkei 
are not wanted in the new administration. That tended to be a view that 
people expressed whether it was backed up by facts in terms of 
counting heads or it was backed up by feelings that those people who 
were managers in the ex-Transkei department did not feature much in 
the new administration. And then the whole notion that people had to 
move headquarters and Umtata not being the headquarters and Bisho 
being the headquarters and there remained that headquarters Umtata 
with a number of officials… Then there were lot of perceptions that 
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developed to say even the fact that they have moved to Bisho its not 
necessarily about [how] central Bisho is, it’s about snubbing us as 
Transkei being bigger  (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 
November 2003). 
 
The issue here is that the Transkei had ruled itself under the auspices of 
independence for nearly thirty years and had become accustomed to its own ways 
of doing things. The integration thus would have removed their power of 
decision-making and broad political, social and economic influence. Of course the 
tensions to remain separate were not only a subject of Umtata, Bisho became 
territorial in rejecting outsiders as well. For instance, some officials went on to 
say: 
Then there was for a number of years this feeling that the seat of this 
province, the decision to have the seat of this province here, meant for 
those public servants who worked in the Ciskei that there is now an 
invasion of foreigners in their territory to take their jobs. Then people 
started being critical of one another like how these Transkeians do this, 
how do these Ciskeians do this, how these Department of Education 
and Training (DET) people do this, how these white people do these 
kinds of things. So for about three to four years we grappled 
extensively with this particular problem (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 
November 2003). 
 
The other issue here was the very issue of the capital of the province. 
It caused a problem as well. A large number of our staff were 
operational in Umtata and when the capital was identified to be Bisho 
that in itself created problems because those who were operational at 
Bisho saw this as their base and anybody else coming in was a 
stranger. The system they had was therefore the one that was adopted 
whereas what was needed was a new approach altogether. And 
obviously, the polarization – because being operational within 
previous systems impacted very much on a new co-existence. People 
identified themselves as being from Transkei or Ciskei or whatever 
and that didn’t help us (Interview I, Zwelitsha, 15 May 2004). 
 
What this identifies are underlying tensions in the broader spaces of a required 
reconciliation and compromise. The point is that the new transition treated the 
previous divisions as superficial. If anything it started from the premise that the 
change was necessary and thus assumed consensus, but as tensions intensified in 
Umtata, even President Mandela tried to become involved in the discussion at the 
time by suggesting that big departments should move to Umtata, including 
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education (Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 November 2003). Fundamentally, these 
tensions demonstrate struggles of power and rigid identities formed through the 
apartheid era. Again, if one goes back to Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) concept of 
‘imaginary’ selves it is the ‘us’ and ‘them’ phenomenon that became the basis to 
associate, organize and mobilize where the ‘us’ qualifies one for a particular 
community with a common conscribed identity. Indirectly, such belonging 
assumes collaboration and co-operation while the reference to the other may 
represent a threat to the acquired ‘stable’ identities and makes the other rejected 
or treated with suspicion. Beyond the political differences about what this 
reconfiguration meant and who was likely to benefit from the new arrangements, 
there were other realities to contend with which would subsequently affect 
effective integration. These include the economic and the administrative realities 
discussed below.   
 
The economic realities 
The EC province has a population of 7 million people, the third largest provincial 
population after Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. One of the distinguishing features 
of this province is that – despite the documented history of good missionary 
education at the beginning of the twentieth century – it still has low literacy levels. 
For instance, the South African Year Book (SAYB) (2002/2003) assessment of 
educational trends discovered that 20,9% of 20-year-olds have not received any 
schooling, while only 4,7% have completed higher education. This low level of 
education is but one of the many characteristics that contribute to poverty. There 
is a lack of economic vibrancy in the province resulting in a high unemployment 
rate. The SAYB of 2002 and 2003 describes the EC as one of the poorest 
provinces. The average economic growth rate from 1995 to 2001 stands at 2.4% 
(South African Institute of Race Relations, (SAIRR) (2002/2003).  Rembe (2005) 
highlights that 70% of the 6.2 million inhabitants are classified as poor. Of this 
64% live in rural areas. In places like Queenstown’s Lukhanji district, 
unemployment rate has remained at 31% and 38%  between 1996 and 2001 
respectively (Mears 2004). Of those employed, 41% have monthly earnings that 
are less than R400 per month (Rembe 2005). It is no surprise then that there is a 
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high dependency on the state to provide basic leaving allowances through social 
grants and pensions.  
 
Of course this state of affairs in unlikely to improve immediately as there are rules 
governing how provinces can raise their revenue. For instance Simeon and 
Murray (2001) did an interim assessment of South Africa’s multi-sphere of 
governance. Amongst the areas reviewed were the fiscal responsibilities 
designated between the national and provincial offices. Their analysis showed that 
due to the high centralisation of financial decision making, provinces have limited 
revenue raising and borrowing capacities. Rather provinces were fully dependent 
on national pool of revenue as dictated by the Constitution (Sections 214-216) and 
the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act of 1997. Such lack of autonomy thus 
was seen to reduce their capacity to respond to regional mandates and needs. This 
is despite the national directives which require that provinces spend at least 85% 
of their revenues on health, education and welfare sectors (ECSECC 2000 and 
Simeon and Murray 2001). Despite such directives such revenue allocations have 
hardly addressed provincially oriented needs. On the contrary provincial agendas 
become secondary to nationally designed mandates (Simeon and Murray 2001).  
 
Of course this creates challenges for the Eastern Cape which had inherited two 
economically deprived homelands of Ciskei and Transkei.  For instance studies on 
equity in education (Lemon 2004 and Fataar 1997) reveal that the inherited 
economic disparities have affected the quality of education improvement in the 
province. The most affected being the old Transkei and Ciskei regions.  For 
instance Lemon (2004) identified an East-West contrast between the schools and 
their performances. Using the map in figure 4.2 as a point of reference, Lemon 
(2004) highlighted that schools in the Eastern parts of the province which include 
the coloured areas of Graaff-Reinet, Humansdorp and Willowmore and former 
white schools in Port Elizabeth, East London, Grahamstown and Queenstown had 
lower teacher: pupil ratios with minimum and maximum averages of 17,5 to 
37,1%. This was in contrast to schools in the Western side of the province whose 
teacher ratios ranged between 37,1% and 66,6% respectively. Such patterns of 
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inequality were also evident in Matric results, where the Eastern schools’ pass 
rates ranged between 50% and 85%, while the Western parts of the province 
performed at 15% to 40% averages. There is no doubt such disparities are 
symptomatic of the homeland and its economic resource deprivation.  
 
The administrative realities 
Beyond the economic challenges that characterise the new Eastern Cape, the 
province also inherits poor administration capacities that were inherent in the 
homelands (Picard 2002 and 2006). The homelands are known to have relied on 
patrimonial bureaucracy, which survived on ‘clientelist’ networks (Peires 
(1992:385).  Of course this was not unique to the homelands, patrimonial 
tendencies were a phenomenon of South Africa as well (read Lodge 1998 and 
Hyslop 2005 for a historical analysis of political corruption before and after 
apartheid). Nonetheless, the concept of separate development had seen different 
systems of administration that ran parallel until the democratic elections of 1994 
which enforced integration. While integration was essential for the new 
democratic dispensation, one cannot underestimate the legacies of these previous 
regimes and the divisions they created. The culture of separation had in one way 
or another created distinct identities and cultures, which could not be written off 
overnight. All previous structures had over time developed their own ways of 
doing things and had created their own practices in response to their supposedly 
unique environments and contexts. 
 
By 1998, there were about 138 000 public servants in the province, paid 8 million 
per year in salaries (Picard 2005). This number had subsequently reduced to 
approximately 125 068 in 2002 (Radebe et al 2004). The bulk of these employees 
came from the homelands. For instance at the time of 1994 integration, Transkei 
and Ciskei had 125, 217 employees between them. Of these 94 664, 30 553 came 
from the Transkei and 30 553 were from the Ciskei (Picard 2005). Lodge (2005) 
puts these numbers conservatively at 55 000 and 20,000 for Transkei and Ciskei 
respectively. Despite the numerical differences the key issue raised in the 
literature is that common to all the homelands, the public services lacked skills to 
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run an efficient bureaucracies and it was prone to corrupt and nepotistic 
tendencies due to the patrimonial system that dominated homeland governance in 
general (Southall 1998; Picard 2002 and 2006; Lodge 2002). Hence it remained a 
challenge how to integrate it into fully effective machinery.  
 
4.5  The legislative context and organizational change from 1994 to 1999  
Theories of organizational change tend to be framed within the notions of stability 
and equilibrium, where change is either internally and/or externally induced for 
the betterment of the organization. Inherently change becomes a temporal 
phenomenon whose task is to enhance further conditions of control, order, 
efficiency and competitiveness. Rarely would notions of politics and strategy 
become part of this debate unless one looks specifically at strategic management 
research. Even there, politics are sidelined as unnecessary in organizations 
(Mintzberg 1983). However, in this case one sees change as a product of external 
strategy and politics. Brown (2000:46) goes on to define strategy as ‘a 
decentering movement, a re-ordering of discourses’. Equally with the general 
transformation, opportunities were seized to re-order and destabilize the 
discourses of the apartheid administration. Using the normative or value-based 
conscriptions of the Interim Constitution of 1993, the reformers forged 
ideological consensus to see change as a necessity, to lobby for ideological 
incorporation and the alteration of power relations. Indeed, this was a conducive 
strategy in the era of the Government of National Unity (GNU) where political 
co-operation was essential.  
 
Equally then, the ECDE, like all other public organizations, drew its mandate for 
transformation and change from various government policies and regulations. At 
the beginning the Interim Constitution 0f 1993 and the White Paper on Public 
Service Transformation (1995) became the major points of reference, followed by 
other newly developed policies which all had differing impacts. Some of these 
include the White Paper on Education and Training (1995), National Educational 
Policy Act (1996); the South African Schools Act (1996) and the Public Finance 
Management Act (1999). While almost all these policies were based on the 
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normative values of equity, redress, quality and access, the way they were 
interpreted depended on the local conditions.  
 
In the ECDE, the national department of education dominated most policy 
directives. This was in line with the fact that national departments had concurrent 
and even overriding powers over provincial departments. The powers of the 
national and provincial governments are highlighted in schedule 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution of South Africa. Section 146 of the Constitution deals with 
conflicting laws between the two spheres of governance. For instance Section 146 
(2) (a) and (b) states that: 
National legislation that applies uniformly with regard to the country as a 
whole prevails over provincial legislation if any of the following conditions 
is met: 
(a) The national legislation deals with a matter that cannot be regulated 
effectively by legislation enacted by the respective provinces 
individually. 
(b) The national legislation deals with a matter that, to be dealt with 
effectively, requires uniformity across the nation, and the national 
legislation provides that uniformity by establishing 
(i) norms and standards; 
(ii) frameworks; or 
(iii) national policies. 
 
Implicitly, such emphasis on national norms and standards, frameworks and 
national policies elevates the powers of national department’s authority and 
control over their respective provincial departments. Hence the provincial 
departments tend to follow policy directions set by national offices, albeit their 
autonomous status.  
 
However, with the furious pace of reform this meant that at times provinces were 
caught off guard by pronounced mandates leaving the departments stranded 
without the necessary resources and capacity to deliver. This was largely due to 
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the tenuous relationship between policy-making and policy implementation, 
where the former remained the jurisdiction of the national offices while provinces 
had to contend with implementation (McLennan 2000). Equally, when talking to 
the officials here there is no doubt that external policies became major drivers for 
change, although their experiences of both conceptualization and implementation 
could be equated with nightmarish dreams. One reason for this is that there was 
little or no conceptual alignment and co-ordination between the national and 
provincial offices. While this disjuncture could be explained by the urgency to 
change the system, in retrospect it paralyzed the department’s ability to plan, co-
ordinate and streamline its activities. In the process, one could not fail to read the 
articulation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the provincial officials continuously referred to 
the national officials as ‘national’. This almost suggests distance rather than 
collegiality, which was supposed to be built through interaction. Perhaps it is that 
implicit distance that made it difficult for national to play an empathetic role 
around local conditions and contexts as it proposed change after change. The 
quotations that follow are expressions of different forms of ambivalence in the 
policy-changing environment: 
…now the critical thing, national determines policy and also 
pronounces some policy. National says now we are going to admit 
learners who are turning six or are six-year-olds into Grade 1 and we 
all clap in the legislature. Yourself as a parent you are very happy, my 
child won’t stay home until he is seven. Now immediately you 
translate that into the EC arrangement where you are now going to 
bring into the system almost 10 000 students for example, and this 
allocation that Mr Godongwana [MEC Finance] spoke about there in 
the policy speech, it says nothing about the policy that has been 
pronounced by Minister Asmal. Remember this budget is for this year 
until March and schools start in January. So schools are not going to 
wait until we say something else in March. They must do admissions 
in October and November by law. So they are going to start admitting 
these Grade 1, six-year-olds in October, November. ….. 
 
He went on to say, 
 
They are going to come back to us as Education and say declare what 
we call staff establishment. So a school must be told how many 
teachers they qualify for so that teachers… schools can plan for next 
year. So I know I’m going to have twelve teachers instead of 10, then I 
know I can take so many kids, then I can give them responsibilities, all 
that. That’s what education does. So we do that basing it on indicative 
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budget figures we are going to receive from Treasury and remember 
we’ve got two years, so we already have a sense that its not going to 
take us far because the two years are already indicated in the budget 
speech. So the national policies are putting additional pressure on 
provinces. Now they put more pressure on us because we do not have 
any other resources in terms of revenue (Interview P, King William’s 
Town, 20 November, 2003). 
 
The politician will pilot policies into parliament and they will be 
passed and become laws and they would write to bureaucracies at 
national levels, which does nothing but make those policies and 
laws…and the law says there shall be this, there shall be that, there 
shall be this… So now people at the national level, they make the 
policy, which is translated into law, and then they produced the 
regulations then they expect the provinces to implement, right?…The 
department of education has this kind of room full of policies and 
documents and the majority of them have never been read by anybody. 
This explains to me when they say they have got policy overload, they 
will tell you that we have not been able to read, interpret, internalise 
and assess the first policies you came up with, the second one, the 
third one…now you are at number hundred and fifty. So we don’t 
know how to implement the rest of the policies (Interview S, Port 
Elizabeth, 18 May 2004). 
 
There was new policy from national that obviously had to be 
implemented. So we had a changing policy situation. Curriculum was 
one of those areas, major changes as from the beginning of 1998 that 
had to be implemented. It was an imperative, with all the implications 
of implementing new curriculum, there were a number of other major 
policy changes which were all necessary of course, and there is no 
suggestion that policies per se were a problem. But it is the impact of 
massive policy change on a system that had all those inherent 
challenges. And that of course has… resulted in some people 
becoming confused, demoralised and demotivated (Interview I, 
Zwelitsha, 15 May 2004). 
 
Inherent in these quotations is the sense of being overwhelmed by the mass 
production taking place in the policy realm. But more importantly, these policies 
found the officials not yet ready to deal with, or interpret them, due to various 
change pressures. It was thus no surprise to hear the former MEC (Interview S, 
Port Elizabeth, 18 May 2004) frustrated by the fact that the officials did not read 
policies but relied on workshop materials, which are usually thin and lacked 
detail. One union member  went on to identify this lack of reading and 
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familiarisation with policy as one of the major problems in the organisation as it 
left managers vulnerable to manipulation as workers tend to bargain on 
everything, including allocated work. Undoubtedly this has implications on broad 
organisational competencies, capacity and empowerment. 
 
Nevertheless, the issue here is that whenever mandates were pronounced 
provinces were expected to jump on board whether they were ready to do so or 
not. Sometimes such policy pressures came from ‘outside’, through highly 
influential entities like the Department of Public Service and Administration 
(DPSA) who also had the mandate to change and modernise public administration 
in South Africa. To do this they also designed new policies, laws and regulations 
that had to be implemented by all departments and it is a common feature that 
departments sank or swam with the current, largely because there was little or no 
space to negotiate the avoidance of any form of development or reform. Instead as 
one official indicated, the process rolled out exactly the same as anywhere else:  
We all sign performance agreements we are going to do one, two, 
three, four, five, six, seven. We have no idea whether we will be able 
to do those things. The whole process of planning activity and 
budgeting accordingly and then measuring performance against your 
plan is completely undermined. It becomes an artificial exercise. It 
becomes whatever you were doing, what did we get last year, what can 
we ask for in addition and what did we actually spend. So what I am 
saying is that as a result of that process, the implementation of some of 
those really important reforms in the public service that have enabled 
other provinces to move forward significantly in terms of the 
performance of their managers say at Deputy Director General, Chief 
Director and Director level, this simply hasn’t been possible here 
(Interview J, East London, 18 November 2003). 
 
Complicating this situation has been the lack of adequate preparation of officials 
with regard to training and skills development, who have relied on cascaded 
workshops that were more information-based than skills-oriented (Interview S, 
Port Elizabeth, 18 May 2004). All these ambivalences were consequential to 
externally driven reforms where the department was more a follower than a 
proactive player. This is perhaps the major difference in changing public 
institutions, that their agency unlike that in the private sector is limited by the set 
guidelines and rules as they emerge from the political processes. As one may 
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expect, the contradictions and tensions were not just about how much content was 
to be handled in short pressured spaces of time, but more about what the 
implications were at an organisational level. In this context, the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) as a service delivery tool will be examined.  
 
4.6  The RDP as the key driver of Access, Redress and Equity 
Generally, when talking to the officials there is no indication that the broad policy 
values of access, redress and equity were ever contested. Rather, indirectly they 
became the new change signifiers of relations between the state, the bureaucracy 
and the local communities. For instance, their articulation was a shift from the 
politics of marginalisation and exclusion to general access and inclusion in state 
services. Theoretically, the RDP changed the state’s role in the new democratic 
change process to a distributive entity and its bureaucracy was included. For 
bureaucracies surrounded by massive poverty circles, such distributive logic 
automatically focused bureaucratic activities towards expenditure rather than 
efficiency. By this is meant the notions of redress, access and quality stretched 
both the community expectations and their respective bureaucracies about the role 
and expectations of the state in the new dispensation. Fundamentally, the South 
African state had adopted more of what Ngema (2003) and Matomela (2003) 
describe as a developmental state. As Ngema says: 
The developmental state is usually established when there has been 
some sort of rupture in the pre-existing order. Such rupture need not 
amount to a revolutionary one; it could simply be reformist. The 
developmental state therefore strives to change the pre-existing power 
relations but the degree to which it seeks to change them depends on 
the balance of forces within the state and in society (Ngema, 2003:18). 
 
While the reformist nature of the state could be driven by policy, the changing of 
power relations was always going to be a contested issue due to the varied 
interests involved. Theoretically, one claims that the RDP became an attempt to 
change such power relations, as it became a resource redistribution tool. As a 
needs-driven programme, located in the office of the President, it became a 
distributor of key funding for various Presidential Lead Projects in various 
sectors. However, due to lack of key strategic direction for public sector reform at 
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the time, it became a flytrap that attracted anything to it. Munslow and FitzGerald 
(1995) examine its many faces as (a) a fund; (b) a set of development planning 
tools for government; (c) a major governmental change management process and 
(d) a societal vision and site of a national development debate. For the ECDE 
officials it became a point of challenges. This is evident in the following 
articulations: 
You see the people with the new government were under the 
impression things are going to change overnight. My office was like 
the real gqirha [doctor’s] office. You know I had a bench outside. 
Every day delegations came from all over and it was a question of 
going out and say Next! Next! Next! Mr X and I dealt with that. So we 
had that difficulty, how do you contain and how do you address these 
expectations. (Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004). 
 
You had to make sure that all communities are provided for with 
facilities and the new ratios that were required – the learner to 
educator’s ratios that they required has to be met. And people were 
very much aware of what was supposed to be provided because the 
RDP was there before we moved into the election…So guided by that, 
they knew exactly what was supposed to be happening in education 
and they demanded in a state that was being set up and not ready. So 
the demands were more than the state of readiness of the state 
(Interview To, Bisho, 19 May 2004). 
 
Now as we bring together these people in 1994, all of them I believed 
had expectations. Now the challenging aspect was how you manage 
expectations…Because if you look at parents, parents have their own 
expectations and in terms of education the parents’ expectations were 
in relation to free and compulsory education. Parents said for the first 
time our children will have access to education and it will be free 
education, because they take it from what the Freedom Charter said 
because it was a popular voice in the 90s to say doors of learning and 
culture will be opened to all. So they went further to say that not just 
opened but there will be free and compulsory education. So that was 
mainly the parents’ component. Then the students, there was a period 
where everybody believe that its liberation before education, that was 
the popular slogan. Then the whole thing changed then there was a 
whole campaign I mean especially within our province, but I’m sure 
nationally, that which we termed mobilisation. Mobilisation for a 
Learning Nation, so we had to mobilise them to go back to school 
because there was a whole new paradigm shift to say without 
education you will not be able to sustain our liberation within the 
country, so students went back in droves, large numbers. We had all of 
an experience of overpopulated schools. Now if you come to 
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educators, remember I said educators belong to a number of groupings. 
So educators’ expectations were that for the first time we can receive 
resources, the learning and teaching environment will be improved, 
will be maybe a different one and then there was an element of 
remuneration because somehow people believe that what they were 
being remunerated far below what is supposed to be the threshold in 
terms of remuneration of educators (Interview P, King William’s 
Town, 20 November 2003, Zwelitsha, 20 November 2003). 
 
Implicit in these quotations are reflections of internal organisation inabilities to 
cope with the political demands and set expectations. For instance, one sees how 
the notion of distributive justice became easily intertwined in the broader politics 
of the Freedom Charter and the political campaigns of 1994. To some extent one 
argues that it is this type of justice that reconfigured relations between the state 
and the communities. While contending with their own competing interests, 
communities bargained using the same RDP and the Freedom Charter to advance 
their own particular interests. The point is that democracy and the vote had made 
it possible for people to voice their needs, something they could not do within the 
repressive state.  
 
With such varied expectations then in place the questions are: what were the 
implications for the new distributive bureaucracy? What kind of power relations 
emerged from this? Firstly, the bureaucracy found itself under extreme pressure to 
respond to various stakeholders’ needs, and the pressure became the determinant 
of the responses, and when and how they happened. Such pressures came from 
various sources, including the politicians whose success depended on the votes, 
the local stakeholders, the donors and even the media. Of course, without any 
measuring glass to give weight to competing claims,  this meant that other needs 
were prioritised, hence the doctors’ queue outside the offices. In extreme cases, 
however, this resulted in hostage-taking of officials whereas one interviewee went 
on to say ‘during that whole first year I was held hostage at the school because 
they wanted to have something now and I had to talk myself out of it’ (Interview 
Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004. One of the reasons for this is explained by one 
official who said ‘we were in the camp site but we were expecting all the luxuries 
of living in the established residence, you know walls, floors, water, sewerage and 
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electricity whereas you know in the camp site those things were not functioning’ 
(Interview I, Hogsback, 17 May 2004). Such pressures and expectations were also 
exacerbated by the context of extreme poverty and under-development, and tools 
like the RDP became synonymous with escape from such conditions.  
 
For the departmental officials, the pressures had consequences, with work being 
done erratically, and achievements uncertain. As was explained: 
In 1997 you know we selected 278 schools. We’ve given each 
community R63 000 and we have said build three classrooms for us 
this is the plan, establish a building committee. We will give you R10 
a day and we’ll give you the support. We’ll send the work-inspector 
for you to put out the foundation, we give them a step-by-step manual 
and we say will you please now deliver those three classrooms. We 
can’t, if you don’t help us you’ll only get classrooms in ten years time. 
Open a bank account, we are going to give you, the MEC went there to 
hand over cheques. A big risk that we took, but we’ve realized that we 
have got to make one big effort. Our target was to put in as many 
classrooms in a short space of time. As I said it was part of this 
pressure we got from the communities. So, you know the 
communities, we gave them three months to build three classrooms in 
278 schools. You know they delivered on that project. We put into that 
area 861 classrooms through community participation. We said we 
don’t expect you to do it for nothing you can buy milk, you can buy 
bread for R10. We will pay you ten Rand out of that money of 861 
classrooms. Beside that 861 classrooms we also built 2 000 emergency 
classrooms. We’ve used 13 contractors to do that. 
 
Q: What would be the emergency ones? 
A: Emergency ones, these are these pre-fabricated, you know. Now we 
say you know when we started we looked at a backlog of over 22 000 
classrooms, now we’re looking at a backlog of 12 000 to 13 000 
classrooms and at that time we had to depend on the information that 
we got through our co-coordinators in each district. They did not have 
cars, they reacted on information that they in turn heard from schools 
which meant that we have made many mistakes. We may have built 
more classrooms at a school we should not have. We have built 
schools where we should not have because of inadequate information 
so we’ve made our mistakes in some areas. But what we are saying 
now is we’ve got to a point where we have now managed to visit each 
and every school (Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 11 May 2004, Zwelitsha, 
20 May 2004). 
 
Again this reflects the complexities of managing competing stakeholder interests 
and the compromises that were made. Theoretically, these compromises come 
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from the reconfigured bureaucratic-community relations. For instance, it is mostly 
unusual that the bureaucracy of the ideal type engages with the community on 
service delivery. This is usually left to the politician and her/his constituency. 
However, with democracy in place, it opened spaces for communities to challenge 
government on realising their rights where necessary. It is possible to contend that 
the direct community interactions in places like the Transkei were partly to pacify 
the discontentment from those who were calling for self-governance, but also to 
dismiss the mythical dispositions that had emerged that it was the ‘Cinderella of 
this province’ (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003, King 
William’s Town, 20 November 2006). This is illustrative of how decisions are 
made to consolidate hegemonic ideology. The new state had flagged itself as a 
state of abundance and had to play along to meet the expectations thus created. 
With the aid of the minimal cheques and promises of better schools (even though 
these were often sub-standard, for example, the prefabricated temporary 
classrooms), it retained its position as a demi-god bringing manna from heaven; 
the indirect result of this was to build community confidence in the new 
democratic state, which subsequently won the next election. Such observations 
are not intended to detract from the ingenuity of the bureaucrats to somehow 
produce service delivery in even the most inaccessible places – the intention is 
rather to demonstrate the complex relations that bureaucracies forge in externally 
driven contested change settings.  
 
The RDP was unfortunately not able to deliver on all these expectations for many 
reasons. Some of the reasons cited by Munslow and FitzGerald (1995:47) include 
the fact that its basic philosophies underestimated the influence of global 
considerations on the decision-makers. Its assumptions were based on the ‘cozy 
world of autonomy and self-reliance, which unfortunately existed only as a 
development fantasy’ (Munslow and FitzGerald, 1995:47).  For instance, some of 
the international funding had conditions attached, which had to be met, but the 
RDP also suffered from lack of institutional capacity, which paralysed 
communication about the criteria for funding. They contend that some of the 
officials dealt with departments in presumptuous and patronising ways that 
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‘earned them a minor reputation as self-anointed development commissars’ (ibid: 
47). At another level, the RDP was in motion when there were no clear 
institutional arrangements for its operations in some departments, and this lack of 
clarity led to the RDP encroaching on the territory of other departments, 
especially since the accountability of its development programmes lay outside the 
host department.   
 
Although the RDP did not make any significant impression on the structural and 
cultural arrangements of state bureaucracies, it became the organising tool for 
development and service delivery for at least the first two years of democracy. It 
was unfortunately a programme set in motion when the field was hardly prepared 
for it to take off and it faced increasingly harsh criticism. On closure of the RDP, 
it was replaced by a more orthodox and fiscal austerity-oriented macroeconomic 
policy, which will be examined in more detail later.  It is necessary to turn now to 
an examination of the dynamics of resource provisioning, which were 
instrumental in shaping the early dynamics of the initial transition phase.     
 
4.7 Resource provisioning and allocations: The Tale of Empty Coffers 
Although significant amounts of money were spent on various RDP projects, the 
reality was that this department, like all others, had to fight for its share of 
resources in the broader context of varied parameters of resource allocation, 
financial continuity and discontinuity that had been set by the Interim 
Constitution Act No. 200 of 1993. Among the many conditions set, sections 239 
and 240 which addressed assets and liabilities and state revenue funding 
respectively, appear to have had a direct impact on provisioning. For instance, 
section 239 (3) (a) talks to the inheritance of debts and liabilities, stating that  ‘all 
debts and liabilities directly linked to an asset vesting in terms of subsection (1) in 
a provincial government shall be assumed by such provincial government (Interim 
Constitution Act No. 200 of 1993:18). In retrospect, what this meant for the 
ECDE was an automatic transference of all education debts and liabilities to its 
financial coffers. Such debts predominantly emanated from the two inherited 
homelands which had minimal infrastructure and were predominantly poor. This 
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meant that any structural rationalisation thus became a merger of debts, an 
inheritance of financial backlogs and an adoption of poorly developed 
administration financial systems, which would have a bearing in the new 
dispensation. The comments of officials reflected their frustration with the lack of 
assistance in these matters. For example: 
On the other side it is fact, that fact is that the department of education 
in the EC which is in control of 6 500 schools, in control of over       
73 000 to 75 000 employees with a learner population of about 2.1 
million inherited the massive backlogs that were found in the 
homelands, Ciskei and the Transkei and also your ex-DET inherited all 
of that and was charged with the responsibility of putting a 
government together to address that. The fact of the matter is that no-
one pronounced what we were inheriting. The people of this province 
were not sensitized fully about the magnitude of the problem we were 
inheriting here. If I could use a thermometer or something like that I 
would say when other people started at 0 degrees or at 5 degrees we 
started at -20 degrees. Like having to fill a hole before building a 
house, you know. We have that challenge and whenever we try to 
build that house we discover a new hole, you know (Interview B, 
Zwelitsha, 19/11/2003). 
 
The distribution or sharing of the cake started from the basis that was 
not informed because the basis did not consider that as we entered into 
the dispensation of 1994 we already carried a huge financial backlog. 
There were debts that were sitting somewhere, whether it was 
Transkei. Remember the homeland systems were run by debts or over-
expenditure and borrowings and all those things. So when that 
government collapsed, De Klerk had no duty to tell anyone to say that 
remember Transkei has x-amounts of debts sitting somewhere, it 
would come one day. And now since that period the debts were like 
springing up whether it’s people that have not been receiving their 
monies or back pay or bonus or whatever. Those people came up and 
said I have not been paid my this and that and we had to pay them…So 
I’m saying until we are able to cost the policy implications financially 
for the province and also cost the backlog accumulated by the province 
and allocate a separate earmarked funding or redress fund. You 
earmark x-amount of money to deal specifically with backlogs… 
(Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003). 
 
This inability to fully comprehend how deep the hole of debt is means that the 
department is in a constant state of repairing different damages, some of which 
have bearing on infrastructure, pensions and salaries. The consequences of this 
are discussed more fully in the next chapter on departmental re-orientation.  
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Amongst many reasons for this financial state of affairs, is the initial 
arrangements implied by section 240 of the Interim Constitution Act of 1993. One 
of the major issues here was the delayed transference of funds from the old State 
Revenue Fund to the new National or Provincial Revenue Fund of the new 
democratic government. Instead, the Interim Constitution communicated more on 
the basis of continuity until the new structures had been put in place, and 
delegated that: 
In the 1994/1995 financial year the head of department of the 
Treasury, as defined in section 1 of the Exchequer Act, 1975 (Act 66 
of 1975), may, in consultation with the Minister responsible for 
national financial matters, from the Exchequer account, on conditions 
aimed at ensuring financial control, grant advances to provincial 
governments as he or she deems necessary for the purposes of 
establishing of structures of government at provincial level as 
contemplated in this Constitution until Parliament has appropriated 
money for such purposes (Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993). 
 
With Parliament not yet fully operational, and typical of the negotiated transition, 
a great deal depended on consultation and discretionary authority. The delay in 
formalising the structures thus meant delayed access to funds and to formal 
decision-making; it also meant that financial allocations could only be based on 
financial estimations which the officials contend were inaccurate, given that they 
were not statistically based. Recounting some of the experiences the ex-then 
Director-General of the province observed:  
We had not participated in the formulation of those budgets [this is in 
1994] because they had been approved the previous year. We were 
governed from outside this province because the headquarters of [Cape 
Provincial Administration] CPA was in Cape Town…So the budget 
was crafted and paralyzed in the Western Cape for many of the issues 
that affected the Eastern Cape in as far as former CPA portion of the 
province. So you had budget X from CPA, budget Y from Ciskei, 
budget Z from Transkei and you had to amalgamate these and as you 
know that the per capita allocation for the former homeland areas for 
Africans was far lower than for whites and even if you went to the 
CPA side of the province, the whites under CPAs or coloured or 
Indians were allocated more than Africans. Now you had the majority 
of the people of the EC coming from the Transkei, about one million 
from the Ciskei and CPA about one million. So more than five million 
came from the homeland and on average if you had to deal with equity 
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issues you had a very low baseline of the EC, and that has dogged us 
throughout the budgetary system… But of course limited as we were 
with information the key issue was to plan and we could not budget 
adequately – we had problems. So allocations were very much off the 
mark because even if you consider the population, the population 
statistics were so unreliable in this province. So those were the 
external factors that also affected the department as we built it because 
when people came in there they struggled with budgets, struggled with 
resource allocation (Interview To, Bisho, 19 May 2004). 
 
Indeed, statistics came into effect with the first population census of 1996. It 
appears that these unfortunately had little bearing on the revision of allocation of 
funds, according to departmental officials interviewed. Instead, the system 
continued to use pre-statistic estimates without consideration of new information 
and data for education. Nevertheless, what this discussion suggests is that while 
the broader political shifts were happening, the resource conditions and 
allocations continued to be imposed by the previous apartheid administration 
systems, effectively. This reduced any hopes of administrative reform to a 
synthetic exercise due to lack of authority over resources and debt overload. It is 
likely that debt overload and limited resources are the reason why this 
organisation is still running on the treadmill while other education departments in 
the richer provinces are on the race-track. A case in point, is the issue of 
classroom backlogs. Table 4.3 compares levels of classroom shortages between 
three provinces. 
 
Table 4.3 Comparative statistics on classroom backlogs 
Province Number of 
schools 
Number of 
classrooms short 
Rurality % 
Eastern Cape 6 148 11 557 63 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
5 583 9 867 57 
Limpopo 4 180 9 071 89 
Source: Adapted from the South African Institute of Race Relations. 
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According to the table the ECDE has a backlog of approximately 12 000 
classrooms, which is very high when compared to other provinces with similar 
conditions. These backlogs are not the only challenges that are inherent in the 
system. For instance, department has 1,487 schools without toilets, 1 972 schools 
without water supply, 2 931 with no sports field, 4, 333 have no electricity and 
90% of schools have no libraries or laboratories (Infrastructure Journal: 2003). 
Obviously this is a huge challenge for a department that has limited resources on 
the table. To leave such responsibility this to the creativity of individual 
departments and their respective provincial governments can be a serious 
contention to equity and redress and may even  perpetuate inequality and 
marginalisation in the newly formed democracy as the poor departments struggle 
to mobilise the resources.  
 
What we see here is that while the transformation created a good political space of 
engagement, it mechanically endorsed rigid structural arrangement it found in 
place without thinking about their consequences on the reform process. While at 
another level this is indicative of the complexity of the transition, it also confirms 
Kallaway’s (2002) observations on the ANC’s lack of readiness to govern when it 
took power from the National Party. He compares the two parties by saying that 
‘the National Party arrived into government in 1948, much like the ANC in 1994, 
without a clear plan of action’, (Kallaway 2002:13). For the ANC there was 
urgency to transform and own the state in a way that would make it accessible to 
the broader citizenry, especially the black population that had been marginalised 
before 1994. This meant that there was very little detail put on the costing of the 
transformation project, and provinces encountered debts that they had not known 
existed. More importantly, and unlike the Bantustan programme, they had no 
national office to bail them out (Southall 1998; Interview To, Bisho, 19 May 2004 
and Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003). The new concept of 
regionalism became strongly synonymous with ownership of debt, including the 
respective departmental apartheid debt. Effective change as a result seemed 
conditional on how inherited debts were to be managed, in many cases presenting 
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a serious challenge (Interview To, Bisho, 19 May 2004; Interview B, Zwelitsha, 
19/11/2003; Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003).  
  
4.8  Public administration beyond the RDP from 1997 to 2002 
By the late 1990s and in tandem with global economic changes and the newly 
coined concept of globalisation, public administration – like all other discourse – 
was put to debate. At the forefront were challenges about the role and the 
relevance of the state. This precipitated another shift in public administration 
discourse in general. While public administration had relied on traditional 
bureaucracies to deliver state services, these structures were now being 
questioned on their efficiency and effectiveness to the extent of proposing a new 
entrepreneurial bureaucracy.  The basis of what this means is captured by the 
NPM thesis already considered in Chapter Two. In the South African context 
these debates found resonance with the revision and literal dumping of the RDP’s 
economic and social distribution strategy in favour of the adoption of the Macro-
Economic Strategy for Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). Since 
the subject of GEAR is beyond the scope of this research, Marais (1998) is 
recommended in order to obtain an understanding of its historical and ideological 
origins. What is significant about GEAR is that it changed the discourse of 
reform, moving from the RDP’s ‘social democratic, basic needs agenda’ to a 
‘neo-liberal’ agenda (Munslow and FitzGerald, 1995). The new strategy was 
focused on: 
(a)  Slashing state spending to drive the budget deficit down to 3 per cent of 
GDP by the year 2000; 
(b)  Keeping inflation to single digits; 
(c)  Reducing corporate taxes and providing tax holidays for certain 
investments; 
(d)  Gradually phasing out exchange control regulations completely; 
(e)  Encouraging wage restraint by workers; 
(f)  Creating a more ‘flexible’ labour market, possibly by deregulating certain 
 categories of unskilled work and exempting small business from aspects of 
 the new labour regime; and speeding up privatisation (Marais, 1998:162). 
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The question then is: was this new strategy successful in off-setting public sector 
reform? To some extent one could argue that ideologically, GEAR was 
instrumental in bringing about the changes seen in the public sector in later years. 
However, it would be an exaggeration to credit GEAR alone as there were many 
other contentious and powerful forces directing the new discourses for change 
internally and externally, and these will be explored independently. 
 
4.9  Internal forces for change 
Internally, the administrative bureaucracy was under pressure to enhance service 
delivery. By 1995 the functioning of the state bureaucracies was synonymous 
with poor service delivery, crisis and chaos. While this was to an extent due to the 
fact that many public organisations lacked the capacity and skills necessary to 
deliver large-scale reform programmes, the public sector reform programme also 
lacked direction and clearly articulated goals that could be translated into delivery 
programmes at an organisational level. This meant that organisational 
effectiveness at the time could only be conditional on acquired leadership skills 
and general staff competencies. Otherwise organisational processes remained 
more haphazard than following a controlled planning process. The subsequent 
public criticisms of the state bureaucracies led to a number of reviews being 
instituted including the Provincial Review Report (PRR) (1997) and the 
Presidential Review Commission of Inquiry on Transformation and Reform in the 
Public Service (1998) to investigate the functioning of systems of government. In 
the next few paragraphs, commentary on the two reports will show how these 
were instrumental in creating pressure for fundamental change in the public 
sector.  
 
The Provincial Review Report 
The Provincial Review Report was intended to (a) take stock of the reform 
process to date; (b) assess how well the new administrations were progressing; (c) 
establish whether the administrations had capacity to manage the block budgets 
that were to be introduced during the 1997/1998 financial year; and (d) to assess 
whether the new ways of governing and administering the country, especially 
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corporate governance, are workable (Provincial Review Report 1997). The 
findings of the report focused on three areas, namely (a) the role of the national 
government (b) issues common to most departments and provinces (transversal 
issues) and (c) department-specific issues. Without getting into too much detail 
about each of these areas, the findings on the role of national government 
highlighted tensions between the national and provincial planning systems where 
national government was seen to set policies with little consideration of provincial 
capacities. It was also seen to concentrate power on issues essential to 
organisational effectiveness such as performance, discipline and accountability. 
Beyond this, the lack of balance of power created confusion with regard to roles 
and responsibilities and support.  
 
With regard to transversal issues, the findings reflected a lack of alignment in 
various areas. For instance, the departments were still structured in highly 
functional terms with strong centralisation of key areas like personnel and 
finance, which surely presented a contradiction, especially when departments 
were expected to be client-focused. Underlying a client-focused approach is the 
notion of organisational flexibility and autonomy to facilitate speedy decision-
making at points of service delivery. However, when the tensions between 
centralisation and flexibility are unresolved, they tend to complicate the balance 
between accountability and control. Without getting into the debate about the 
relationship between these two concepts, it is a fact that when these forces 
function in unison and are located at the same level, there is likely to be evidence 
of organisational performance. The basis for this is that those put in charge 
become custodians for accountability and control.  
 
Nonetheless, the Review went on to identify other key transversal issues like (a) 
leadership, management, and strategic planning; (b) organisational arrangements; 
(c) human resources; (d) financial management; and (e) information systems and 
technology as all inadequate at the time. All of these issues are indicative of 
challenges to public sector reform. Seemingly, there was very little that was in 
place and going right in the beginning. Surprisingly, many organisations 
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continued to function in such chaotic arrangements without experiencing a total 
collapse, including education, which showed the same dysfunctional tendencies as 
all the other departments. For instance, education had problems with (i) 
management systems such as a lack of financial systems and controls, poor 
communication systems, poor information systems and resource provisioning; (ii) 
training of teachers and administration staff; (iii) conflicting roles and 
responsibilities between the administrative and political heads; and (iv) lack of 
shared values (Provincial Review Report 1997). Of course, all these factors are 
fundamental to organisational performance. 
 
Presidential Review Commission 
Similarly, the Presidential Review Commission (1998) identified various points of 
misalignment and dysfunctionality in the system. Comparatively, the Presidential 
Review Commission provides more depth and detail on many of the issues 
identified by the Provincial Review and even makes recommendations on how to 
address some of the system dysfunctionality. It outlines clearly the strategy that 
was adopted to reform public bureaucracies: 
government opted for a strategic change management or strategic-
developmental approach to administrative reform, rather than 
traditional bureaucratic models or neo-liberal models based on the 
restructuring and increasing contracting-out of state services 
(Presidential Review Commission, 1998:2).  
 
Central to strategic change management is the belief that strategy is the driver for 
effective organisational change and performance. Organisational success therefore 
depended on how well it was conceptualised, articulated and implemented. This 
was in line with the broader management discourse propagated by leading schools 
of public management who also advocated strategy as the key aspect of driving 
transformation and fundamental change. Swilling captured the spirit of the 
debates in the following way: 
A strategy for managing administrative transformation must be rooted 
in and enhance the process of political transformation. If we allow the 
process of administrative transformation to become depoliticised, that 
is, to become a technical process of redeploying resources in new 
structures, we will find ourselves left with a new public service that, 
while having merit of being non-racial, will remain incapable of 
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impacting on social, economic, and physical development…. What is 
needed is a strategy-led process that transforms existing structures, 
systems, and processes into an administration capable of implementing 
and executing the policies of a developmental provincial dispensation 
(Swilling et al, 1995b:491). 
 
The basic assumption then was that, contrary to relying on traditional bureaucratic 
functional structures that had lost legitimacy through their over-reliance on tight 
authority and disciplinary controls, a new developmental strategy would be a 
vision to transform the state and its bureaucracy. In fact, the new strategic 
management approach was supposed to open up the bureaucracy and make it 
more creative while also being democratic. As De Clercq (2002) highlights, the 
South African ‘broker state’  
relies on the strategic management model of public administration 
with participatory work processes and devolved decision-making and 
managerial powers to lower units. It combines a strong policy and 
strategic management centre with flatter decentralised structure to be 
flexible and answer the changing needs of the society and economy. 
The bureaucrats are expected to be flexible, strategic and innovative to 
respond to the differentiated societal needs and are subject to public 
market as well as bureaucratic accountability (De Clercq, 2002:85). 
 
Inherent in this is the notion of the devolution and decentralisation of power and 
decision-making to the points of service delivery. To some extent, one may argue 
that the provincial system was partly to advance this. But as organisational 
management literature suggests, divisionalised structures work well when the 
centre is strong to co-ordinate and manage key strategic issues and is able to give 
direction to policy and key management issues. At the beginning the 
transformation lacked such a co-ordinating point, which was picked up and 
emphasised by the Presidential Review Commission, which subsequently 
recommended that the President’s office co-ordinate and ‘pull things’ together for 
strategic direction. Unfortunately, the early transition was more about policy 
formulation than co-ordination and implementation. The lack of such co-
ordination obviously resulted in maladministration and inefficiencies in some 
sectors as Munslow suggests: 
In terms of strategic management reforms and re-engineering, a mixed 
picture had presented itself at the half-way term of the first democratic 
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government. While in some departments and provinces considerable 
efforts had been made and clear efficiency and rationalization gains 
have become evident, other national departments have apparently 
made little progress, not addressed themselves to institutional issues or 
appear reconciled to gross inefficiency, maladministration, and chaos 
(Munslow et al, 1995:12). 
 
Such ‘gross inefficiency, maladministration and chaos’ also created conditions for 
the emergence of opportunistic tendencies like corruption, mismanagement and 
poor work ethics due to inherent multiple vested interests (Picard, 2002). This 
scenario is perceived to have been worse in the former homelands, which had 
incomplete records of their civil servants.    
 
As part of a cultural revolution then, business process re-engineering was seen as 
the mechanism to change the practice and ways of doing things, to ensure that: 
departments overcome their functional parochialism and embrace the 
“one-stop shop” or “single window” approach to service 
delivery…(Presidential Review Commission, 1998:6).  
 
Underlying this one-stop or single-window approach, the idea was to decrease 
multiplicity and duplication of tasks across departments. At the time the reviews 
were made, many departments worked as self-sufficient silos co-ordinating 
themselves as fully functional entities. Perhaps what complicated issues further 
than silos was the diverse nature of organisations that existed outside the 
mainstream bureaucracies, which included centres and agencies which, because of 
their relative autonomy from the state were difficult to manage and control. In 
addition, there were departments like health, education and local government that 
had developed their own ways of doing things which made conformity and 
compliance to the new reform programme a challenge. By adopting business 
process re-engineering, the assumption was that the organisational bureaucracy 
could now be organised around particular sets of activities that cut across 
departments and agencies. The question then is: were the strategic management 
and business-process-engineering approaches the best approaches to resolve the 
apartheid organisational dysfunctionalities and the subsequent inefficiencies and 
maladministration? Trying to answer this question now is perhaps a subject of 
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theoretical rather than empirical debate, but one thing that is clear is that such 
thinking has framed the basis for reform. In a way, change had to go beyond the 
reshuffling of bureaucracy and locate the new bureaucracy in a particular mode of 
thinking. The consequences of this are still to be determined.  
 
Nonetheless, De Clercq (2002) questions the premise of the reform adopted. She 
argues that it operated from a premise of a strong mature state that is able to work 
with ‘partners and retain its relative autonomy’, while in reality the new 
transitional state was still emerging and thus unable to achieve this. More 
importantly, however, she identifies three assumptions made by the reform model. 
These are that (a) it assumes that organisational development occurs under 
external pressure and tighter accountability systems; (b) it ignores context, 
particularly the underlying values that drive public organisations; and (c) it over-
emphasises strategic planning and management systems and ignores other 
organisational weaknesses like policy overload, inadequate leadership and poor 
human resource capacity. While one agrees with her, it is imperative to 
acknowledge that these weaknesses are synonymous with management theory and 
practice, which tends to focus on identifiable and quantifiable input, process and 
output chains rather than the reform strategy, per se. For instance, the over-
emphasis on outputs creates less flexibility even when context calls for this. As a 
result, organisations tend to be treated as homogenous entities even where their 
differences are acknowledged.  
 
Such additional limitations mean that strategy can easily turn into a mechanistic 
plan, especially when there are resources attached to it. In such cases, instead of it 
playing the liberating and visionary role, it becomes a stabiliser of past 
achievements. Furthermore, those who have faith in it tend to ignore the role of 
agency. For instance, strategic approaches assume co-operation but as is well-
known, managers constantly make decisions and choices in organisations that 
shift with different interests. Equally, Swilling et al (1995b) warns against the 
dangers of strategic management because it can slide into crisis management, and 
explains: 
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This is an instance when the consequences of change trigger 
administrative, institutional and policy disjunctures that cannot be 
sorted out by line managers.  In such instances incomplete change 
processes create greater confusion and disharmony than would have 
otherwise been the case. This is then used to discredit change 
management entirely (Swilling et al, 1995b:507).  
 
In retrospect, one has to take cognisance of organisational change literature, 
which acknowledges that organisational effectiveness is more a product of the 
alignment of several factors than any one isolated entity. Some of the factors 
include organisational skills and competencies, staffing, leadership style and 
culture and strategy, where strategy is but one of the key elements. The tendency 
though is that organisations tend to rely on adopting new strategies, hoping they 
will drive performance, while in the meantime they retain the same old modalities 
that made them dysfunctional in the first place. It is thus no surprise that many 
public organisations, including some education departments, could not break the 
mould of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in their internal organisational 
operations for at least five years after the democratic inception.  
 
4.10  The external forces 
Turning to external issues, it is a fact that by the time South Africa was evolving 
into a democratic state, international debates on public administration had also 
moved to embrace New Public Management (NPM) and its neo-liberal 
tendencies. NPM puts emphasis on creating lean, mean and efficient 
governments. Efficiency as such is the dominant concept around state re-
organisation and reform. While the interpretations of NPM vary, it set a platform 
for change for many countries including South Africa. In South Africa, it found 
fertile ground in a context where there was little indigenous knowledge of what 
needed to be done. It thus became an automatic choice in the field of international 
benchmarking and adoption of existing models. The advantage of this was that 
such an adoption of foreign models located public sector reform in the country in 
the broader context of international reforms. This indirectly gave legitimacy to 
both content and process. Benchmarking thus became a way of life as various 
teams were sent to different points of the globe for learning purposes but also to 
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adopt best practices that would enhance productivity. However, while 
international borrowing was instrumental it also stifled growth of local knowledge 
as pressure became synonymous with shortcuts.  
 
Besides developments in public administration, the business world was producing 
influential texts which propagated business practices as better and more useful for 
organisational management. Similarly, the White Paper on Transforming Public 
Service Delivery (1997) popularly known as Batho Pele – ‘People First’ 
advances the notion of a customer-oriented public service. For instance, Section 3 
of the policy document identifies the eight principles which are deemed central 
and mandatory to the reform programme, namely: 
(a)  Consultation:  where citizens should be consulted about the level and 
quality of the  public services they receive and, wherever possible, should 
be given a choice about the services that are offered. 
(b)  Service standards: where citizens should be told what level and quality of 
public  services they will receive so that they are aware of what to expect. 
(c)  Access: where all citizens should have equal access to the services to 
which they are entitled. 
(d)  Courtesy: where citizens should be treated with courtesy and 
consideration. 
(e)  Information: citizens should be given full, accurate information about the 
public  services they are entitled to receive. 
(f)  Openness and transparency:  where citizens should be told how national 
and provincial departments are run, how much they cost, and who is in 
charge. 
(g)  Redress: where, if the promised standard of service is not delivered, 
citizens should be offered an apology, a full explanation and a speedy and 
effective remedy; and  when complaints are made, citizens should receive a 
sympathetic, positive  response. 
(h)  Value for money:  where public services should be provided economically 
and efficiently in order to give citizens the best possible value for money 
(White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery 1997). 
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Generally, Batho Pele is a widely accepted doctrine to reform public 
organisations in South Africa. To date, however, there has been limited 
engagement with what it really means and how it impacts on organisations. 
Instead, the existing thoughts are dominated by state reviews and case studies-
based advice on implementation found in the Public Service Delivery Review 
publications, which are government publications within the Department of Public 
Service and Administration (DPSA). With the lack of critique, it seems 
unavoidable to reflect on experiences drawn elsewhere to examine how 
organisations in other countries have responded to the NPM genre. Generally, the 
literature demonstrates that different counties choose different versions of NPM 
and thus it is difficult to consolidate lessons that are similar. However, research in 
five African countries that have implemented NPM showed that these did 
reasonable well to implement ‘cost reduction and stabilization related reforms’ 
but struggled with ‘performance improvement’ and with ‘removing systemic 
bottlenecks’ (Mutabaha and Kiragu, 2002, 48-49). This is because performance 
improvement tends to demand more that an enumeration of identifiable variables 
to focus on systemic cultural change and long-term benefits. Pollitt communicates 
better in his review of managerialism when he says that there tends to be a greater 
concern with  
procedural rather than substantive issues – with whether income 
support claims are dealt with within an average of four days rather 
than whether the level of benefit allows one to live decently… (Pollitt 
1998:55). 
 
The questions then are how different is the ECDE’s response to the change? 
Could it be procedural rather than substantive? While responses to these questions 
require different research, the next paragraphs draw opinions on the general 
observations on the direction of the reforms within a particular context.   
 
4.11 Change implications for the ECDE  
Undoubtedly, all these outlined internal and external factors influenced the 
trajectory for change. Public sector reform in general had caught the global whim 
of reforming state institutions to follow the three popular Es of Economy, 
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Efficiency and Effectiveness. Strengthening this was the adoption of the Public 
Finance Management Act No.1 of 1999, which stipulates conditions for financial 
expenditure for all state departments. The significant shift promulgated here is the 
introduction of budgetary-driven planning cycles and conditions to enhance 
accountability. For instance, with regard to planning the departments had to 
develop three-year corporate plans that demonstrated projections of revenue, 
expenditure and borrowing. This would vary with each department’s needs and 
emphasis. Similarly, the ECDE has showed some conformity to these basic 
requirements.  As one former DDG explained: 
[The] SA government has brought out the SA Excellence Foundation 
Model and if you look at it it’s the same model, it was first called the 
EFQM, the European Foundation of Quality Management and so that 
model talks to outputs. These are your inputs, this is your process and 
these are your outputs. We define the outputs, we improve the 
processes and the whole system’s computerisation. We optimise the 
inputs through resource utilisation and calculation of the costs. That is 
the model we are focusing on. We just come from a conversation now 
with the new person who has been appointed talking about all the 
inputs and things like that and I could see the people around the table 
are so frustrated because they want the result. Is it done? Or not done? 
If not done, what are you going to do about it? And the person was 
talking this and that, and we sat around the table thinking, Dear God! 
We still have to educate this colleague. But the person had just joined 
the organisation. So it’s the mindset, its the management mindset that 
you must get results now, get it out. So we put out that model to say it 
must be output focused and this is how we will measure your 
performance (Interview E, Zwelitsha, 21 May 2006). 
 
Of course the reference to the European Foundation of Quality Model is more of 
an individual interpretation and association than a real interpretation of Batho 
Pele. Generally, as this official maintains, the shift is on outputs and results rather 
than inputs. While this may change the traditional inward-looking practices of the 
bureaucracy it is interesting that other countries like New Zealand are shifting 
from outputs to outcomes-based planning systems for various reasons, as outlined 
in Webber’s article on Wrestling with Outcomes: The New Zealand experience 
(2005). Fundamentally, the basis is to generate sufficient attention to broad-based 
public service improvement. Notwithstanding these international shifts, it is a fact 
the departments like the ECDE were still at the initial stages of their 
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transformational process and will go through their own learning curve to see what 
works better within their specific context.   
 
4.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the role of context in organisational change. It has 
explored the broad historical trajectories that enforced different organisational 
shifts and some organisational responses to them. While the issue of fragmented 
histories is mentioned but not fully developed here, it becomes more evident in 
subsequent chapters. However it is mentioned here as a reminder that while the 
technical context of policy shifts has been realised, they happen in a conflictual 
environment of differences and previous politics of separate identities that must 
still consolidate. More importantly, the historical legislative genre explored 
illuminates the context under which the department operates and hence the 
directions it took over time. In many ways this chapter confirms the significance 
of context in determining organisational change. For instance it is clear that 
before the 1994 democratic change there was a lot of emphasis on tribal and 
ethnic politics than on creating efficient and effective bureaucracies. While this 
exclusive and separatists ethnic agenda was eroded by the new shift to nation 
building and inclusive democracy in 1994, the study showed that there was still 
very little conceptualisation of the nature of bureaucracies that existed at the time 
and what they needed to make them work effectively. If anything the bureaucracy 
saw little development between 1995 and 1997, as it focused on the external 
political agenda of social reconstruction and development. The point of 
illumination here is that bureaucracies that are highly embedded in the macro state 
politics and are centrally (nationally) controlled than locally driven tend to focus 
on issues external to their immediate environment. In terms of service delivery 
purpose, this makes them less relevant to the local needs even though they are 
nationally compatible. In many ways, this brings to question the issue of whose 
purpose should provincial departments serve? and why? Without clarity on such 
questions, the provincial offices will remain caught in the web of tension and dual 
responsibility between the local and national needs. Nonetheless, the next two 
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chapters examine the micro processes that are in place in the ECDE and their 
consequences on the organisation and its efficiency and effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
FRAMING THE NEW ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter looked at the general macro contextual factors influencing 
public sector reform, including the ECDE. This chapter focuses on a micro 
exploration of the processes of reorganisation and organisational change of the 
ECDE as a consequence of the external pressures of transformation and reform. 
Such reorganisation has not been extensively studied, but there has been some 
commentary, such as March and Olson (1986); Wise (1990); Cheung (1996) and 
Swilling et al (1995), for instance, who define reorganisation as a process of 
administrative transformation more fundamental than restructuring that 
encompasses a change of systems, cultures and practices. How organisations 
respond to reorganisation depends on the models of change adopted and how they 
are implemented. Keeping the themes of power politics and identity in mind, this 
chapter traces how different logics of reorganisation influenced the ECDE in its 
efficiency and effectiveness. It argues that while reorganisation and its side tools 
of restructuring are championed as good managerial strategy for organisational 
change, they are neither a neutral nor a politically free exercise. Rather, they are 
value-laden and highly political tools that can be variously used by different 
interests to achieve different goals that may well exclude efficiency. The key 
questions raised by this chapter are: (a) what were the levers for the 
reorganisation of the ECDE? and (b) how did they influence the themes of 
change, efficiency and effectiveness? To answer these questions the chapter first 
looks at the historical emergence of the department at the time of the merger and 
the conditions affecting it, and secondly it explores different logics of 
organisational re-ordering between 1994 and 2002 and the inherent complexities 
and contestations that emerged.   
 
 134 
5.2  A brief historical outline on the nature of the bureaucracy pre-1994 
A brief examination of apartheid bureaucracy shows that it functioned within 
scientific management discourse for its everyday execution of the apartheid 
policies. Bureaucrats were highly socialised into the principles of management 
such as planning, co-ordinating, organising and control. Like all other entities 
derived in the modernist project, the bureaucracy was perceived to provide 
objective and calculable means to service provision. Rules became the means and 
ends as public administration became synonymous with value-free, neutral and 
apolitical sentiments. Besides, like all Weberian bureaucracy it was partly 
conforming to established principles of control, order, authority, efficiency and 
rationality. Beneath these appearances, however, there was chaos that was 
embedded in the broader political irrationality and corruption. 
 
A deeper analysis of education suggests that the same trends of administrative 
rationality governed the system. With regard to its configuration, the system 
exhibited one of the most complex designs, in the sense that it had 19 departments 
of education that serviced it, 11 of which served Africans alone (Hofmeyr and 
Swart, 1984, quoted by Hofmeyr and Buckland, 1992). Such an elaborate 
structure meant that there were duplications in systems and functions, which made 
it an expensive entity to run. For instance, like any bureaucracy, one expected 
some standardised assignments of duties, training, communication channels, and 
work rules (Dessler, 1986). This was almost impossible to do across the system 
due to separate development, under which systems could not be developed 
uniformly and be of the same quality, since this would defeat the ideology of 
apartheid policy. A consequence of this was that African education in particular 
became the worst-planned system, with poor communication and information 
systems. Those most disadvantaged by this were rural communities and their 
schools as they were seldom included in the general information statistics that 
were used for planning (Hofmeyr and Buckland 1992).  
 
To function then, the system relied on over-centralised authority and power while 
delegating responsibility at lower levels. These lower levels ranged from sub-
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units in the national ministry to the ‘divisionalised’ (Mintzberg, 1983) systems at 
provincial level. Overall, as Hofmeyr and Buckland (1992) explain, the 
fragmented management structures prevented the national implementation of 
policy on any single matter. Quoting Selfe (1990:12) they argue that the 
multiplicity of the departments produced ‘superstructural administrative chaos’. 
While there may have been various reasons for this, the duplication of parallel 
functions and running multi-systems was always going to be a challenge 
especially when co-ordination was based on tight policy control rather than the 
espoused managerial efficiency and effectiveness. How did this play out in 
reality?  
 
The education system in South Africa had always been organised through 
hierarchy, with the national department of education acting as the intellectual pot 
for the whole system. In the process the provincial, the district and the schools 
systems were to respond to the directives of the national ministry. This top-down 
approach created highly bureaucratic and rigid systems of organising where 
almost every level played a god-like role over the level below. As a result, the 
system could only be effective as far as the next level, depending who was in 
authority and the level of discipline exercised. While it could be argued that such 
an approach was intended to create efficiency, on the contrary it created a culture 
of secrecy, discipline, bullying and manipulation (Soudien 2002). A case in point 
is that of inspectors of schools who would bully teachers when they visited 
schools for school and teacher evaluations. While such bullying could easily be 
validated as exercising authority, control and order in schools, the question is: in 
whose interest? Such a system of management and governance could not be 
sustained through subordination and repression, as became evident with the 1976 
school boycotts. Black schools in Soweto protested against the use of Afrikaans 
as the medium of instruction. Such protests became the turning point in the 
struggle against oppression as schools ceased to be sites for teaching and learning 
and instead turned into platforms for mass protests and mobilisation (Morrell and 
Moletsane 2002). 
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As for its maintenance, the system had to ensure an enmeshing of values and 
culture based on the racialist ideology. Organisations had to conform to 
prescribed formal and informal rules with very little or no challenge to the status 
quo. This saw public organisations turning into spaces of marginalisation and 
alienation. Such marginalisation and alienation included exclusions of certain 
groups, and black people in particular, from broad and meaningful participation in 
education. This included denial of access to critical education services and 
resources. Table 5.1. shows how different systems benefited from the previous 
racially oriented system. Unfortunately, because homelands statistics are not 
readily available, the table uses only the broad South African statistics in 
demonstrating the patterns that fed the system at the time.  
 
Table 5.1 Comparative Education Statistics 1989 
 White 
Education 
Indian 
Education 
Coloured 
Education 
African 
Education 
(DET) 
Pupil-teacher ratios 17:1 20:1 23:1 38:1 
Under-qualified teachers 
(less than std. 10 plus a 3 
year teacher’s certificate) 
0% 2% 45% 52% 
Per capita expenditure 
including capital 
expenditure 
R3 082,00 R2 227,01 R1 359,78 R764,73 
Std 10 pass rate 96,0% 93,6% 72,7% 40,7% 
Source: Hofmeyr and Buckland in McGregor’s (1992:22) 
 
From this table one sees disparities in expenditure, teacher qualifications, and 
teacher pupil ratios, all of which are essential to quality schooling. It must be kept 
in mind, however, that these disparities became worse with each school and point 
of location. For instance, further disparities would be exacerbated by the rural, 
urban and farm school divide. Both the rural and farm school arrangements have 
always been the worst off in terms of neglect and marginalisation. To use 
Hofmeyr and Buckland’s (1992) metaphorical reference, they were the 
‘Cinderella’ of the system. Coincidentally, both the Ciskei and Transkei 
homelands were predominantly in rural settings and thus carried the greatest 
burden of poorly resourced schools, as confirmed by Interviewees P, King 
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William’s Town, 20 November, 2003 and F, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004. For 
example, their descriptions of schools in these areas were that they were highly 
under-resourced, dominated by mud structures and highly overcrowded. 
 
Caution is necessary when placing emphasis on structural conditions at the 
expense of agency. However, it is the view of this study that agency was passive 
in many ways. One of the explanations for this is well-articulated by Archer when 
she explains that  
By reproducing a stable corpus of ideas over time, cultural forces work 
to produce a unified population. Its members may indeed be the 
victims of perceptual power rather than voluntary adherents to 
consensual precepts, but in any case they are incapable of articulating 
dissident views and of passing these over the intersection to stimulate 
structural disruption. On the contrary, the cultural forces generating S-
C [structural conditioning] unification and reproduction work to 
depress incipient forms of structural opposition (Archer, 1988:290-
291). 
 
While for Archer the central issue is to explain the reciprocity of structure and 
culture, this indirectly also provides insights into why the education systems of 
the time perpetuated the status quo. As a result, education became synonymous 
with authoritarianism, repression and ideological dogmatism.  
 
Equally, homelands like all other apartheid creations, continued replicating the 
broader South African administration systems. There was little reason to deviate, 
as incentives were based on conformity with the nationally designed systems. 
With regard to education bureaucracy in the homelands, there was very little that 
was unique about its administration systems, except that it followed the same 
repressive, discipline-oriented systems seen in the broader South Africa. Picard 
(2002) picks up this point, explaining that:  
homeland governments often approached the public sector with the 
same framework as the National Party. Obedience and loyalty, not 
education and competence, were often the qualifications for these jobs 
(Picard, 2002:288).  
 
Southall’s (1982) elaboration on the emergence of the petit bourgeoisie in the 
Transkei touches on the subsequent class formations which emerged with the new 
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bureaucracy. This is the bureaucracy that was driven by expansionism which 
came with the departure of white bureaucrats and the creation of new service 
departments. It was consolidated through material privileges such as good salaries 
and other benefits such as generous housing subsidies (Southall 1982). An 
interesting observation is that these bureaucrats were: 
…separated from the mass of the reserve community (which is largely 
dependent upon the meagre returns of migrant labour) by the education 
(which was what enabled them to gain white-collar employment), by 
the level of their financial remuneration and by their constant 
preoccupation ‘to better themselves’ (Southall, 1982:178).   
 
Explicit in this was that class determined access to resource and wealth 
distribution. Equally one could argue that the bureaucracy was separated from the 
communities, which exacerbated the master-servant attitudes of the apartheid era, 
a consequence of which was reduced civil service accountability with further 
marginalisation of the ‘voiceless’ when it came to service delivery.  
 
Nonetheless, Ngubentombi (1989) goes into detail about the planning processes 
of the education bureaucracy in the Transkei. He outlines the structural design and 
the organogram used as the basis to organise that system. While these indicate 
clear roles, responsibilities and relationships between various levels and systems, 
they are also based on a hierarchical, functionalist and rationalist logic of 
planning, where power and authority are centralised at head office while the rest 
of the organisation responds to directives. Indeed, such planning was in line with 
general administrative developments at the time. Administrative theory and 
practice had not progressed beyond scientific management to offer alternatives. 
Hence homelands mimicked broad administration and modernisation techniques 
available at the time, including rational planning. The unfortunate part is that such 
planning tended to benefit, and work well in, highly resourced capital towns like 
Umtata and Bisho in the Eastern Cape, but had marginal effects in semi-urban 
areas and the rural peripheries.  
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5.3  Organisational reorientation: The representative logic of 1994 
To change the previous apartheid and homeland bureaucracies, public 
administration reforms of 1994 and 1995 were influenced by the broader national 
politics of reconciliation and integration as different and fragmented systems were 
brought together. Embedded in this was the concept of adopting representative 
bureaucracies as the main reorganisation politics. By representative bureaucracy, 
this thesis refers to a system of bureaucracy that saw different ethnic and racial 
groups equally represented in the new structure of administration. Research on 
representative democracy and representative bureaucracies is wide (Dresang, 
1974; Riccucci and Saidel, 1997; Kelly, 1998; Meier, 1999). The underlying 
principle extracted from this literature is that representative bureaucracies ensure 
that different community interests are protected and given voice whether they are 
racially, ethnically, class, gender or geographically based. It becomes a measure 
of equal opportunity and access to decision-making (Riccucci and Saidel, 1997). 
Within the South African context, of course, threading through the notion of 
representative democracy were the politics of redress, equity and reconciliation 
derived from key legislation including the New Constitution (1996), the 
Employment Equity Bill (1997) and the White Paper on Affirmative Action 
(1998). All these policies advocated for a much representative and inclusive 
public service that is sensitive to different community needs. 
 
With reconciliation and equity guiding the policy reforms, the new ECDE was 
also reconstituted to reflect the identities of previous bureaucracies. For instance, 
the province had inherited six different departments of education, two of which 
were homelands of the Transkei and the Ciskei, and the other four made up of 
former apartheid education systems, namely the House of Representatives (HOR) 
for Coloureds, the House of Delegates (HOD) for Indians, the Department of 
Education and Culture (DEC) for Whites, and the Department of Education and 
Training (DET) for blacks outside the homeland boundaries. All these 
departments operated their own systems through policy directives and resource 
provisions that were determined by the central government in Pretoria. At the 
time of integration they exhibited the heterogeneous identities and cultures 
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resulting from separate histories and traditions that enabled them to survive 
different apartheid storms. Describing these systems, some of the officials went 
on to say:  
Unfortunately those six administrations were very discrete 
administrations and previously they had different systems and very 
different procedural administrations (Interview J, East London, 18 
November 2003). 
 
You had different policies, different systems, people coming from 
different departments, different skills and different views on how 
government operates (Interview N, Grahamstown, 19 May 2005). 
 
There [were] cultures and subcultures. That’s what made it so 
complicated… People were at different levels of development with 
different levels of understanding in terms of what the agenda is… You 
find people belonging to different parties and therefore perceive 
differently (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). 
 
There [were] tribal and ethnic undertones that [were] at a low intensity 
level which you can’t see, if you can’t see things deeper (Interview 
Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 2005). 
 
These descriptions support McLennan (1995) and Swilling and Wooldridge’s 
(1995) theoretical considerations that South African bureaucracies were highly 
diverse and not monolithic entities, but also that they were highly fragmented and 
poorly co-ordinated. Conventional wisdom suggests that between 1994 and 1996 
there was very little radical transformation in state bureaucracies, possibly as a 
result of an ‘implicit understanding carried from the negotiation period into the 
government of national unity’ which was to maintain ‘much of the existing 
personnel and structures’ (Munslow et al, 1995:11).  
 
The process of change 
The process of integration started with the provincial public service commissioner 
who led public service reform in the EC in conjunction with the provincial 
Director General (DG) and other key stakeholders. In discussions with both the 
commissioner and the former DG of the province, it became clear that the process 
of change was highly contested and filled with tensions and anxieties emanating 
from the uncertainty of the time. Such uncertainty was due to the fact that 
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inherent in any change are connotations of displacement and dislocation. 
Furthermore, the change was about to threaten familiar homeland and apartheid 
networks of access and influence to power and decision-making. As these 
processes of change began, it became clear that the displacements were inevitable, 
as the commissioner explained: 
You had to ask people to leave their offices, the old public servants 
and the old administration because you had been allocated those 
[offices]. That was very interesting and not a very easy and smooth 
process, as you can imagine, because everyone was quite uncertain as 
to what the rules were and who was in charge and what their function 
was (Interview I, Hogsback, 17 May 2004).  
 
Despite the lack of clarity of rules, inherent in this reorganisation was the 
underlying notion that the change would benefit and serve the broad national 
interest of instituting a democratic public service. The process to create a 
representative bureaucracy thus started with the implementation of affirmative 
action. Fundamental to this was the assumption that the apartheid bureaucracy 
was inadequate to addressing the needs of the new democratic state. Furthermore, 
the existing structures and personnel had less capacity and capabilities than 
expected. As Munslow states:  
Abilities and capacities more suited to a previous order did not 
automatically or easily translate into a democratic and diverse South 
Africa, concurrently emerging into a new and highly competitive 
global environment. New people, attitudes, skills, and concepts were 
urgently required, as well as new personnel, training, information 
technology, labour relations, grading, and salary policies and 
procedures (Munslow et al, 1995:11). 
 
While this was partly to eradicate marginalisation and exclusion of certain racial 
groups from the state systems, there was also a reconciliatory agenda, which 
focused on bringing all representative structures into the new government. For the 
EC the process was described by the DG as follows: 
We had criteria that we could put down to say this person comes from 
Transkei, this person comes from Ciskei, this person from the old 
CPA. They [ECDE] started recruitment towards the end of 1994, and 
the first crop of people who were the HODs were employed in March 
1995, and then the support staff around April, May and June. So every 
time you had to write a report, how many directors you have, the 
gender issues were coming up, the racial issues were coming up, 
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because of equity issues. But our equity went beyond that, [it was] 
geographical as well: “How many come from Transkei, how many 
come from Ciskei?” so that with time we would cut down on 
resistance to change and make people accept this is a democratic order 
with no favours to anybody – impartial and objective (Interview To, 
Bisho, 19 May 2004). 
 
The notion of impartiality and objectivity is contestable as change by itself is a 
value-based and biased process, but before getting into the politics of this 
exercise, it is important to highlight its basic features. It was a massive drive 
which took about eight months to complete. However, like all change process it 
had limitations some of which were that it was time-consuming and costly. One of 
the reasons for this was the high mobility of civil servants which saw them move 
between jobs, departments and provinces. Without adequate systems to track 
appointments being made, this meant that filled posts became vacant overnight as 
civil servants competed for the best opportunities available everywhere and 
anywhere. In other cases, this led to unintended consequences where cycles of 
interviews had to be repeated due to ‘double parking’ as some people were 
appointed to more than one position while chasing different opportunities made 
available by the restructuring (ECSECC 2000 and Interview I, Hogsback, 17 May 
2006).  
 
At another level and as a political tool, this resulted in organisations of 
compromised identity, due to the reconciliatory agenda which could hardly 
function in a unified way. The high level of fragmentation brought about by 
representation as such became another point of contestation as organisations, 
including the ECDE, struggled to move forward. For instance, talking to the 
officials in this department there was always reference to this history of 
fragmentation, as one official strongly asserted:    
…the strategy was that the set-up should be representative of the 
departments, that was the fundamental principle, to be representative 
of the ex-departments which was wrong, that was a wrong approach… 
the second thing was the appeasement of different nationalities that 
were there. I am not talking about equity, I am talking about 
appeasement. 
 
Q: Can you elaborate on that? 
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A: That all nationalities should be part of administration, but not 
necessarily on merit. You just do that for people to be there. Even 
today there are people who are products of that process, they can’t 
deliver, even as I speak now (Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 
November 2005).   
 
Of course such comments need to be understood in the context of underlying 
tensions emanating from regional and racial differences that are pervasive in the 
organisation. In fact, the integration had brought in people whose loyalties were in 
their historical spaces of culture and origin. The ECSECC (2000) baseline study, 
for instance, looked at the conditions in the ECDE from 1994 to mid-1997. Their 
findings identified that the new bureaucracy was a mixture of forced groupings of 
people suspicious of each other. This they attributed to the fact that the officials 
came from opposing sides of the education system. These opposing sides would 
not just be racial and ethnic but would be consequential to other dimensions 
including the fact that:  
…other people came on board because of the sunset clause, you know, 
because they wanted the jobs; others came on board to come and 
transform this education department. Now if you have those different 
groups you are going to have a problem (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 
19/11/2003). 
 
Another interviewee went on to say: 
 
If you take 1994, you are now bringing in these people, those that were 
dismissed in the 90s or 80s, those who were in the administration of 
compliance, those that were used to being governed by rules, those 
who were very hostile to anything that seems like rules and regulations 
and those people who claimed to be democrats, those people that were 
sitting on the fence and who said if you shake the fence left, I will 
remain there, if it falls right I will remain there, if I remain in the 
middle its good for me [laughs]. So these are the kinds of people we 
brought together (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 
2003). 
 
Theoretically, while the notion of representative bureaucracy was to endorse the 
broad unified politics of national reconciliation one cannot escape the fact that it 
also legitimised in an unconscious way the separation, fragmentation and 
difference which had literally been transposed in the new system by the 
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compromise. The point is that the compromise was not just bringing in people that 
were different in terms of race, gender and politics but also that it was people who 
believed in the constructs of difference as represented by different notions of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ conscribed by different political systems that ruled them over forty 
years of apartheid. Indirectly, this was the beginning of challenges in a system of 
forced integration and reconciliation. Consequentially, this reorientation and re-
organisation of the new bureaucracy resulted in the formation of Bisho as the 
head office, the incorporation of six regional offices with their districts and 
schools. 
 
Bisho as the central office 
The reconstitution of Bisho as head office was managed by various task teams 
ranging from the Educational Transformation Task Team of 1994 (ETTT) 
(Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003), the Strategic 
Management Teams (SMTs) around 1995 and the Departmental Transformation 
Unit (DTU) (Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004 and 
ECSECC 2000) around 1996. All these structures played different roles in setting 
up the department where the ETTT was an advisory body to the MEC at the 
beginning of process. This was replaced by the SMTs whose mandate is well-
articulated by (Wooldridge and Cranko, 1995). Amongst other things, these 
structures handled the policy, legal, financial and institutional processes. 
Presumably their powers varied with each province and department. In the ECDE 
they seemingly focus more on institutional processes of setting up the 
departmental structures (Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 2005). When 
the SMTs were disbanded in accordance with Public Service Commission (PSC) 
directives they were replaced by the DTU which became a consultative forum of 
‘different representatives of all directorates and labour organisations’ (ECSECC 
2002) to set the new organogram. Unfortunately the DTU never got to work on a 
consistent agenda because of challenges in the department, which included poor 
communication and unclear roles, functions and responsibilities (ECSECC 2002).  
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Nevertheless, what was common to all these structures was to transform Bisho 
from a homeland structure to a new bureaucratic system that represented the 
democratic ethos as prescribed by new regulatory frameworks. But more 
importantly, the transformation of Bisho was important for the eradication of 
homeland practices that would have been part of the homeland system and its 
informal networks. However, what became of Bisho was that at the point of 
transformation it lacked internal systems to make regional offices accountable, 
which, as a result, continued running the old mill as if it had no responsibility 
over them.  It also had no databases and so was unclear as to who existed where 
and in what capacity, and rather relied on regions for whatever information was 
needed. Structurally, the new reorganisation resembled Mintzberg’s divisionalised 
structure. Divisionalised structures consist of independent entities joined together 
by an administrative overlay (Mintzberg, 1980). In this case, Bisho acted as the 
administrative overlay over the six regional offices but with symbolic powers 
rather than real authority over them as these entities remained functioning as they 
had been before the 1994 elections.   
 
Adding to the complexity of the situation was that the integration in 1994 saw the 
department become a hybrid of different and unrelated units. This was due to the 
fact that with the early structural allocations in 1994, MECs held parallel 
portfolios and functions (ECSECC 2000) because of the limited allocations of 
human resources in general. Education was thus combined with Sports Recreation 
and Youth Affairs, Arts and Culture, Library Sciences and Heritage and 
Museums. Since these units had little relevance to education, it is difficult to 
imagine how education was prioritised, with its extended and varied needs 
emanating from regional, district and school entities. In this hybrid structure, 
education as an entity focused on  (i) professional support services, (b) regional 
co-ordination, (c) standard education and administration support services. 
Managing these were a permanent secretary and five deputies, twelve directors 
and six regional directors (ECSECC 2000).  
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The regional offices 
The six regional offices (later five, due to the closure of Butterworth) saw these 
regional structures being the major power blocks in the new dispensation. The 
Annual Report of 1998/1999 and the Education Management Information System 
(EMIS) review of education indicators in the EC (2001) provide a glimpse into 
the operations and the configuration of the regions, which were the North Eastern, 
Eastern, South Eastern, Northern, Central and Western regions as shown in Figure 
5.1. Between these six regional entities, they managed 42 districts of education. A 
large concentration of these districts is in the former Transkei as shown by the 
North Eastern, Eastern, South Eastern and partly the Northern territories.  
 
Figure 5.1 The Regional Boundaries of the ECDE5. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Source: Education Management Information System: Review of Education Indicators 1995-2000. 
Eastern Cape Department of Education. 
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In the period between 1995 and 1997, these regional entities had high levels of 
autonomy over their budgets, recruitment and appointments of teachers and 
principals for their schools. This means that very little changed for them, with the 
transformation era resembling bureaucratic continuity rather than discontinuity as 
they continued to manage the same jurisdiction of schools as they had done under 
apartheid with the same teachers and inspectors of schools. Theoretically, this 
means that while the merger dismantled the symbolic structural fragmentations of 
the apartheid period, it is also true that such dismantlement was artificial as it 
touched only the superficial spaces created by race, ethnic and homeland 
discourses. With the adoption of regions, people continued to work in the same 
culturally and socially constructed environments that existed pre-1994, except for 
the top political and administrative leadership that moved into the newly adopted 
administration centre in Bisho. The regions thus became the sine qua non of the 
new power arrangements defined by geographical spaces, race and ethnic 
alliances and other external networks. 
 
5.4 The exhibition of chaos 
The administrative bureaucracy was very soon under pressure to enhance service 
delivery. By 1995 the functioning of the state bureaucracies in general was 
synonymous with poor service delivery, crisis and chaos. Reasons included the 
fact that many public organisations lacked capacity and skills to deliver large-
scale reform programmes, but also that the public sector reform programme 
lacked direction and clearly articulated goals that could be translated into delivery 
programmes at an organisational level. This meant that organisational 
effectiveness at the time was conditional on acquiring leadership skills and 
general staff competencies. Otherwise the trail of reform became more haphazard 
than following a controlled planning process. The subsequent public criticisms of 
the state bureaucracies, led to a number of reviews being instituted including the 
Provincial Review Report (1997) and the Presidential Review Commission of 
Inquiry on Transformation and Reform in the Public Service (1998) alluded to in 
Chapter Four. Amongst the generic factors this study identified that part of the 
problem was that the integration of the six regions and the recreation of Bisho as 
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the new centre did not automatically transfer power to Bisho. Rather, Bisho 
remained as the weak structural overlay supported by six pillars it had little 
understanding of, other than their past. Implicitly, what this thesis confirmed is 
that in mergers where centres are weak and the divisionalised entities are more 
powerful this creates problems for organisational functioning, co-ordination and 
efficiency plans as each division becomes a consolidated turf in its own right thus 
protecting its own interests. If anything, the lack of reconstitution of these 
regional bases validated their fragmented power bases and their previous cultural 
and identity practices which were being nurtured under new organisational 
arrangements. It also provided an opportunity for different interests to consolidate 
themselves in the new order thus creating conditions for resistance and sabotage.  
 
A case in point is evident in how the merger failed to consolidate basics like what 
Deetz (1998) calls artefactual databases. By artefactual database, he refers to all 
forms of information management systems including client records, filing systems 
and financial management systems. Systems as such became points for 
contestation, manipulation and even sabotage. For instance, in other cases in the 
homelands they were disrupted, disintegrated and disengaged (Lodge 2005; 
Piccard 2002, 2006; Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 November 2003) due to 
unresolved politics of resistance. Such disengagement included the manipulation 
of data and in some instances the removal of data from files. This threw the 
organisation into a spiral of incompetence as it struggled to account for the basic 
elements of its resource functioning. For instance, it could not state how many 
schools and teachers there were, let alone provide accurate statistics on the 
schools register of needs and the salary bill. Equally, as client records were stolen, 
mishandled and destroyed, the system became almost self-terminating. Most of 
these problem were not unique to this period, but continued for many years into 
late 2003 when this study was conducted.  The following comments therefore 
speak to some of these issues:  
The first area is systems especially, our information management 
systems, relating to personnel, relating to finances, relating to asset 
management, relating to education management. So you have this area 
of systems that are sort of broken down. That worries me a great deal. 
So first let’s talk about personnel management information and 
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personnel management. How many teachers we are paying, where they 
are, what the total salary figure or the total salary bill is, and how we 
can verify some of these things is still a huge problem. You know 
sometimes you don’t know how many bills you are paying (Interview 
R, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). 
 
[the senior managers] left the lower management there [in Umtata] to 
carry on and those people just decided not to control anything. So you 
could go there and get your file and you could take whatever you 
didn’t want in your file. When I had to go there and collect files I 
collected files with almost nothing inside, and in fact even today we 
are still having a problem of paying gratuities, because there is no 
record. How do you know if a person says to you I started teaching in 
1955 you know, then you have to go to the file not so, but there is no 
file to do that, that is why, one reason why for instance, we are failing 
to pay gratuities. For instance, one big problem is that people who go 
on pension wait for two years or three years without their pensions 
simply because one of the main reasons is that we don’t have a record 
of their service.  Literally, I took my files from passages there all over 
Umtata. It was chaotic in that building, it was chaotic and I think if 
you want to trace our problems, you trace our problems to that, that is 
where our problems started (Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 November 
2003). 
 
He went on to say: 
 
As a regional director there I was expecting that somebody would 
come and say here are files from the Ciskei, for our people there. I will 
receive those files and check, you know, Umtata will bring files, and 
Port Elizabeth. I remember one day they dumped files from 
Middelburg for the Coloured Education Department and they were not 
properly arranged. The other mistake also which we made was that 
they engaged some consultants to try and sort this thing out and they 
opened the processing centre at Bulembu. That was another big 
mistake at Bulembu, and I think those people just took our money 
away, those consultants. We were asked now to second people there, 
you know, people to be there to second and those people to be able 
sort out the filing and all that kind of thing. So we had to pack our files 
to send them there, you know. We tried to pack them in a system but 
you know when these people when they left, in fact they didn’t 
achieve anything they just send them back but now in a muddle like 
that you know, that is why you will find in most of our offices you 
don’t find properly run registries. For instance, if you want a file you 
will struggle to get a file. Let me say you want a particular file, there is 
no system but now, its only now that an attempt is being made now to 
have proper registries, you know (Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 
November 2003).         
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The other critical aspect was systems because we all come from 
different systems. Then it took time to integrate the systems. If you 
take a system in Transkei was there nothing called Persal systems, 
which is the systems for personnel and salary payment or appointment 
of the personnel. So in Transkei they mainly relied upon files, ordinary 
manual filing systems and then they would capture and pay a teacher. 
In the DET and others they had Persal systems where all teachers were 
in this system where you press a button and you see myself and all that 
I’m supposed to be and paid at the end of the month and all those 
things. So there was a big process then to put the ex-Transkei teachers 
into the Persal system (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 
November, 2003). 
 
These documents that get lost cause hardship for our people because 
they pay. You are waiting for your salary and your file has been lost in 
a district office or your file cannot be found between Bisho and your 
district office. And that is another critical issue that has to be 
addressed…. We have a running battle with the treasurer about our 
base-line when they want to determine our budget for personnel. We 
always fight. We say, we have 65 000 teachers in the system, they say 
that’s not true – in terms of persal you have 63 000 teachers. Drawing 
information from EMIS, here is information from EMIS, this is how 
things are. Then they start punching holes in that. We retreat because 
we are not sure about the credibility of the data that we have. So this 
issue of not being able to manage information and data is also 
challenging in that sense. (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 
2003).  
 
The department has since adopted a project called Get The Record Straight 
(GTRS) which aims to tighten systems, especially around personnel (Department 
of Education: Policy and Budget Speech 2001/2002). It is a project meant to 
eliminate ghost employees through head count and matching personnel to existing 
posts. All these efforts are a reflection of the complexity of change in transitional 
environments. What these experiences reflect are contradictions and complexities 
emanating from an abrupt rupture in the system where the consequences depict 
chaos and inability to manage basic information transfer due to interests working 
against the direction of change adopted.   
 
Similar patterns are evident in the lack of management of the finance systems. 
The department suffered from poor financial systems and lacked accountability 
measures for financial expenditures, leading to financial crisis and bankruptcy. As 
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the Imbewu project (ECSECC 2000) discovered, they did not follow financial 
regulations or meet basic accounting standards set by the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) of 1999. As a result, by 1997, the department was 
sitting at R1-billion over-expenditure. Amongst other things, the basis of this 
expenditure was a result of the autonomy given to regions in the absence of clear 
accountability measures and rules from the centre. In any event, the centre was as 
confused and lacked knowledge and expertise about finance, as officials 
explained:   
They were unable to recruit competent financial managers. There were 
financial reports presented but it was chaos. Particularly from Transkei 
it was a shambles (Interview J, East London, 18 November 2003). 
 
Finances were a factor and one cannot deny that. On the management 
of whatever little was budgeted for and allocated in that department 
there were a lot of inefficiencies in the department… So they were just 
spending and that culture permeated to lower levels because you could 
authorize spending on an item which was not budgeted for – the lower 
levels could later on learn that this can be done and they would do it. 
You would find that in regions, because we had people placed in 
regions besides the centre – people would just hire teachers without 
even checking that there was a budget allocated for that. And once a 
person is there, there is a legitimate expectation that they will be paid 
at the end of the month…. Some opened loopholes for corruption. You 
can’t exclude that (Interview To, Bisho, 19 May 2004). 
 
But one of the mistakes that we made was that we did not comprehend 
the difficulty we were putting ourselves into in terms of budgets. 
Where I came from, the districts, the regional office had the meeting 
with all the EDOs there, with all the people from the former 
departments. [They would ask] how many teachers do you need. The 
answer would be 500. There is no justification for the 500, nothing has 
been tested. You come and say you can have those 500 teachers. Now 
you appoint, no proper costing etc. That has landed us in deep trouble 
because you see why this was done, one was to get rid of the people 
that are angry on the ground… Its only when we got to 97/98 that we 
looked at the budget and then realised we were in trouble. I was deeply 
affected in 97 because I couldn’t pay my contractors (Interview Fr, 
Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004r, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004).  
 
This bureaucrat who was heading the finance unit repeated that things 
were in order because we were not able to go into systems and look at 
things. We were just reading reports, we believed that, until such time 
that he left the department. After he left another bureaucrat from the 
CED [Cape Education Department], the white department, then 
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discovered that we were overspending by about 100-million Rands a 
month on personnel (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). 
 
There were three main systems that were operational and those 
systems didn’t talk to each another. That was one of the big reasons 
why it was only almost two years later that it was discovered that there 
was over-expenditure because the systems were not speaking to each 
other. And when we talk of systems, we talk of computerised systems 
in terms of payment of staff etc. So there was never any data in terms 
of spending methods and cash flows almost until it was too late. And it 
was too late because there was then already at that stage approximately 
a billion Rand overspend, which then impacted on the following three 
years… And that meant that the following three years, the non-
personnel budget was reduced to almost nothing, to insignificant 
amounts. That resulted in actual delivery of the department being very 
severely affected obviously (Interview J, East London, 18 November 
2003). 
 
The plight of the department was highlighted through union protests, media 
pressure and state intervention as they failed to meet financial obligations made 
with contractors, schools and other stakeholders. Again the issue of regions and 
their lack of co-ordination come to the fore. While one would argue that by their 
nature the homeland and the other former apartheid structures were bound to 
collapse due to the inherent history of lack of capacity and skills, it needs to be 
taken into consideration that the adopted regions were powerful entities on their 
own and thus one cannot water down issues of sabotage that came with the 
change. Such sabotage was defined through different measures of corruption 
including creating ghost schools, self-promotion and manipulation of Persal 
systems (Interview Be, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004; Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 
November 2003 and Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004). These happen as a 
result of lack of control and clear rules and sanctions. As a result it seems 
fundamental to take cognisance of the former commissioner’s words: 
…the other reality is that when you are moving between systems in 
administration things are extremely loose. And that opened a great 
deal of space for graft, for what I call the skollies [colloquial for 
thieves, small-time crooks] to go in and scope things, duck and dive, 
hide behind what I call the sort of transitional process and that you 
know….. that’s probably one of the most remarkable phenomena of 
transition, that  you haemorrhage all over the place and one of the 
critical issues is to get it under control because there is so much space 
for the criminal mind actually (Interview I, Hogsback, 17 May 2004).        
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The point being made here is that transitional environments by their nature are 
unpredictable and complex and due to their fluidity they create spaces for 
different forms of behavioural tendencies to emerge, which may be detrimental to 
the change itself. While some of these may be reduced to the inherent chaos of 
complexity, others may be due to different interests that are trying to assert 
themselves as part of the change and thus create further chaos to legitimate their 
interests.  
 
5.5.  From autonomy to centralisation: The mid-crisis of 1997-1999 
The reorganisation of Bisho had started on the basis of a supposedly functional 
Ciskei bureaucracy, where Ciskei had put in place systems and structures unique 
to its homeland environment. Debates about the inefficiencies of homelands are 
well-known and will not be repeated here. However, in the context of change it is 
presumed that change will create better conditions than those previously 
experienced and this was no exception with the creation of the new bureaucracy. 
Generally Weber and his iron cage inform bureaucracy debates and its planning in 
public administration and this was no exception. However, since Weber’s ideal 
type iron cage is idealistic, it is important to draw attention to other analytical 
types, which closely analyse instances of bureaucratic inefficiencies. Here one 
thinks of Gouldner’s (1954) and Blau’s (1955) bureaucratic analogies, which 
include the mock, representative and punishment-centred bureaucracies (Gouldner 
and Blau quoted in Clegg, 1990) and Riggs’ (1964) sala bureaucracy. In terms of 
their definitions, there is indeed a closer resemblance between the mock and the 
sala bureaucracy as both tend to identify lack of rules or their lack of application 
as instrumental to organisational inefficiency. Riggs’ work is perhaps the closest 
analytically to giving accurate accounts of inefficient bureaucracies due to his 
empirical observations of different public sector contexts. What is missing in his 
research is an exploration of how to change such conditions to ensure efficiency. 
The next few paragraphs explore the processes embarked upon by the South 
Africa state to correct the situation.    
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Going back to 1997, the crisis of reported inefficiencies shifted the reorganisation 
to centralisation. Symbolically this moved the bureaucracy from its sala/mock 
status to resemble what Gouldner and Blau in Clegg (1990) call a punishment-
oriented bureaucracy. As one may recall sala and mock bureaucracies tend to be 
weak on rules. In punishment-centred bureaucracies rules are enforced through 
‘punitive measures’ (Gouldner and Blau cited in Clegg, 1990:47). Equally here, 
the bureaucracy came under siege as the state recaptured the territory for financial 
management and planning. This they did by withdrawing all departmental 
autonomy on financial expenditure. While one official acknowledged that some 
drastic measures had to be taken to push back the over-expenditure, it is true that 
the process reconfigured all power dynamics ‘as all department delegations or 
control including those that were in the regions went back to central treasury’ 
(Interview R, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). By this treasury had instituted 
section 100, of the Constitution of 1996 as he explained: 
The National Treasury instituted the Section 100 (a) or (b) of the 
Constitution. Section 100 of the constitution is for the national treasury 
to intervene when a province is incapable of managing. The Financial 
Management Regiment was put in both KZN and the EC. Enoch 
Godongwana was sent to sort out the mess. The Provincial Treasury 
decided on recovery and financial controls. The strategy was blunt. We 
are going to close the tap for five years (Interview J, East London, 18 
November 2003). 
 
Similarly, one official added: 
then there was section 100, the national government took over, you 
know. I mean the province then that gets subjected to that kind of 
thing, definitely everybody in the country, everybody’s attention is 
drawn to that. The administration of that province has been taken over, 
they have been placed under section 100 (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 
November 2003). 
 
The basis of section 100 (1) is that  
When a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of 
legislation of the Constitution, the national executive may intervene by taking any 
appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation, including 
(a)  issuing a directive to the provincial executive, describing the extent of the 
failure to fulfil its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its 
obligations; and  
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(b)  assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that province to the 
extent necessary to 
maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum 
standards for the rendering of the service (The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996:57). 
 
The pronunciation of section 100 was therefore a confirmation that the 
department had failed to meet the minimum standards of service delivery. Already 
unions had enforced a public focus as they embarked on strikes that included the 
physical occupation of the head office education building. These measures 
declared a ‘crisis’ that would legitimise the state’s intervention (Kotter, 1995; 
Patterson, 1983). Such state intervention was, of course, a double-edged sword, 
since on one hand the intervention was a takeover. The new state had to assert 
itself in the bureaucracy that had refused to co-operate, while on the other hand, 
unlike its predecessor, the apartheid state, it had to build an image of a listening 
and a caring state for public approval. This legitimated its actions as it also got 
support from the premier’s office.  
 
Theoretically, the application of the financial takeover became an instrument to 
close the symbolic negotiated spaces that were perpetuated by regional, district 
and local fragmented identities. It is these spaces that advanced lacked of co-
operation and even subordination. For instance, when reading correspondence 
between the head office of education and its regions and between the same office 
and the office of the Auditor-General (AG), it is dominated by complaints about 
lack of submissions on basic information needed to write and complete 
accountability reports. For instance the AG’s report of 2002, subsection 3 on 
Qualification, states clearly that: 
(a) A significant number of payment vouchers, personnel files, revenue 
vouchers and other documents in support of transactions of the department 
and the financial statements could not be produced during the audit. This 
placed a limitation on the extent of the audit work to establish the validity, 
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accuracy and the completeness of transactions in ledger, expenditure and 
revenue accounts.  
(b) The inability of the department to produce records has been reported since 
1995. 
 
The report goes on and comments on the department’s internal control systems 
which are almost non-existent. In a brief way, it goes on to say:  
(a) The personnel and salary system has not been updated to reflect staff 
movements and terminations. Paymasters did not always certify the 
payrolls to confirm that officials listed thereon were employed at the 
relevant paypoints.  
(b) Personnel and leave records were found to be unsatisfactory. Significant 
backlogs of information have not been captured on the Personnel and 
Salary System. 
(c) Financial obligations were not settled within the prescribed period in 
terms of section 38(1) (f) of the Public Finance Management Act (Act 
No.1 of 1999).  
(d) Monthly accounts and statements of outstanding balances rendered by 
suppliers to the department were not checked to verify discrepancies or 
outstanding amounts. 
(e) Adequate control is not exercised over assets and records of assets are not 
always properly maintained.   
(f) There was lack of evidence that the accounting officer ensures internal 
compliance to regulation. 
(g) The provisions of Treasury Circular 37 of 2000 were not adhered to. 
Revenue was not deposited into the Provincial Revenue Account nor was 
it deposited daily as required, (For a full Auditor General’s report read the 
Depart of Education: Annual Report 2001/2002: 99-104).  
 
All these statements are indicative of the system that failed to conceptualise the 
technical side of the bureaucracy. For instance as the centre failed to set the 
ground rules for financial accountability, it assumed that the semi autonomous 
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regions had the ability to manage, control and monitor themselves following the 
broader policy regulations. This proved not to be the case as it is implied by the 
poor consolidation of information. But, while regions were a challenge to manage, 
one cannot take away that the centre itself lacked the capacity to manage its own 
activities let alone that it was expected to lead others. It lacked good internal 
systems to management its own activities. This is despite the fact that it was 
paying over a million rand to a group of consultants to sort out its human resource 
and information technology systems (Department of Education: Budget Review 
Action Plans 2001/2002). 
   
Unfortunately, even with the Auditor General, there was little it could do. Other 
than basic correspondence of appeal and negative financial reporting there were 
no sanctions in place to curb ill-discipline and lack of co-operation. Section 100 
thus became an instant disciplinary tool instituted by national, compelling the 
provincial administration to attend to strict conditions which are summarised by 
the Department of Education Annual Report (1999/2000). It had to: 
(a)  remain within the allocations made in the Appropriation Act of the 
Province, as a province and as individual departments; 
(b) improve financial management and cash flow management to ensure that 
the budget will be sustainable over the three years of the MTEF [Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework]; 
(c)  ensure that provincial departments honour their commitments, 
responsibilities and obligations; 
(d)  establish efficient and effective budgetary practices to ensure budget 
achievability; 
(e)  ensure sound financial practices including the timeous payment of 
legitimate claims, the enforcement of Treasury legislation and Tender 
Board legislation; 
(f)  optimise the collection of own revenue and to improve own revenue by at 
least 10%; 
(g)  undertake a number of other administrative measures to save costs 
(Department of Education: Annual Report 1999/2000). 
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While these conditions were to apply to at least four departments, each department 
would respond to them differently. Implicitly, the intervention was bound not only 
to impede the poor bureaucratic activities but it was to starve networks of power 
bases that fed on patronage and corruption spread throughout the diverse 
fragmented systems. The level of patronage in South African bureaucracies is well 
covered in Lodge (2005), (1998), (1997) and Piccard (2002), (2006). For the 
Eastern Cape analysis of government corruption one can read Allan (2002). But 
more important, Bisho as the centre had no sense of financial expenditure in its 
different regional entities. Section 100 was therefore a mechanism, it is argued, to 
enforce civil obedience, subordination and conformity and the strategy was 
‘deviant-centred’ (Pettit, 2000). Deviant-centred strategies over-emphasize 
compliance, penalties and discipline. Even here, compliance penalties and 
discipline became central as treasury refused to approve any expenditure that did 
not meet the set regulations and requirements (Interview M, Bisho, 11 May 2004). 
 
Consequences of the disciplinary mode 
While centralisation is a dominant norm in instances of organisational failure, 
there is very little research that tells us about the consequences of such 
disciplinary intervention on systems, processes and on the managers themselves. 
While this research was also not meant to look at this, it is interesting that some 
officials found it necessary to talk about this process and how it affected them. 
Since the strategy was to target financial expenditure, all powers were delegated 
within treasury, leaving the department with the political and symbolic 
responsibilities but with no financial mandate. These disciplinary strategies and 
tactics employed by the state intervention reduced the education officials to 
glorified clerks, as one official indicated, with feeble responsibility and tasks they 
could not execute (Interview K, Zwelitsha, 15 May 2004 and Interview J, East 
London, 18 November 2003).  
 
The consequences of this included the fact that the organisation had problems 
with its stakeholders and external alliances as delivery was halted at all levels.  
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The point is that the intervention by treasury was a double-edged sword which on 
the one hand proclaimed state authority to enforce discipline for state legitimacy, 
while on the other hand facilitated internal organisational paralysis that would 
enhance conformity in set rules. As McKinlay and Starkey (1998:5) argue, 
‘disciplinary power is most potent and efficient when it operates through 
administrative rules rather than force majeure, largely because ‘rules presuppose 
agency and discretion’. In this case agency and discretion was reduced to treasury 
limitations:  
With authority centralised on treasury officials, what the HOD in 
education could not approve the deputy director in finance could 
approve. So it created for me an anomaly in terms of bureaucratic 
practices that what cannot be approved by a Senior Manager in 
education can be approved by a junior official in treasury. It created a 
problem in terms of credibility of these managers in education and it 
created a situation where people always went with cap in hand when 
they went to treasury. It was a situation of begging for the few 
resources that you have been allocated and you have no control over 
how you spend the money but you remain accountable to the public in 
terms of perceptions and delivery. So if there are no schools and there 
are no desks people don’t know Mr X sitting in Treasury has said no to 
your request. They know you in education sitting in a district office 
(Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003). 
 
There is famous quotation from one of the acting SGs [Superintendent 
General] who said in 1999 that ‘I have a responsibility for nine billion 
Rands but I don’t have the authority to utilize one cent or buy a pen’. 
That tells you immediately that there is a problem, if the head of the 
department of education, a department this big did not have the 
authority to buy a pen. Because what that meant was that for the head 
of the department to approve that I buy this pen what is going to 
happen was that the submission from the head of the department 
would have to go to a junior clerk at treasury (Interview K, Zwelitsha, 
15 May 2004). 
 
Essentially what happened was that in the centralisation of decision-
making in the provincial treasury, your role as an accounting officer is 
completely undermined. I mean you sit with a situation where you 
have responsibility for the budget and we are talking big budgets of 
like 7 billion Rands in some cases. But the authority over that budget 
is removed from you and is placed in the hands of a junior official in 
the provincial treasury. So you will have somebody who is a director 
level person who determines what you are able to spend money on or 
not and as a head of department whether your judgement says this item 
is absolutely essential or not, the centralisation of the payment 
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function and the authorising function meant you had absolutely no say. 
This was really the situation that made it untenable for me. You see 
effectively you weren’t managing, you can’t manage if you can’t make 
decisions about allocations and that was the one key problem 
(Interview J, East London, 18 November 2003). 
 
The junior officials had the power to approve or reject any proposal put forward 
and this they would do by scrutinizing every detail of the requisition forms where 
each missing detail would add another cycle of correction and delayed processing. 
This was partly to enhance discipline, conformity and obedience but also to 
reconstruct the culture of laissez-faire to a culture of accountability and 
responsibility. These junior officials thus became the embodiment of discipline 
that was to train the education officials in docility and subordination. That they 
were junior was a misnomer as the hierarchy had placed them in a position to 
execute such tasks, the basis of which was to break ill-discipline and enforce 
conformity irrespective of rank and status. This is close to Foucault’s description 
of discipline which explains that while discipline 
dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 
“aptitude,” a “capacity,” which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, 
it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, 
and turns it into a relation of strict subjection’ (Rabinow, 1984:182). 
 
Similarly, one contends that the department was now experiencing such a reversal 
of power where subjection became visible through the reduction of internal tasks 
into superficial plans that could not be undertaken. Equally the organisation had 
been reduced to a state of paralysis which one official (Interview P, King 
William’s Town, 20 November 2003) called the ‘Bisho Syndrome’.  Such a 
syndrome became manifested in different ways as articulated below: 
…those were the years when the department couldn’t pay electricity 
bills, the schools get cut off, we can’t pay fuel bills and the children 
freeze in the hostels because there is no fuel, we can’t buy books and 
there is no toilet paper or soap and on and on, I mean the list goes on 
and on. We couldn’t service photostatting machines so they did break 
down and they just stand. You can just imagine items of expenditure, 
the process was just absolutely brutal (Interview J, East London, 18 
November, 2003). 
 
When we centralised nobody understood the impact of that because the 
public perception also was so huge to say we have these useless 
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managers who cannot even take a decision. They will always tell you 
about Bisho, that’s where the Bisho syndrome came up, and people 
were saying ‘why do I go to a district or to a region when the decision 
resides with Bisho?’ So these other structures were rendered in a sense 
useless or ineffective and people were moving straight from schools or 
communities, delegation after delegation after delegation came to 
Bisho and Bisho education offices unfortunately had to manage this 
because we had to nurse relationships and not pass them over to 
treasury (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003). 
 
He went on to explain: 
 
So you had a situation where most managers, most middle managers, 
were just demotivated and demoralised and never thought anything 
could happen. So the state of apathy grew by the day in a number of 
offices and the work culture, the work ethics started to disappear in the 
district offices and in the regional offices. People felt that there is 
nothing we can do, we are just here. All we are here for is to receive 
our money because there was almost nothing in terms of non-
personnel budget  Then there was the whole problem of electricity 
being cut, teachers not getting their monies, transport couldn’t move, 
you had to ground them, there was no money for petrol. So it created a 
whole state of apathy and very much huge unhappiness from managers 
and a state of hopelessness from the side of seniors in the department.  
You are sitting with pressures from social partners or unions who are 
saying you are not paying our members and therefore you are a useless 
department and therefore go public and shout. You have problems of 
payslips. There are no more salary advices and there are payslips 
because they don’t advise anyone because they get late to the teachers 
and ourselves. That’s a problem because education does not print the 
salary advice, treasury prints them centrally, distributes them to 
education and other departments. But the public in the form of teachers 
don’t see treasury, they see education. If I get my salary slip after two 
months I shout and I wag my finger at this useless education 
department (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003).  
 
… In 1997 remember we had already now been three years coming 
and we were now looking at how we’re dealing with it and how we 
have made this undertaking to schools as to where they would be in 
1997 but to complete your schooling. And then when we could not 
deliver on that it placed us under tremendous pressure. Not only to the 
communities but also to our clients or the people who were rendering 
the services for the department. You know in our particular field of 
work I saw contractors suffering. I saw families of contractors, I saw 
people losing their properties. You know that time contractors could 
not even reach their goals because their workers had taken over 
because they were not paid. In 1997 I was sitting in the MEC’s office 
with a group of contractors where the MEC’s office was under siege 
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where the chairperson of the contractors’ association told Nosimo, 
‘You type man, type!’ There I saw the MEC typing a letter making an 
undertaking by Friday you will be paid. They took that letter to the 
press, this is coming from the MEC, but on Friday we couldn’t pay. 
This is how it was. Treasury didn’t want to budge and we were held 
hostage. These guys came to my office and said “you know, I’m sorry 
you are not going to go home”. So 1997 was a terrible time (Interview 
Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004). 
 
From these comments, one sees that the disciplinary nature of the intervention did 
not make things better but rather made them worse as the department struggled to 
operate within the allocated budgets. Interestingly, it is Patterson who advocates 
that things should never get worse in the process of being made better. For him, 
the strategy is to find the ‘elements of the system that can be attacked with little 
costs’ (Patterson, 1983:5). Unfortunately, this intervention did not take this into 
account as the situation worsened with each year of lack of service delivery. 
  
Concomitant with this pressure was the media pressure that became the new point 
of surveillance as it reported on teachers’ strikes and teachers’ perceptions of 
inefficiencies, focusing on financial non-payment to teachers. The role of the 
media in change is never an issue largely because the transformation of many 
organisations is never great enough to attract attention, and its role generally tends 
to accentuate the crisis that legitimises any intervention planned, it is also true that 
its role can be sensationalist as it focuses its attention on the negative than the 
positive. Actually Lingard and Christie (2003) quoting Bourdieu (1998) address 
the notion of the media and its characteristic of ‘permanent amnesia’ when it 
reports on issues, where the past and related events lose significance in the 
moment of accentuating the present. Even here the media drew a blindfold over 
history as it put emphasis on the perceived crisis. For instance, one official 
articulated his frustration in the following way:  
You have a media that is not worried about whatever… they find 
stories from whoever has been affected, whether it is one teacher not 
paid. They create those as weekly stories and they forget that maybe 
65 or so or a 1 000 of them are getting their money on time… I bet we 
are not different than any other province but its because its very easy 
to talk about the EC. For example, anyone coming from Johannesburg 
goes to few hospitals here and films them and goes to Third Degree or 
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Special Assignment and says this is what is happening in the EC. He 
didn’t go to Frontier Hospital that has been revamped and rebuilt, they 
didn’t go to Umtata Nelson Mandela big hospital, or to the Lusikisiki 
Hospital. They don’t go there because that is not newsworthy. So they 
come around to a few schools. We have built more schools than any 
province in the country. They don’t worry about those schools. It’s not 
newsworthy. You invite them, the MEC is going to open a school, 
please come, they ask you  where and [you tell them] in Mt Frere in a 
particular village. [The response is] we don’t have a car. We don’t 
have a reporter in Mt Frere. Our reporters are only in Umtata. You 
phone the reporter and he tells you, hey there is a story, there will be 
payments of social grants today. We anticipate that all payments of 
CPS will run into problems. We’ve gone there early in the morning 
and we have seen long queues. We think its going to be more dramatic 
than that school of yours. Sorry man, we can’t come. Now nobody 
reports and we don’t own the media. We can’t report and say this is 
what the media is doing, because even if you send the story to them 
they look at and it competes with the space of social grants, child hit 
by a car there, a bus fallen there. This editor says they have been 
building these schools man, nothing new. Put the school aside, put in 
the bus accident or the granny that died in the queue. So I’m saying 
then perceptions, the media has assisted to create a particular 
perception (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003). 
 
…[with the attention] therefore on the number of roads we have built, 
the number of schools we have built, the number of learners that have 
gone through the system, all these other things that [you] have done 
are forgotten. All we get is bad press, is bad comments, even 
ourselves, we started being critical about ourselves (Interview B, 
Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). 
 
Undoubtedly the idea for public exposure had indirectly instigated a mixture of 
emotions that included frustration, embarrassment and cynicism as the same 
official went on to explain:  
You know this thing about people telling you all these bad things 
about yourself, it affects your self-esteem and to try and cope with that 
you also use it, you also laugh at yourself, then we got into that. You 
would go to Jo’burg and meet with an EC person and say but what is 
happening there (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). 
 
In the same vein, one official added: 
 
… one needs to be appreciative of  the people who have been working 
in this department under such difficult circumstances. But you are 
always condemned for things that did not go right. But nobody really 
looked at this thing carefully and said, but look, these guys are 
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overwhelmed, you know, they are working and they must put systems 
in place and at the same time working with a limited budget and 
there’s no support. So our challenge as we moved along has always 
been, how we could get ourselves out of this quagmire since we can’t 
work like that. People thought that we enjoyed working under such 
difficult circumstances but it is not a matter of enjoyment, it is how do 
you get out. How do you manage at the end of the day to get out of 
here? I have been asking myself whether I am incompetent? When we 
apply people think we are not competent, when they hear we are from 
Bisho, which department? Education? Oh no, you are useless!. That is 
the perception that people have (Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 
2004). 
 
Overall, the disciplinary nature of the centralisation strategy was to normalise a 
situation of chaos which was a result of lack of co-ordination, lack of order and 
lack of rules for accountability. To use Foucault it was introducing 
‘governmentality’ (Faubion, 1994). The centralisation strategy had its limitations, 
of course, partly caused by the inability of treasury to process large amounts of 
information. As a result, documents went missing, departmental information was 
delayed resulting in systems blockages, but also it became vulnerable to 
corruption (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003 and Interview 
Maz, Bisho, 11 May 2004). This compromised its authority over the departments 
it had taken over. For instance, while it seemed essential for treasury to institute 
all disciplinary measures towards the department, it ignored the time factor in 
strategic interventions. Change management prescriptions argue that the time for 
an intervention cannot be prolonged; instead the system must be seen to work on 
its own as quickly as possible. Such lack of understanding saw treasury perceived 
as part of the problem rather than the solution, so it was not surprising that the 
Auditor-General intervened. For instance, with accountability removed from the 
education officials, this plunged the department into a different curve of under-
expenditure which treasury became liable for (Interview P, King William’s Town, 
20 November 2003), as shown in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 ECDE Financial Expenditure between 2000 and 2002 
Year Budget Expenditure Under/over 
Expenditure 
2000/2001 7,439,714,000 7,191,331,000 248,383,000 
2001/2002 8,118,856,000 7,863,867,000 254,989,000 
Source: ECDE Strategic Plan 2004-2007-Incorporating Operational Plan and 
Budget. 
 
This under-expenditure was largely due to the conditions set which saw the 
department unaware of how much it was to spend, where and when, as finance 
decisions remained with treasury. Unfortunately, the consequences of these 
under-expenditures contributed to new pressures for both the department and 
treasury. This subsequently saw the Auditor-General intervening and instructing 
treasury to hand over the responsibilities to the departmental officials after a 
period of three years (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003).   
 
5.6 From centralisation to decentralisation: The conformity age of 2001-
2002  
The disciplinary tendencies were of course happening in a context where global 
trends on state reforms were dictating smaller efficient governments. In South 
Africa this had seen a dramatic shift from the politics of the RDP and its 
redistributive function to embrace efficiency models propagated by GEAR. This 
prompted a policy shift that saw the White Paper on Transforming of the Public 
Service (WPTPS) (1997) concretised by a more managerialist NPM-oriented 
White Paper on Transforming Service Delivery (1997), known as Batho Pele, 
which was efficiency-, customer- and output-oriented. Equally the Public 
Financial Management Act of 1999 had been put in place to streamline the state 
expenditure. At the helm of these shifts had been the election and the appointment 
of a new president, Thabo Mbeki in 1999. Compared to his predecessor president 
Nelson Mandela whose presidency was dominated by policy formulation, he was 
advocating policy implementation and enhanced service delivery. At a 
governance level, the new era saw provincial public service commissions 
disbanded leaving MECs to run their respective departments. MECs had now 
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more authority and powers over their departmental functions as promulgated by 
the new Public Service Laws Amendment Act of 1997. All these factors gave a 
new identity to the new organisational re-orientation that ensued.   
 
Internally, the discourse of change commenced with the arrival of the new MEC 
in 2000/2001. Although the department was still swamped with financial 
tribulations a number of changes were proposed to facilitate an efficient and 
effective service delivery. At the backdrop of this were numerous challenges that 
had been identified and illuminated at the launch of the Provincial Education 
Summit in 2002. For instance in his keynote address on the transformation of the 
ECDE, the MEC then Mr Stone Sizani identified that the organisation was 
suffering from issues of administrative backlogs, structural dysfunctionality, 
leadership turnover and severe budgetary and resource constraints (Department of 
Education Report: Proceedings of the Provincial Education Summit and Launch 
of the Eastern Cape Education and Training Council 2002), which will be 
shortened as the Report of the Provincial Summit from here on. In the process it 
identifies elements of intervention to help ‘address the blockages facing the 
education transformation project in the province’ (Report of the Provincial 
Summit, 2002:7). These include building a decisive political leadership, 
organizational restructuring and gearing, school development and support, 
popular mobilization, human resources development and mobilization of technical 
support. Of these, and consistent with the area of study in organisational theory, 
the focus will be on the managerial intervention of organizational restructuring 
and gearing. 
 
The organizational restructuring and gearing  
Premised on the notion to improve organisational dysfunctionality, the new 
strategy for change thus focused on two elements namely (a) developing and 
rolling out a District Development Plan; and (b) building senior management 
capacity in line with the identified strategic priorities. This was to re-organise the 
department from four to nine directorates and effect change to 30 senior 
management positions in the department (Report on the Provincial Summit, 
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2002:7). The next discussion thus focuses on these two elements of change and 
how they steered the new direction for the department. 
 
Decentralisation as the Roll-Out Plan  
Central to the district development plan is the notion of decentralization. Of 
course decentralization is one of the strategies seen to be foundational to 
efficiency in the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. The basic principle 
guiding decentralisation is that flatter hierarchies accentuate speedy responses to 
service delivery, hence the concentration is on the redistribution of functions and 
devolution of decision making powers (Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993) and 
autonomy at the local centres. The assumption is that due to close proximity to 
their communities, these centres create better access to government services and 
can speedily respond to the varied needs. Other than being a generally developed 
phenomenon, different contexts tend to handle this differently depending on the 
uniqueness of their contexts.  
 
In the case of the ECDE, the general reorientation had focused on creating a three 
tier system where Bisho retained its guiding role on policy articulation, the 
districts became the centres for policy monitoring implementation, and then the 
schools. As the MEC explained the change: 
The focal point for administration in our education delivery system 
will be the district office. The district office we envision will have the 
capacity to deliver effectively and efficiently… To attain this we will 
consolidate our current forty-one districts into twenty-one newly 
constituted district offices, and we will, over time, phase out our six 
regional offices (Department of Education, Province of the Eastern 
Cape: Policy and Budget Speech 2000/2001:5).  
 
Other officials added: 
We designed a new organisational structure, which was aimed at 
flattening the management chain. So we abolished the regional offices. 
We had a head office and we had six regional offices and forty-one 
district offices and beneath them of course circuits and 6 500 schools 
operating. Before this period the district office was a small office in 
general consisting of between ten and fifteen staff members essentially 
acting as a post office for schools, with no proper service functions – 
essentially just circuit inspectors and some clerks. So we replaced 
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those with executive districts and we consolidated the forty-one to 
twenty-four so you have a direct relationship between the head office, 
which is meant to be co-ordinating policy, determining, facilitating 
and supportive of districts and then twenty-four district offices that 
have responsibility with the director level staff member in charge so 
that you can delegate executive responsibility to a member of the 
senior management service who can manage a budget. The idea being 
that the only way that you could turn around poor performance of the 
system is to have much local accountability which was at the time 
lacking in the system. But I think any sort of sensible modern 
organisation appraisal would tell you that its madness to try and 
administer 6 500 schools from the central office, you know. It just 
doesn’t make sense and it cannot be done efficiently (Interview J, East 
London, 18 November 2003). 
 
I think the improvement came when the department realised to 
improve service delivery you had to decentralise and you have to bring 
service delivery closer to the people. Now there is delegated authority 
to District Directors and the level of the head of the district has now 
been upgraded before it was District Manager now it is a District 
Director at SMS level 13. You can appoint your own staff at schools: 
teachers, principals, you have control over certain parts of the district 
budget. Before that we had the provincial office, and we also had 
regional offices and district offices. Now they have removed that 
centre part, the regional, and its just provincial and district.  The 
decentralisation improves the service delivery [because] you are closer 
to your clients and they are closer to you, you expedite (Interview N, 
Grahamstown, 19 May 2004). 
 
From this, one can see the convergence of ideas between the notion of 
decentralisation in this context and the global trends where decentralisation 
becomes synonymous with flattening the horizontal hierarchy in the hope that it 
would increase accountability and efficiency at local level while also empowering 
local structures. Hence it is no surprise to hear these officials putting emphasis on 
new executive managerial titles because the basic assumptions of this are 
modelled on private sector managers who tend to be accorded executive status 
and superiority in an organisation. But more than that, there are assumptions 
about accountability and what it means. For instance, the emphasis on local 
accountability seems to suggest that local communities have the capacity to 
engage officials on issues of service delivery (read Department of Education: 
Policy and Budget Speech 2001/2002), something that is a misnomer as usually 
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bureaucratic programmes are rarely, if ever, driven by community needs. Equally, 
the notion of flattening of structures tends to work better if systems are well 
developed to run independently. Somehow there was little to suggest that this was 
the case here as the organisation was battling with basic resource capacities and 
skills at all levels. The question then is: was this another fashionable fad in a 
context that was not ready for it?  
 
While there is no attempt to answer this anywhere in the thesis, the issue here is to 
highlight how generic programmes tend to overlook the realities unique to each 
context. For instance, while the ECDE had started with this project at the time of 
the research, it is argued that it had no capacity to carry it through. Some of the 
criticisms of this process are highlighted in the Radebe et al report (2004). An 
official who came from the disbanded regions felt the process lost its significance 
because of lack of continuity between the regions and the districts (Interview X, 
Zwelitsha, 11 November 2003), and felt that there should have been a gradual 
hand-over to the new districts. While this makes sense in many ways one cannot 
underestimate the levels of political contestation which were part of the regional 
systems, and thus relying on them to hand over would have been as disastrous. In 
any event, the restructuring itself was equally contested. For instance, a question 
had been asked at the summit on how to deal with resistance if people did not 
want to move to districts. The answer from the MEC confirmed the political 
nature of the process, paraphrased in the report as follows: 
The MEC replied that placements at District level have become a 
political issue and an avenue for people to oppose government. People 
in urban areas who are redundant and used to their comfort zones do 
not want to move to other areas. The MEC emphasised that the 
managers are employed to observe such trends and act on them… 
Similar positions exist in offices where office staff refuse to move to 
rural areas. A precedent seems to be created when government uses the 
law, and it is seen as ‘forced removals’. District managers must 
identify such instances and act on them and follow procedure to ensure 
that these persons move (Report on the Provincial Summit, 2002:14). 
 
Indeed, the issue of economic disparities that exist in this region cannot be 
understated because sometimes resistance to such policy changes may be 
economic and not necessarily political. For instance, this quotation rings a bell 
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about the levels of poverty in this area which would make an ordinary move 
impossible, as agreeing to the move could be synonymous with agreeing to 
alienation, poverty and marginalisation due to the peripheral nature of some of the 
rural areas and their high levels of under-development. Nevertheless, the strategy 
to redesign the department had implications for the central office which 
coincidentally had to go through similar processes. This is discussed in the next 
paragraphs as the second leg of the change, which in reality happened 
interactively but is treated separately here for the purposes of the discussion.  
 
Building senior management capacity and re-reorientation towards strategic 
priorities  
With Batho Pele in the background and its emphasis on results-oriented 
bureaucracies, the organisation joined the bandwagon by developing its own 
management tools. For example, it created the four-year Corporate Plan for 2000-
2004, the Budget Review Action Plans 2001/2002, the Business Plan 2002-2003, 
the Strategic Plan 2002-2005 which all reflect programme objectives, Key 
Performance Areas (KPA), expected outputs and their budgetary estimates. Of 
course this is not new to South Africa, most countries that have followed Osborne 
and Gaebler’s thesis on ‘reinventing government’ and the NPM philosophy have 
adopted similar performance-oriented trends. The basic thesis is that results-
oriented and performance-based organisations enhance accountability even in 
instances of limited budgetary constraints. Hence there is always an emphasis on 
programme-based management. In Mintzberg’s (1983) structural terms this is 
‘adhocracy’. In adhocracies, programmes and projects dominate and there is high 
reliance on the professional’s skills and expertise to deliver the expected 
outcomes. Because of this high reliance, accountability remains at this level rather 
than with the broader organisation.  
 
While this seems sensible for management empowerment and capacity-building, 
there is much faith placed on managerial autonomy which is not as flexible in 
public organisations. More importantly, NPM or Batho Pele philosophies tend to 
assume organisational stability and order and it is a rare phenomenon to hear how 
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they fare in contested environments. Although this was not the basis of the thesis, 
it seems logical to assume that its success will be conditional to each context 
because, like all tools, it is bound to interpretation and thus will be acted upon by 
local meanings and contestation. A case in point is that while the reorganisation in 
the ECDE was also programme-based and befitting the efficiency rhetoric of the 
Batho Pele programme, the organisation was still highly publicised as lacking in 
service delivery two years after its adoption of the efficiency drive. There may 
have been many reasons for this, including the inability to consolidate the merger; 
however, data reveals instances where organisational politics dominate, 
management tools remain part of the cosmetic change and politics of conformity 
but do not necessarily create performance shifts as they depend on who directs the 
change, how it is done and its legitimacy and acceptance in the broader 
organisation as discussed in the following chapter.   
 
Strategy 
Compared to the districts, the strategy for change in the centre became 
Machiavellian in nature as consultation became minimal. As Cobb (1986) says 
‘High Machs’ believe the end justifies the means as they tend to operate in 
situations that are uncertain and emotionally charged. The strategy for change 
thus involved shifting the managers around to fit the newly created organogram 
that supports the newly adopted programme-based and results-oriented delivery 
approach. However, beyond the neatness of managerial language of efficiency 
and maximising performance, there were rumbling tensions of historical conflicts 
and battles for power. In fact, the new change was as much about asserting new 
power bases and survival. This is reflected in some of the comments made by the 
officials, one of whom, for instance, saw this as a battle for survival between the 
political and the administrative bureau: 
You see, the big problem is every MEC comes with a different 
challenge. His political colleagues said that when you go there 
[ECDE] you are going to sink. So when he comes here he comes with 
this intention that ‘I am not going to allow [them] to sink me’. These 
guys are not going to sink me, so he changes the systems that allowed 
the previous guy to sink. (Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004). 
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For one MEC and his planners for change, the fear of sinking indeed resembled 
another war of displacement, as one official explained:  
[The MEC], the HoD and I sat down and talked and the HoD simply 
said that the one way is to motivate people to change. The other way is 
to take a big stick and discipline them. We have been doing both of 
these. The third thing we are going to do is to rotate them. We are 
going to do a massive rotation. We decided to study people’s skills and 
look at the jobs they were there for, and said they are not good for 
these. If in this section we cannot see performance after four months of 
guiding somebody, then we can just let the person go. Because you can 
transform by building or just shocking the system that somebody must 
just go to another area and start from scratch. Bring somebody into his 
area and say – look at what you have been doing here, this is 
unacceptable. And so we did that with the whole team and people were 
very angry. And you are faced with twenty managers in the upper level 
who, we had perceived,  were not performing. We simply said what 
we were going to do was to give them a fresh challenge. Give them a 
fresh group of people to work with. At times you work in a section and 
things just don’t work well and people don’t get along well with each 
other and that affects performance (Interview E, Zwelitsha, 21 May 
2004u).  
 
Our strategy was that we must change these people and it should not 
be automatic that if you were acting you will be appointed, even 
though the Labour Relations allowed that. I did that. The people 
became disgruntled, organizationally disgruntled...There was a 
perception that I was brought in to destabilize the organisation and 
rebuild – the theory of freeze and unfreeze… One friend used to say, 
you are running alone, you are exposed to missiles and I said I can’t be 
part of the commotion. I don’t want to be part of the furniture because 
the furniture was broken ((Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 
2005). 
 
In true Machiavellian style, the MEC and his senior managers adopted a new 
culture of micro-management, disrupting all known networks. One of the officials 
keen to talk about this period thought this was the most traumatic time for 
management. He branded the respective DG as ‘inkwenkwe’ (a boy) with poor 
people management skills and a bully who lacked respect for his fellow 
professionals. It is important to note that the word ‘inkwenkwe’ is derogatory if 
used to a grown man and is loaded with cultural stereotypes. Besides, the DG was 
from another province, which made him an outsider in cultural terms. 
Nevertheless, he adopted a ‘hit and fire’ strategy, significantly targeting senior 
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managers in the department. Senior leadership got moved to different 
programmes and portfolios causing frustration, anger and even resistance. Largely 
this was also to destroy the farm mentality, as one former DD-G of the 
department has likened the situation of turfs to farm ownership. As he said: 
This is my farm – we use that term here… This is my farm, why are 
they coming to my farm without my permission? Yet the person above 
him has more power but because he has been delegated, they now 
think they need their permission to get in there (Interview E, 
Zwelitsha, 21 May 2004u).  
 
These farms had been legitimated by the initial politics of reorganisation that saw 
Transkei, Ciskei, HOR, HOD, DET and the DEC farm tags on them. Disrupting 
these was therefore the equivalent of capturing the generals in a war situation and 
putting them in enemy camps. In the process, the organisation lost eleven generals 
who were suspended due to poor performance (Allan, 2002). However, this did 
not break down resistance as the MEC observed: 
… if you dare touch [the organogram], you have then developed an 
enemy of these people, because the person is not going be the 
individual opposing you, he will rally his own forces with all those 
people that are benefiting from his patronage (Interview S, Port 
Elizabeth, 18 May 2004). 
 
Similarly, the former DD-G went on to say: 
But these people unfortunately are also linked to other people. They 
are not individuals. My brother would be in one position, my cousin 
another. 
 
Q: Outside? 
A: Outside, and they would have that power to influence, and they 
would use it aggressively and actively and that is the bad part of it – 
that the people don’t see what the picture is all about and they get 
angry (Interview E, Zwelitsha, 21 May 2004). 
 
Theoretically this thesis argues that the blind spot in these power games is where 
managers are constantly moved around. It is argued that this renders them 
ineffective. The nature of the move requires that they adjust to the newly allocated 
portfolios, thus wasting time studying the intricacies of the new job rather than 
doing it. The point is that contrary to other public service organisations, 
professional organisations tend to be organised around areas of specialisation and 
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thus managerial competency is as much conditional to the mastery of subject 
knowledge. For example, a curriculum specialist does not turn into an educational 
psychologist overnight. Access to an unfamiliar territory in terms of space and 
knowledge thus becomes a negotiated terrain. Here also, managers faced the risk 
of being marginalised by their new staff who have already mastered the content 
and have access to already crystallised networks of relations. 
 
But more importantly the constant changes were not creating pressure 
organisationally only but were tempered with questions of economic survival. 
Due to lack of employment opportunities in this region, any secure jobs determine 
economic survival. Any threat to this form of security then is likely to be 
challenged, so it was no surprise to learn that particular DG left the province 
fearing for his life after receiving death threats. One of the reasons for this is that 
this organisation was infiltrated with networks extending way beyond the 
organisation itself (Interview S, Port Elizabeth, 18 May 2004 and Interview E, 
Zwelitsha, 21/05/2004 ). The point is that tampering with structure is almost 
tampering with representative proxies of wider networks brought along with the 
change.  None of these change strategists remained in the organisation, the last of 
which was suspended in early 2004 for poor performance.  
 
The question then is what happens to management tools of Batho Pele and NPM 
in such situations? The answer is that they become a smokescreen of the rumbling 
volcano, the cues of which can be taken from these officials’ comments about the 
unending cycles of restructuring in this organisation. For instance, while 
restructuring is used to resolve organisational inefficiencies, it can be equally 
disruptive to organisational goals and efficiency. Commenting on these 
restructuring pathologies, some officials explained as follows: 
Every time we want to put people something happens to the 
organogram…We have this history of not having completed one single 
organogram to its ultimate conclusion. The only one that we got to was 
the first one [1997]. Then we changed that first one, after that no 
organogram in this department was a success up to this one we’ve got 
now (Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004). 
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I don’t know how many times now the organogram has been changed. 
There has been a lot of instability even insofar as the organogram 
which we are supposed to operate with in the district. You would 
never be certain as to how many people you should have and you 
won’t have or even be certain as to whether the people in the district 
are still holding those positions. Because once there is a new 
organogram it means everybody else has no position. You have to be 
reabsorbed or something of that sort (Interview R, Zwelitsha, 19 
November 2003). 
 
We had a structure prior to 2001, it has changed and I was employed 
in that structure. In 2003, less than three years, that structure was 
changed to the new one and there are indications that the structure, 
which was approved in October last year, might be changed because it 
was for instance disputed by one of our social partners, SADTU, you 
know. With the structure of 2003, only senior managers (SMS) 
members were placed, levels 12 down were not placed yet, and even 
before they are placed there are rumblings that it is going to be 
changed. Immediately it affects the individual (Interview K, Zwelitsha, 
15 May 2004). 
 
The structure of the ECDE has been changed more than five times. 
Each MEC or HOD comes and changes the structure – why? 
(Interview N, Grahamstown, 19 May 2004)  
 
While the answers to this question reside in the organisation itself, one learns 
from theorists like March and Olsen (1983) that state reorganisation is always 
infused with either the rhetoric of administrative orthodoxy or the rhetoric of 
realpolitik. The former speaks of administrative reorganisation as means ‘to 
facilitate efficiency and effectiveness in bureaucratic hierarchies’ while the latter 
speaks of reorganisation in terms of ‘political struggles amongst contending 
forces’ and political interests who seek ‘access, representation, control and policy 
benefits’. The ECDE represents both worlds of rhetoric. For instance, while the 
efficiency rhetoric was adopted to enhance efficiency and even legitimise the 
department activities by modelling itself on existing practices (Offe, 1996) it is 
also true that in the process it had to contend with the rhetoric of the realpolitik as 
different fragmented interests of apartheid origins continued to assert themselves 
in the change for continuity and survival. 
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5.7 Concluding comments 
This chapter explored how different logics of bureaucratic reorganisation 
contributed to cycles of inefficiency. It argued that while reorganisation is 
essential in public administration it is not a value-free objective exercise and it is 
also political. To support this argument, the chapter first explored the notion of 
representative logic and its reconciliatory agenda and the complexities that 
emerged with it. Amongst other things it identified that while the representative 
logic became synonymous with a political compromise and continuity it also 
accentuated fragmentations and validated previous cultures and practices due to 
the negotiated settlement that saw the apartheid and homeland regional identities 
continue in the new dispensation. The consequences of this saw the new 
department being an island in the midst of powerfully constructed regions that 
continued to work under their apartheid rubrics. The lack of direct influence on 
these entities became the first cycle of inefficiency due to the negotiated spaces 
created by the change that lacked rules and accountability measures.  
 
Second, it looked at the efficiency logic of 1999 and the attempts to enforce 
conformity through section 100. While this type of intervention shifted the 
organisational orientation towards generic managerial tools of efficiency, it 
brought lessons. For instance, it showed that where such interventions ignore 
broader social and economic conditions of context they accentuate chaos. In fact, 
the urgency to create order through financial discipline paralysed all systemic 
operations to deliver recourses to schools thus reversing the very normative 
intentions of service delivery of access, redress and equity. Also while technical 
rationality creates managerial order it is not sufficient to address power battles 
inherent in conflictual environments. This organisation demonstrates continuous 
conflicts, some of which have origins in the apartheid history while others have 
emerged in current political battles for power and control as demonstrated by the 
inability to create stable organograms, which theoretically suggest that 
organisational structures have become embodiments of power battles rather than 
job functioning. To change such institutions, it is argued, would have to go 
beyond technical rationality to include resolving the political relations that have 
 177 
dominated the organisation in different ways. The next chapter sheds more light 
on this as it explores issues of leadership in the organisation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
INTERNAL CHANGE CHALLENGES AND COMPLEXITIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Continuing with the themes of power and politics, this chapter explores the 
internal organisational dynamics that perpetuate organisational change 
inefficiency. It argues that unless the Eastern Cape Department of Education 
(ECDE) addresses its politics of leadership fragmentation, its leadership 
instability and lack of capacity and skills it cannot experience any significant 
cultural shift and change nor improve its service delivery to the required levels. 
Instead the organisation will continue to be challenged by inefficiency and poor 
performance. The point is that organisational change is usually perceived to be a 
linear exercise of well-orchestrated plans. However, this chapter argues for 
recognition of complexity, since organisations are a milieu of formal and informal 
cultures which may dominate at different times. The ECDE is found to be a 
complex network of fragmented leadership and fragmented spaces of influence. 
This means that any change in such an environment has to consider the nature of 
these fragmentations – how they are organised, how they function, and how they 
affect skills’ organisation and co-ordination for use in the organisation. In order to 
examine these issues, this chapter will: 
(a)  explore the existing internal networks and fragmentations and how they 
influence the ECDE and its functioning; and 
(b)  examine the nature of skills available and their influence on change.  
 
6.2 Internal networks of dominant coalitions: Reflections from 1995-1999 
One of the assumptions of the majority rule government’s transformation project 
was to treat public organisations as uniform entities, creating the expectation that 
they would implement similar approaches across the board. This lack of 
recognition of difference meant that at times it became difficult to understand why 
certain organisations behaved differently or even became less efficient than 
others. At a time of crisis, therefore, there would be calls for national intervention 
as was the case for the ECDE. While interventions may differ, the Radebe, 
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Matomela, Moloi, Schoonraad and Sekwati (2004) reports demonstrate that these 
are not easy interventions to implement, since they cannot rely on ready-made 
plans; their success is subject to an understanding of how organisations work. 
This lies partly in understanding the context which has already been discussed in 
the previous chapters. This chapter contends that it is equally important to 
understand the ripple effects of change and how they affect the organisation.  
 
One of the major ripple effects identified is the organisational inability to manage 
a complex network of relations brought about by the integration of six different 
departments. The point is that the change process itself was not an easy exercise, 
bringing in a range of relations that became difficult to resolve. These relations 
were the products of a broad-based logic of creating representative and equitable 
bureaucracies, as discussed in Chapter Five. With the integration of the six 
departments there was now a plurality of interests to be co-ordinated, but there 
were no co-ordination efforts made from the start. Instead, the organisation was 
pulled in different directions at different times, depending on who was in charge. 
As a consequence of this, the organisation is perceived as operating as a 
conglomerate of different interests, some of which have formalised over time into 
coalitions and networks of support largely determined by historical alliances.  
 
By networks and dominant coalitions is meant the existence of tightly coupled 
groups of people that share similar interests and values. Entry into such groups is 
usually limited and controlled, given the support that is expected from those 
within the group due to their bounded specified loyalties. However, as implied 
elsewhere in this thesis, one cannot claim that these networks were the result of an 
organised plan but are rather seen as consequential to the transformation. The 
point is that while the transformation encouraged integration and reconciliation it 
hardly had a blueprint for how to resolve internal differences and conflict, and this 
was left instead for each organisation to resolve. Theoretically, this meant it 
became the responsibility of the leadership to resolve such tensions where they 
existed, as they reoriented their organisations to fit with the broad public sector 
transformation. Before discussing leadership issues, the literature on networks and 
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coalitions usually focuses on the positive aspects of their existence, which often 
includes an assumed faith about their pursuit of organisational goals. As a result, 
networks in such environments are perceived to be part of a healthy competition 
to gain leverage on resources. Most of the research on networks is, however, 
theoretical and lacking in empirical evidence, while others have a quantitative 
focus based on business organisations.   
 
While the emergence of networks in the ECDE may be contentious, evidence 
shows that they were a product of the transformation. The 1994/5 period 
determined who would be included and who would be excluded in the 
organisation, and for what purpose. The most obvious process of inclusion and 
exclusion started with the politicians that came into power who wanted their own 
trusted comrades heading, leading and filling the departmental structures 
(ECSECC, 2000). Presumably, this was to create a critical mass for change but 
also as the Presidential Review Commission (PRC) identified ‘there was a threat, 
real or perceived, of political sabotage by intractable incumbents of the previous 
dispensation’ (PRC, 1998). This was not left at the political level since the 
appointed bureaucrats adopted the same tendency. Politicians hired political 
appointees and the rest of the bureaucracy followed a similar pattern of 
recruitment. There was a strong tendency for the new leadership that came from 
different regional offices to recruit from their different ‘home bases’, creating 
their own networks of coalitions. Seemingly the major issue was to create as 
strong an internal support base as possible. Officials advanced the following 
reasons:  
You would always appoint people that have your philosophy and 
ideology. You can’t surround yourself with people that can sabotage 
your mission (Interview N, Grahamstown, 19 May 2004). 
 
…you don’t want to be surrounded by new people that you cannot 
trust with your own behaviour. So if you were recruited from Transkei, 
you would rather surround yourself with Transkei people who know 
how to work with you and understand you and so we had such 
problems in our bureaucracy, the networks that were there – these are 
some of the issues when it comes to organisational structures in a 
transitional bureaucracy. People had wide networks, not in a positive 
sense (Interview To, Bisho, 19 May 2004). 
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That these managers opted to look for people who shared their values and 
ideologies is not a misnomer, since interpersonal networks by their nature focus 
on similarity (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve and Tsai 2004). Furthermore, as Brass 
et al (2004: 796) explain, similarity eases ‘communication, increases the 
predictability of behaviour and fosters trust and reciprocity’. By focusing on 
building their own support base in this way, it can be assumed that these 
managers were deriving comfort in familiarity in a context of rapid change. Also, 
it may be that the potential anxiety linked to making such a choice about who to 
work with lies in the unstated bureaucratic self-interests, which may drive the 
organisation in different directions. Nonetheless, this unco-ordinated process thus 
saw both the physical and symbolic transference of pre-packed Transkei, Ciskei, 
Department of Education and Training (DET), House of Representatives (HOR), 
House of Delegates (HOD) and House of Assembly (HOA) fragmented racial and 
ethnic identities into the new ECDE. Theoretically, this is depicted in Figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1 The Organisational Blocks of Dominant Coalitions 
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The Senior Management is perceived to be inclusive of all members of the Senior 
Executive of the Directors General, Chief Directors and Directors. The pillars 
reflect the imagined dominant coalitions of the Transkei, Ciskei, HOA, HOD, 
HOR and the DET. Metaphorically, they also represent all other identities 
inherent in them. The basic assumption then is that each block represents a 
coalition and thus has strong ties with its members for loyalty and protection. 
How each coalition relates to other coalitions depends on the nature of relations 
formed by those who control them, largely residing at the top of the hierarchy. 
Social network theory explains the difference between different types of network 
relations in organisations and possible fluidities that may exist as individuals 
cross into different and interactive spaces. While recognising this, it will be 
argued that such spaces of interaction would have been limited early in the 
transition due to the uncertainties that existed, as energy was directed to building 
power bases (Interview Be, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004) and alliances.  
 
Theoretically, what Figure 6.1 depicts, therefore, is an imagined imposed overlay 
of relations over the usual hierarchical official structure. This indicates that 
managers have a double responsibility to oversee not just their divisions, but also 
to manage their internal networks of relations and support, whose power and 
influence may even be greater than their officially sanctioned authority. 
Compared to normal bureaucracies where conflicts tend to be concentrated on 
expertise and the emergence of administrative silos, here managers have to 
contend with regional silos as well. As one official indicated at the start of the 
amalgamation, there was no-one dedicated to the unification, and as a result 
people remained as these separate cohesive groups with no relation to one 
another. Reflecting on this, one official explained: 
The first thing you could see is that there are people coming from the 
Transkei, it’s a complete cohesive group. There are people coming 
from the Ciskei, it’s a complete cohesive group. There are people 
coming from the DET and this had racial undertones. They have tribal 
and ethnic undertones which are at low intensity level which you can’t 
see if you can’t see things deeper. Because what you would see is that 
people coming from the Western Region like Port Elizabeth are white, 
historically advantaged, purported to be efficient and purported to be 
politically correct. In terms of the apartheid government systems, all of 
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them you will find in Port Elizabeth, running smoothly and that was a 
legacy, purported to be South African and others not. They have been 
a provincial administration, a Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) 
of some kind. Everything you get in Port Elizabeth. Then the Transkei 
ones were a threat because they purported to once run a country and 
therefore understand how the systems of government work and on the 
other side understood how to trick government and government 
systems. A perception is that people from the Transkei are highly 
educated but highly incompetent, highly corrupt and that created a rift 
between people. People from the Ciskei were just administrators, we 
couldn’t track their way of thinking even today (Interview Ng, 
Johannesburg, 10 November 2005).  
 
All these perceptions had their grounding in the apartheid classifications of race 
and ethnicity, hence people were suspicious of each other. Indeed the lead word 
about the different cohesive groups had implications about the levels of 
permeability and influence these groups can have on each other. It is argued here 
that this regional, racial and ethnic cohesiveness became the major focus of 
fragmentation and antagonism in the organisation. This was exacerbated by the 
fact that coalitions by their nature tend to focus on member interests rather than 
the broader organisation. Riggs (1964) states that the clects [coalitions in this 
case]  are not only recruited for support, they protect communal interests and also 
‘bar admission to members of the rival group’ (Riggs, 1964:275). Rivalry in this 
case became synonymous with regional differences, their inherited credibility and 
history of reliability. Consequently, some regions like the Transkei suffered more 
in terms of image as they became associated with graft and corruption and 
extreme inefficiencies. Undoubtedly such perceptions became the basis of a lack 
of co-operation and mistrust.  
 
6.3 Internal organisational dynamics  
Chapter Five alluded to the broad external politics of regionalism, politics that 
were seen in the organisation as well. At stake were issues of collaboration and 
co-operation in a context of rapid change. Fullan (1994), writing on the deeper 
meaning of inside collaboration, talks about the notion to foster and embrace 
diversity. Although he writes for schools, his views on collaboration are relevant 
here. The point is that diversity, as embraced in the concept of regional 
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differences, became a key a factor in determining how the organisational 
members were going to work with each other.  With some reflection from the 
interviewees, it became clear for many officials that this was an area that lacked 
attention, and that conflicts and battles for recognition and control had become the 
norm. One of the points of contestation was knowledge. As one of these officials 
indicated: 
Now there were two dominant features of that system [merger], it was 
like a kind of situation where some thought of themselves as much 
better and knowing almost all in terms of administration. Some 
believed that indeed if you come from the Western [Port Elizabeth] 
part you were the Mister or Miss Know-All, whereas I don’t know 
much because I’ve not been working with systems in the Eastern part 
[refers to the Transkei region] of the province (Interview P, King 
William’s Town, 20 November 2003). 
 
Similarly, another official raised similar sentiments.   
[Kwa]developa ne-regionalism osuka eBhayi u-clever kunosuka eMtata, 
obese-ex Ciskei uthatha ukuba yi territory yakhe le and ukhomba I-
corruption kwela cala (laughs). Niza nala corruption kuba ningamasela ku-
attackwana ngolo hlobo. I PE kudala I-live PERSAL kuba kaloku ibikwi 
DET ibisebenza ne-apartheid system. Ibi-operata phaya kanye kuyo so I-
advance kunezi-homelands zabantu abamnyama kukhona basaphutha-
phutahayo bafunda I-computer. Izinto bebezenza manual. Ifika I-clever 
ngoku. I regionalism yakhe yathi take its toll. 
 
Translation: 
 
Regionalism became the order of the day. People from Port Elizabeth 
[thought] they are smarter than those from Umtata, those that came from the 
Ciskei see the new department as their territory and are pointing fingers at 
the corruption in the Transkei (laughs) saying: You want to bring corruption 
here! People are attacking each other that way. Port Elizabeth had been 
working on Persal for years as they were under DET, it was working with 
the apartheid system. It is advanced compared to the homelands which are 
now learning about computerised systems. They were doing their entries 
manually before. Port Elizabeth is cleverer because of this and regionalism 
took its toll (Interview Be, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004).   
 
The fundamental issue here is that whoever controlled the knowledge terrain had 
power over the transformation process. Specifically, such power could see 
specific interests occupy the space. Without any compromise, these deep 
sentiments of regional differences and their accompanying illusion of superiority 
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meant that the organisation remained in crisis most of the time due to the lack of 
co-operation. With the main dispute centred on who controlled expertise, Port 
Elizabeth as the former white city attracted a lot of negative perceptions. As 
indicated earlier, the major point is that indeed it had an advantage over other 
inherited administrations because of its developed systems and technological 
advancement due to apartheid benefits.  
 
Without any coherent plan to transfer such expertise at the beginning of the 
transformation, the Port Elizabeth office remained a dominant force on its own 
with no interest in making such knowledge accessible to the broader organisation.  
This was in conflict with the fact that the new entrants coming into the ECDE had 
hoped the old state civil servants would show them how government works 
(ECSECC, 2000). Unfortunately, with the inherent disagreements there was less 
co-operation than envisaged as the ‘expertise power games’ (Mintzberg 1983) 
became a symbolic guarantee of continuity and survival in an undefined and 
unclear process of change. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of consistent 
leadership that could have pulled things together. Leonard (1995:63) quoted by 
Fullan (1994) asserted that collaboration must foster a degree of difference. As 
different ideas rubbed up against each other, it was to be expected that sparks 
would fly. While in a well-managed process, the sparks are creative, not personal, 
as Interview Ng, (Johannesburg, 10 November 2005) indicated, the process of 
integration lacked any form of management. As a result, instead of collaboration 
the process resembled ‘bull-fighting’ (Interview Be, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004).    
 
Lacking any grounding for effective collaboration, different sections of the 
department also engaged in various politics of sabotage. A case in point is when 
Port Elizabeth was assigned the responsibility to train some lower level staff on 
the adopted management systems. This turned out to be yet another power 
struggle as Port Elizabeth refused to transfer knowledge in a meaningful and 
empowering way. The former head of human resources related this story:  
We would send our people to Port Elizabeth for training; our people 
complained they were not being trained here. They are not showing us 
anything here. For instance, they say if you were working on a 
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computer, they were teaching them Persal, you work, you work and 
then you get stuck; then one white fellow would just come and fix that 
thing, you don’t know what he has done, and says its now okay, you 
can work and then you find hey! it’s working but you don’t know how 
this chap fixed this thing because you’ll get stuck again. They were 
disgruntled, you know, they decided deliberately to sabotage the new 
department and we are still suffering from that sabotage and that is 
why we are still unable to pay teachers, we are still unable to terminate 
people who leave the system and we continue paying them for six 
months down the line when they have resigned, and some of them 
have died (Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 November 2003). 
 
Of course, Port Elizabeth had no specific loyalties to the organisation, and as this 
official went on to explain, they were already marginalised by the internal politics 
which saw most of their officials not appointed in senior positions. Theoretically, 
this could have been another strategy to limit their possible powerful influence in 
the new dispensation, as was the case with the Transkei. Whatever the case may 
be, such antagonistic behaviour became costly for the organisation as it remained 
with untrained people, despite having expertise within.   
 
The point is that without addressing these regional silos, the organisation has 
remained trapped in conflicts and antagonisms that were part of the apartheid 
discourse and its inherited histories of division and exclusion. There are lessons to 
be learned from this experience. The first lesson is about the role of leadership in 
the context of radical change. This study reveals the inability of appointed 
leadership to negotiate a working environment for all. Instead of co-ordinating 
these different forces and creating a collective sense, they allowed interpersonal 
and inter-regional networks of power and politics to pull the organisation to 
different points of contestation, exacerbating the mistrust and lack of co-
operation. The second lesson is about the importance of regionalism and ethnicity 
in organisational analysis. Usually the politics of regionalism and ethnicity tend to 
take a back seat in the management analysis of South Africa’s transition. Where 
they are mentioned they are glossed over as just one of the problematic factors 
without any serious analysis (Radebe et al, 2004). This chapter contends that 
because of their antagonistic nature they contribute to the successes and failures 
of change processes and therefore need attention, since the struggles of 
 187 
hegemony, continuity and survival are inherent in them. The point is that these 
perceptions of difference and their ensuing fragmentations reveal an underlying 
tension in the scramble to find hegemonic space in a changing context. Such 
tensions emerged from the inherited plural identities which were now asserting 
themselves in the change process. The outcome was the emergence of power 
contestations which were linked to illusions of knowledge and cultural 
superiority.  The third lesson relates to the importance of relational trust and how 
this affects organisational success. There was very little done in this organisation 
to foster good relations across the different segments; instead the organisation has 
been dominated by different points of antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) 
where regionalism with all its undertones of ethnicity, tribalism and racism has 
been key in perpetuating differences. In retrospect this has made it difficult to 
negotiate a new working order within the plurality of interests that exist. Without 
relational trust, the organisation has thus remained vulnerable to different and 
separate interests of coalitions and networks that were part of the apartheid and 
Bantustan orientation.  
 
6.4 The skills nightmare 
As with all knowledge-intensive organisations, the ECDE relies on what Deetz 
calls the intellectual capital – the skills and knowledge unique to the employees. 
As it is, the organisation draws its professional managers largely from the 
education sector and particularly from the teaching sector. The good thing about 
this is that teachers know how the sector operates and have experience with 
schools which is the main point of service delivery. But then the question is: how 
much of that teaching knowledge is transferable to the management of an 
educational bureaucracy?  While there are no clear answers, the evidence suggests 
that over the years this organisation has struggled to balance expertise and politics 
in acquiring skills. There may be many reasons for this, some of which were 
regulatory and some based on the bureaucratic choices made.  
 
With regard to the regulatory mandates, evidence showed the ECDE has struggled 
over the years to build up strong managerial capacity since its inception in Bisho. 
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One such mandate includes a decision made early in the transition to rationalise 
posts across the provincial departments. Posts were distributed equally across the 
departments without any cognisance being taken of requirements or size (Godden, 
2005). This is partly attributable to what is called the ‘Chapter J prescriptions that 
standardised the management size for all departments in the Eastern Cape 
province’ (ECSECC 2000) and also due to subsequent moratoriums during the 
1997 financial crises (Godden, 2005) as discussed in the previous chapter. As a 
result, the department has literally operated with a minimal management 
complement when compared to other departments, both within and outside of the 
Eastern Cape Province. For instance, until 1997 there were only 22 managers in 
the department working with 70 000 employees (ECSECC 2000; Interview J, East 
London, 18 November 2003; Interview S, Port Elizabeth, 18 May 2004). Since 
2003, this has increased to 50 after the intervention by the IMT. With the 
recommendations of the IMT, the department has since appointed additional 
managers to address the 62% of vacant posts that exist at this level. In spite of 
this, when compared to other departments of education nationally and other 
departments within the province, the department still lags behind, as shown by the 
recent IMT statistics in Table 6.1   
 
Table 6.1 Statistics on Eastern Cape Provincial Administration 
Department Employees 
(SMS 
excluded) 
Senior 
Managers 
Total 
Employees 
Ratio 
Office of the Premier 319 32 351 1:9 
Provincial Treasury 313 15 328 1:20 
Education 77250 50 77300 1:1545 
Health 28374 72 28446 1:394 
Roads and Public 
Works 
6151 19 6170 1:323 
Social Development 1993 16 2009 1:124 
Agriculture 5578 16 5594 1:348 
Sport, Arts and 
Culture 
1064 9  1073 1:118 
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Safety and Liaison 28 1 29 1:28 
Economic Affairs 
and Tourism 
1071 16 1087 1:67 
Housing and Local 
Government 
1524 14 1538 1:108 
Transport 1132 11 1143 1:102 
Total 124797 271 125068 1:460 
Source: Radebe et al, IMT Report, November 2002-March 2004 
 
The table clearly shows that the ECDE is the most affected with regard to the 
ratio of senior managers to employees. Of the 77 000 employees, 65 000 are 
teachers in 6 500 schools. It is important to emphasise the complexity of 
managing thousands of employees scattered throughout a largely rural province. 
Most of these schools are located within the jurisdiction of the two former 
homelands and the old apartheid provincial boundaries. This means that 
management faces enormous challenges with regard to access and distance to 
their employees.  
 
Another regulatory issue relates to wider debates about the size of government. 
This operates in tandem with current global debates about state reform in 
developed countries. In South Africa, democracy and its subsequent equity drives 
resulted in a huge intake of employees from different sectors of the population to 
balance the former racial and ethnic inequalities in the public sector. Earlier 
massive recruitment then gave way to proposals for reducing the wage bill. The 
new intake was an addition to the existing personnel appointed in the apartheid 
era. For instance, in the case of Exchequer Personnel, there were already 1 022 
385 people working for central government and the new government was set to 
add over 11 000 jobs to fulfil its affirmative action programme (Picard, 2002). 
However, broad criticisms from both the oppositional parties and the media led to 
this exercise being reviewed, as state effectiveness was brought into the spotlight 
due to reported inefficiencies and controversies over ghost employees in certain 
provinces, including the Eastern Cape (Picard, 2002).  
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Invariably, the WPTPS (1995) proposed strategies to manage the reduction of the 
state bill. It was also advocating for a leaner government. Some of the strategies 
that it proposed included (a) Right-sizing; (b) Efficiency savings and increased 
productivity; (c) Adjusting remuneration structures; (d) Retrenchment, early 
retirement and attrition; and (e) Redeployment and retraining. Of these, what 
received a lot of attention was the right-sizing. The state was already in a process 
of releasing the old white bureaucrats that volunteered to leave under golden 
handshake retrenchments (Picard, 2002). However, this was neither reducing the 
numbers nor making the posts available as anticipated. Right-sizing came though 
a process of Voluntary Severance Packages (VSP) being offered as the new 
mechanism to curb expansionism for equity and redress.  
 
Besides public pressure, the state had adopted the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in 1996, which demanded tight fiscal policies. 
There was added pressure as a result of the Presidential Review Commission 
(PRC) that looked at the state of government in 1997. As part of its 
recommendations it advocated a relatively small but ‘highly motivated, focused 
and well-paid public service’ (PRC, 1998). The report in fact suggested a 
reduction of approximately 320 000 public service personnel, based on 
international trends for government employment. The VSP as the right-sizing 
strategy thus hit departments like the ECDE hard, with the most experienced civil 
servants being the first to leave. This was in large part due to the monetary 
incentive, which provided for large payouts to long-serving (and generally highly 
experienced) personnel. In the ECDE this included experienced homeland and 
apartheid-era administrators who took early retirement. The VSP process saw the 
approval of 1 453 applications at a cost of about R200 million (ECSECC, 2000). 
The consequences of this are expressed in the following comments: 
The expertise that was there, we just decided to jettison all that but at 
the same time without actually getting some of the experience. We put 
in people immediately who were not experienced and this is what has 
crippled us... they were given severance packages, you see, and I think 
that was the biggest mistake. My feeling is that we should have let 
them stay and then perhaps move in other people gradually, but it was 
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so abrupt like this, it didn’t flow nicely from the old to the new. As a 
result we encountered capacity problems where people didn’t have the 
capacity, where we didn’t even have the resources when we started 
and unfortunately we didn’t retain the expertise and we didn’t embark 
on a capacity-building programme (Interview X, Zwelitsha, 11 
November 2003).  
 
Such abrupt departures thus saw little or no transference of skills, let alone a 
handover to those who remained, but more importantly, as the PRC observed, the 
scheme resulted ‘in the loss of competent staff and the retention of the dead 
wood’ (PRC, 1998). This was managerialism gone wrong. While management 
studies, including the reinvention literature, advocate for rightsizing and 
downsizing of state personnel as a key reform strategy, they do not debate the 
circumstances under which this has to happen, or consider the consequences. For 
South Africa, this preoccupation with efficiency paradigms cost the state 
financially and lost scarce skills.  
 
Now lacking in personnel, managers handled double portfolios, and were in 
certain cases expected to perform with little hope of full employment terms and 
benefits, since there were staffing moratoriums in force. The dynamics meant that 
managers could not take responsibility as expected. It also it created unnecessary 
competition for positions in an already unco-operative and antagonistic 
environment. For instance, as one official explained: 
…when there is a gap, you know forces want to close the gap. If there 
is one person in an acting position, there is a reluctance to help that 
person get the post. You will find that someone acting does not get the 
full support because there are people who feel that they might be the 
one to get the post. I think the IMT’s [intervention task team] first task 
was to close those gaps. When I came here we used to say, there is 
“hole syndrome” where you find that there were so many gaps with 
acting director this, acting chief director that, which was not 
conducive for service delivery, because the people under you would 
be saying I want that post of a director. But I would say now 98% of 
the posts have been filled and people know that they have the job and 
are not acting, this is their job and they are expected to deliver at the 
end of the day (Interview K, Zwelitsha, 15 May 2004). 
 
This indicates the vulnerability of managers in contested spaces. Such 
vulnerability is as much about the fact that the organisation has had no clear 
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mandates about career progression, as the fact that promotions had mostly been 
haphazard without any emphasis on competitive skills, competencies and 
experience. To act in any position did not therefore result in authority and control. 
Rather, such positions attracted competition and became a terrain for power and 
politics. Beyond that, as one official stated, anyone ‘who is acting has no 
commitment to the organisation’ (Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 
2005). It may be that the lack of commitment is not as much of a problem as the 
lack of confidence to make decisions in the big spaces of power struggles and 
their resultant vulnerability.  
 
Inherited personnel 
Beyond the managerial level, the department, like all others in the public sector, 
inherited personnel from the Bantustans and apartheid South Africa whose 
continuity of service was guaranteed by the Interim Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa (1993). Specifically sections 236/237/238 of the constitution 
speak to this and these are popularly referred to as the “sunset clause” guarantees. 
Theoretically, these sunset clauses were intended to alleviate fears about job 
losses in the transitional period. Since this was still under the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) there was a strong focus on reconciliation and compromise 
at the time. However, such compromise had serious implications for public sector 
reform in general. For instance, the PRC commented in its report that:  
The so-called Sunset Clauses (in particular paras 236/7/8 of the 
Constitution of South Africa (1993)) were an additional constraint on 
transformation, forcing the state to carry many senior civil servants 
who were anxious, demotivated and in some instances hostile (PRC, 
1998). 
 
Of course, such reactions would differ with each department. While the skills base 
of the senior leadership is not verified, it would in all likelihood be constrained or 
limited, depending on where they served. The broad notion is that comparatively, 
the white personnel were better off due to their exposure to the better 
administrative systems of the apartheid era, while the former homelands 
personnel experienced problems as they had worked with outdated manual 
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systems. Going a level down to the middle managers, there was little 
improvement, with similar tendencies being seen, as explained by an official:   
Again, you know, the political decisions were made and one of them 
was the decision to locate the headquarters of the Eastern Cape in 
Bisho. What that meant was that you were taking over essentially in 
terms of head office operatives and the staff who were in the head 
office of the old Ciskei administration. Quite naturally, all the people 
who get appointed into the functionary positions are drawn almost 
entirely from the Ciskei with some exceptions. Two things happened 
in that process – one was that you had a lot of officials who didn’t 
have particularly high levels of competence appointed into the head 
office of the new department. But secondly the process itself in 
hindsight appears to have been managed particularly poorly 
(Interview J, East London, 18 November 2003).  
 
Another official commented further: 
 
When we did a skills audit was that there were people who knew 
nothing about money who were working in the finance section. 
Working in the finance section they knew nothing about money. 
There were posts advertised and the person applied for a post in 
provision, the post in HR, the post in finance and did not get this in 
HR and in provisioning, but got this one in finance. So that is the 
issue in terms of skills level, that’s why this issue of skills 
development is very critical for us in the department. Now that’s the 
kind of the negative side that is hampering what we are doing 
(Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). 
 
While this skills limitation could be explained by the lack of a clear mechanism 
for recruitment, it is also true that some officials were promoted without approval. 
The White and Broudy Commission cited by ECSECC (2000) revealed instances 
of self-promotion and other corrupt tendencies.  
 
The supranumeraries  
Complicating this scenario were the supranumeraries. One official highlighted 
that before 1994, a group of unionised civil servants protested against the Gqozo 
regime for better salaries. As was the culture at that time, these civil servants were 
expelled from the public service. To replace them, school clerks were bussed in to 
fill the vacated posts. Most of these clerks were unskilled in management and had 
no knowledge of state systems and how these functioned. With the ANC 
government in place, these workers were reinstated into their jobs. While this was 
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guaranteed to deliver the next vote it added a further complexity to the 
organisation, where there were neither available vacancies nor new positions to 
accommodate an additional workforce. Workers thus found themselves in offices 
with no jobs to do. Their aim became to recapture their jobs from the clerks that 
replaced them. The battle for survival thus took a Darwinian turn as the two sets 
of workers jostled for space and positions. As an interviewee explained: 
Kowu yangumlo, yangulowo esithi kwakuhlala mana kule ndawo. 
Phakama suka! [Translation: It was fights everywhere as people 
claimed their desks and spaces] (Interview Be, Zwelitsha, 19 
November 2003).  
 
The bottom line is that the organisation had more people than the jobs available. 
The number of these supranumeraries is estimated at 3 000 people (ECSECC, 
2000). Without any strategy to resolve this, the department kept all of them. 
Interestingly, they have learnt to find their own spaces in the organisation and to 
create their own meanings of what to do. For instance, one official commented on 
this group of workers this way: 
They did not meet the requirements of the posts that were there. But 
with time because “I’ve been associated with this section I end up 
being utilised and forgotten that I was a supernumerary, not having 
financial skills. But I’ve been able at least to use my calculator and 
count this gratuity. I’ve learnt on the job and therefore this is where I 
am. But if you go back and look at me I don’t have that qualification 
of basic accounts practices, so I lack in that aspect”. So I’m saying 
you are sitting with the situation where you don’t have human 
resources to do the work (Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 
November 2003). 
 
With the assimilation, they have learnt to draw less attention to themselves by 
becoming active participants in a smokescreen of activities. Theoretically, by 
doing this they get to be associated and assimilated into the revolving matrix of 
fluid workspaces. The whole idea of smokescreen participation thus gives the 
illusion that they are fulfilling some organisational obligations, which legitimises 
their stay even though they lack the skill to make any difference.  
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The political appointments 
Added to these external processes is the appointment of MECs which the 
department has no control over. Sometimes such appointments do not take into 
consideration sectoral knowledge as it assumed that the Director General will 
administer basic departmental policies while the MEC plays the role of political 
oversight. Without debating the balance of roles at this level, as this is a 
contentious issue, the point is that sometimes MECs struggle to lead in contexts 
where the organisation is unstable, or where they have to surmise by themselves 
what needs to be done. As one former MEC stated: 
When I was appointed, I knew nothing about what needed to be done. 
All I knew was there are three things that you need to take 
responsibility for when you are an MEC for education. The first one is 
the bureaucracy that has to be changed such that its pace of 
development is in line with the policies that are ever-changing. If you 
don’t take responsibility for that, whatever public pronouncements 
you make will be in vain. That is the first thing. And it is a huge task 
to do that because the majority of those people have been in education 
for more than ten years minimum, who are running that 
administration. The second responsibility is the upgrading of the 
actual skills of the people you are dealing with because the system 
may change but it will be run by people who are really …who know 
nothing. And the skills have to be both hard and soft. It has to be 
theoretical understanding of what needs to be done plus the how side, 
the technical side, how to do it. If you don’t take responsibility for 
that, you are bound to run into problems because you might be 
theoretical, theoretical and nothing else. The third thing is the issue of 
resources. If you don’t deal with the issue of resources, you are bound 
to run into problems (Interview S, Port Elizabeth, 18 May 2004). 
 
Indeed, these three issues, namely the bureaucracy, resources and skills, turned 
out to be thorny issues for the organisation. Unfortunately for this MEC, he had to 
learn on the job about their significance. This meant therefore that instead of 
providing the political oversight, he became enmeshed in the basic operational 
issues of the department.  
 
If the MEC did not know what to do, what does that say about the rest of the 
organisation? The answer to this is that at the time skills varied. The point to 
remember is that at the beginning of transformation the changing of organisations 
was a matter of faith rather than being based on any template. This meant that 
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who got to do it was a matter of who got appointed. As trial and error dominated, 
this meant that some officials were appointed in areas where they had no 
expertise. There is a sense that in the ECDE there was a lot of pressure from the 
teachers’ union to have its members appointed into available positions (ECSECC, 
1997). Nonetheless, the experience of the time was narrated by one official as 
follows:  
I was asked in 1995 to take on this job of being the Physical Resource 
Planning Director. At first I came in for an interview for a regional 
director in East London District. I was told that I performed well in 
that interview. Then I got a call two nights after that from the Head of 
Department (HoD) Dr Van Wyk at that time. He said to me, ‘Man you 
did well but I am not going to appoint you in that post and I need 
somebody to take over the physical resource planning and I don’t 
have anybody. I have seen you operating and I want you to take on 
this task. And remember I said listen my father is not an architect, he 
is not a quantity surveyor, he is a normal bedding attendant and I am 
just an ordinary Maths and Science teacher and I don’t know anything 
about engineering and things. I haven’t worked with quantity 
surveyors but if this is where I need to work, if this is going to be the 
calling I will take on the job.  
 
He went on to say: 
I took on the job and to my shock when I arrived at the department on 
that particular day I went to meet the Head of the Department. He said 
‘man congratulations, go and look for an office and start working’. He 
didn’t tell me where the office is, he didn’t tell me where the people 
are. He did not give me a job description, he didn’t give me papers. 
He just said go and find space somewhere and this is how we started. I 
went down in the corridor and knocked on the door to look which 
office is open. That is the time when I really got the shock and I said, 
what did I get myself into? The people just leave you, they give you 
the job and they drop you like that. And then I realised the monster 
that I was going to face. No systems in place, nothing, and then I was 
further hit the next day when I was told I had a budget of 300 million 
[Rands] and I was told I need to build [schools]. I didn’t know that 
300 million meant problems. So there were no systems in place. The 
fact was that we came here and we never really thought it through – 
that you had the Transkei, you had the Ciskei, you had the four other 
departments from the former government and now you are being hit 
by this thing. You had to jump in and swim and how I got my team 
was to walk in the passages and ask ‘who are you, what did you do, 
don’t you want to come and help me?’…This is how we had to get 
this thing off (Interview Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004). 
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While in other organisations this scenario is unlikely, since managers tend to 
move into already established structures, systems and spaces, here managers had 
to find their way in the muddle of things happening. Of course, that this manager 
was making a transition from a school environment to this high level of decision-
making would have been overwhelming on its own, given that teachers tend to be 
the most marginalised group in terms of decision-making in education, if students 
are excluded. How this manager adjusted thereafter, is a long story of pain when 
things went wrong and sometimes of triumph when things went right. But 
fundamentally, he was meant to learn on the job like all other new appointees in a 
system desperate for redress, equity and change.    
 
Added to this group were political appointees. While political appointees are a 
phenomenon of most governments around the world, here they attracted a lot of 
attention due to their lack of skills. Seemingly, unlike in developed contexts 
where political appointees tend to have much high levels of qualification and 
competence (Dolan, 2001) equivalent to their careerists counterparts, in this 
context their administrative skills varied but were mostly underdeveloped. 
Surprisingly, the politicians themselves were unhappy about this state of affairs:   
As politicians we were complicating our own problems because some 
of the political appointees did not have the technical ability. Some of 
them were even junior to those people that they were going to be 
senior to. So that also complicated the whole thing (Interview S, Port 
Elizabeth, 18 May 2004). 
 
I was still a college lecturer and a number of my colleagues who could 
hardly utter any constructive kind of academic argument in the staff 
room, let alone in the classroom, took positions of responsibility and 
were employed, some of them because they had political affiliations 
or people who they were close to who had an influence in the 
government of the day, you know what I am saying…You would look 
at those people who could hardly make any difference even in the 
institution [college] itself and now these people were suddenly your 
bosses (Interview Re, East London, 15 May 2004). 
 
The other problem whether we agree or not is that the inception of the 
new government was infested by the fact that you appoint activists not 
managers, and as a result those activists lacked technical competence 
to deal with issues… You can’t just appoint people as if this is 
Zimbabwe. You appoint Zanu PF all the way even if MDC has got 
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good technical competent people who are citizens of the country 
because of ideology? Suka! No! No! Kwenzeke loo nto phaya MDC 
and ZANU PF [translation] [That is what happened there] (Interview 
Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 2005). 
 
Basically all these views reflect in one way or another two major issues that 
lacked proper consideration in the transformation, namely (i) capacity and (ii) 
hierarchisation of expertise. There was no congruence and relationship between 
skill and hierarchy as the focus remained on changing the composition of state 
bureaucracies. Of course it would be an exaggeration to see this trend as only an 
Eastern Cape phenomenon. On the contrary, it was practiced in most government 
departments. Many new entrants, especially the affirmative action groups, had 
neither government-relevant skills nor experience in state systems. This meant 
that they could be incorrectly placed in positions they had little or no mastery of. 
Why did some systems progress and seem to have coped well with the change 
while places like the ECDE stalled? While the answer to this remains theoretical, 
this thesis argues that it was partly due to differences in the levels of 
modernisation of the inherited bureaucracies and their ability to remain functional 
in the context of radical change. For instance, if one uses the Gauteng Department 
of Education (GDE) as an example, the department had highly modernised 
systems compared to the inherited homeland systems of the ECDE. It is therefore 
these levels of modernisation with their already established routine systems that 
could absorb new entries and still function while the incumbents were learning on 
the job. The GDE had a variety of skills to choose from due to the levels of 
competitive education that exist in the province, in contrast to the ECDE.  
 
This thesis maintains that the bureaucratic structures and systems inherited from 
the Ciskei were weak and poorly developed and thus could not cope with radical 
change. If anything, the system itself needed radical modernisation to compete 
with bureaucracies in other contexts. It therefore did not help to staff such systems 
with people with poorly developed capacities, as neither the system nor the people 
could move things forward. This argument does not take away the fact of agency 
and the fact that interests also drive bureaucracies. Riggs (1964) identified that 
sometimes sala bureaucracies tend to focus more on loyalty and sustaining their 
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clects than efficiency. Nevertheless the dilemma in the ECDE has been 
perpetuated by their inability to answer the very question posed by one official in 
an interview: “… but how do you balance ideology and administrative 
competence?” (Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 2005). The answer to 
this, this study contends, remains with the leadership decisions and choices they 
make in terms of where they want to lead their organisations.  
 
In the absence of skills development strategies and interventions for capacity 
development, the ECDE relies on consultants to fill the capacity gaps. This is not 
unique to them. The Radebe et al, (2004) reports found this to be a common 
phenomenon for most departments that find themselves experiencing capacity 
problems. The report states that:  
In the absence of capacity many provincial governments rely on the 
private sector for as much as 80% of their service delivery outputs… 
The departments themselves account for the remaining 20%, which at 
an output level is hugely disproportionate to their huge personnel 
(Radebe et al, 2004:39). 
 
Consultants have become automated knowledge brokers for many organisations 
that lack capacity and skill. While they contribute to levels of productivity 
through either process or project management, it is also true that they are an 
expensive exercise. Hence there is a move to reduce their use in state departments 
where possible. Besides their expensive nature, one can argue that the over-
reliance on consultants removes agency for managers to solve problems, as they 
are able to order express answers, thus increasing their dependency on outsiders. 
Implicitly, this limits learning, as the alternative is a hands-off approach. To some 
extent this had long-term consequences for service delivery improvement, as 
knowledge was never retained. The point is that consultants are never permanent 
features of any organisation. They are mobile entities whose availability and 
interests are as short -lived as the need and as the market lasts. But then how was 
the rest of the organisation complementing its lack of skills? Evidence shows that 
besides the early concentration on capacity-building that came with the RDP 
hype, very little capacity-building happened for middle managers in the public 
sector. This was equally the case here. Both the middle and lower levels hardly 
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received skills improvement (Interview Be, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004). However, 
given that education is meant to be a knowledge-intensive bureaucracy (Deetz, 
1998), this seems like a misnomer in the case of the ECDE as productivity 
depends on the intellectual capital that exists. Issues of skills and capacity are 
well-known debates as they are mentioned in most public sector review reports, 
including the Provincial Review Report (PRR) (1997), the Presidential Review 
Commission (PRC) (1998) and ECSECC reports (2000 and 2002). This thesis 
also confirms their necessity.  
 
6.5 Organisational Consequences 
Leadership instability 
In a context where the organisation became characterised by fragmentation rather 
than unity and cohesiveness, it was no surprise to hear that the organisation lacked 
consistent leadership. Leadership is one of the most analysed factors in 
management theory. However, the emphasis tends to be on styles and behavioural 
traits. While leadership theories are useful in understanding how leadership 
behaviour is formed, it is very rare to see management research engage beyond 
their functionalist interpretations of this. Instead, leaders in organisations are 
assumed to have absolute power and control to determine what needs to happen 
where and when as determined by the hierarchy. Taking that the organisation 
studied hardly resembled the usually assumed order and stability seen in 
functionalist theories, it is essential then to examine how leadership behaves in 
other contexts of political contestation and complexities. The argument of this 
thesis is that in the absence of relational trust and with the dominance of inter-
regional, ethnic and racial fragmentation, leadership here remained a point of pain 
with its high turnover and instability. For instance, in the period between 1995-
2003 the organisation had had no less that six MECs, some of whom did not serve 
more than a year. Similarly, the Heads of Departments departed as frequently as 
the MECs that appointed them. Amongst many consequences of this instability 
was the discontinuity rather than continuity on projects as each change brought 
new directions. In the process, this created a lot of anxiety and frustration amongst 
the managers that were involved (Interviews Fr, Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004 and 
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Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003) who had to constantly align 
themselves with the ever-changing strategies. Commenting on their frustrations 
about this, some officials stated:  
 
The other thing is instability at the level of the political head and the 
administrative head. The instability there affected us… We are in the 
fifth MEC now. It is our fifth in eight years. It’s our fifth MEC and in 
terms of HOD, this is the fifth one also. But this one is acting for over 
a year now and it’s not like when this MEC leaves, the HOD leaves. 
The MEC leaves, the HOD is there, but because there is a new MEC 
the HOD must also change direction. Sometimes the MEC is there, 
the HOD leaves, a new HOD comes with some ideas, sells those to 
the MEC and directions change again. You can imagine then it could 
be ten changes within eight years.  That confuses the establishment 
and it is not good for stability in the organisation, for production, etc. 
(Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003).  
 
It is so difficult because our environment is not stable. For instance, in 
the department of education, we have had within a period of how 
many years, five years or six years, we have had how many MECs, 
was it five? This one is the fifth one [he goes on to count and name 
various MECs and HODs]. There is no stability, this is another 
problem. These are the things that are crippling us. They are so 
obvious so much that we are amazed that nobody seems to be taking 
these things very seriously yet. They are so glaring can you see, so 
that is why it becomes very difficult to know what is being done 
properly because there is no head all the time. It is a serious 
disadvantage, you know, it’s a really serious disadvantage (Interview 
X, Zwelitsha, 11 November 2003). 
 
… you had a high turnover of MECs in Education…Now you had 
[name of MEC] going, you had [name of MEC] who left and then you 
had [name of MEC] who left. Now you have [name of MEC]. I think 
we are the ones who have the highest turnover under pressure 
situation, including our heads of department [name of HOD] left, 
Caretaker [name of HOD] left, [name of HOD] came, left, [name of 
HOD] came and left and [name of MEC] is still there (Interview P, 
King William’s Town, 20 November 2003).  
 
Implicit in these quotations is the notion that heads of department create stability, 
provide direction and information for the organisation. Of course this confirms 
thoughts that exist in leadership and management research about the role of 
leadership. Actually scientific management was the first to highlight the task of 
managers at this level of the hierarchy with the famous Planning, Organising, 
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Staffing, Directing, Co-ordinating, Reporting and Budgeting (POSDCORB). 
While there is a now a shift towards more strategic, visionary and transformation 
types of leadership, there is still an overemphasis on direction and control. 
Without the leadership stability it is clear that the organisation suffers from 
unclear lines of communication and responsibility, lack of direction as 
programmes get disrupted and discontinued depending on who is in charge and 
for how long.  
 
While there may be many reasons for this high leadership turnover, one of which 
includes public pressure due to poor performance (Interview P, King William’s 
Town, 20 November 2003), the most subtle reasons are implied by comments on 
lack of unity and lack of co-operation, especially that MECs were prone to align 
themselves with existing camps (Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003; 
Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 2005), the consequences of which 
fuelled staff conflicts. For instance, one official commented that: 
… we are carrying huge baggage as a result of the changing 
administrators, or head or political heads, you know. Where this one 
comes in and is seen to be favouring this and not that group and these 
others suffer and when this ones leaves, another one comes, maybe 
this one has another group and that other group complains, this one is 
closer to the HOD than this one, this one is looking at those as the 
ones that are out to get them you know, all that kind of thing 
(Interview B, Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003).  
 
A former DDG of the department highlighted an experience that elucidates this he 
had been involved in the restructuring programme until his MEC resigned. The 
resignation as such became an opportunity for other forces within the organisation 
to regroup around the new MEC for support. He explained:  
When the [new] MEC came in, that Transkei culture came in. [The 
MEC at the time was from the Transkei region]. They grouped these 
Transkeians because we were still dealing with the inefficient 
managers. They briefed the MEC. I continued with my agenda [for 
change] then this person came with her personality in a fluid 
organisation and dealt with me and then I was expelled. The 
redundant managers then re-asserted themselves and then crisis started 
again. The organisation flopped again. The constant change of 
leadership has caused problems because people group around that 
person (Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 November 2005). 
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The quotations used reflect conditions in an environment where relations of trust 
were left to deteriorate while power struggles dominated. Coincidentally, this DG 
came from the former border region and the new MEC came from the Transkei. 
Politically these two areas had hardly any working relationship before 1994. It is 
therefore no surprise that Transkeians grouped around a fellow Transkei MEC 
appointee to consolidate support. What one sees then is that beyond uncertainty, 
this rapid change of MECs perpetuated internal battles for power and control. One 
of the reasons for this is that the leadership itself hardly maintained neutrality and 
objectivity. Rather it became susceptible to internal politics as a result of being 
easily swayed by different interests, pending the dominant coalitions that had 
access to it at the point of entry and presumably even before. Dixon, Kouzmin, 
Korac-Kakabadse (1998) argue that some of the organisational behavioural 
dysfunctionalities are due to anxiety and fear of change. Managerialist reforms 
need to consider those ‘resultant anxiety-generating personal change 
implications’, which could enhance fear and mistrust, and as a result would:  
… engender counter-productive, pathological responses from staff 
notably, paranoia; a siege mentality; turf protection; back-stabbing; 
dishonesty; sabotage and even ‘organisational gangsterism’ (Kobrak, 
1992) – all of which may give rise to some of Caiden’s (1991) all too 
numerous and identifiable bureau pathologies and may introduce 
dysfunctionality, rather than the hoped-for enhanced functional 
rationalities, into the administrative process (Dixon et al, 1998: 173). 
 
The relevance of Dixon et al (1998) lies in their identification of change as an 
emotional process. In this regard, many interviewees referred frequently to their 
emotional attributes of anxiety, fear, anger, sabotage and trust. This is something 
that cannot be overlooked even though it tends to remain in the shadows of 
change management research. The point is that with the fragmented systems in 
place, organisational culture was equally fragmented as each regional entity kept 
its identity with little or no interference from Bisho. Even within Bisho, the 
coalitions ensured that there was little to share between groups; as a result the 
employees themselves could not transcend beyond the homeland and other 
apartheid spaces of location and identity, which resulted in regionalism, internal 
networks and cliques.  
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The ramifications of these different political battles were still felt in 2003. The 
managers interviewed were still frustrated by the domination of various turfs and 
lack of teamwork. The internal struggles were visible, as one senior manager 
discussed the newly conceptualised strategy to separate two divisions. For him, 
this was one way to create a balance of power in the organisation. In place was 
the newly proposed organogram that was meant to ensure such power shifts. 
Unfortunately he was suspended together with the opposition before the change 
could be realised. Nonetheless, the endemic nature of lack of unity in the ECDE 
was highlighted by the secretary of one of the DDGs who was about to be 
interviewed; who observed:  
… what is he going to tell you because they cannot agree on anything. 
They don’t support each other and there is no unity amongst these 
people; if they are not united then they are not, and they just have to 
start working on that’.  
 
Lack of supervision 
The lack of stability emanating from the top echelons of the organisation filtered 
down to the rest of the organisation, with even line managers neglecting their 
supervisory roles. Part of the problem was that many managers lacked the 
knowledge and skills to undertake such responsibilities in a context where very 
little was defined. For instance, the ECSECC report identified that staff were not 
clear about their responsibilities due to the instability of the department. The 
department had no work plans developed for staff between 1994 and 1997. Under 
such circumstances, it was no surprise to hear that even managers reneged on 
basic performance management systems like supervision, as these officials 
indicated: 
People are just not willing to supervise and take decisions. If they take 
them it would be the dictator approach, the bureaucracy that is very 
stiff and not flexible in dealing with issues, not training people, not 
developing people – or just because I don’t like you, you are fired. 
Somebody else will show the same type of conduct and that person is 
kept in the system because that person is being favoured (Interview 
To, Bisho, 19 May 2004). 
 
There was less supervision because people didn’t want to be seen to 
be unpopular. Remember we are coming from an era of so much toyi-
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toyi [protest], so you don’t want to be labelled. So people were scared 
of being labelled to an extent that they abdicated their responsibilities 
(Interview P, King William’s Town, 20 November 2003). 
 
You need to deal with supervision, which is another weak point, 
supervision of work. We get too familiar with people, and in some 
cases we want to cover ourselves by being lax in terms of supervising, 
so that when my people see me doing something they don’t complain 
or report me because I also allow them. It is not helpful (Interview B, 
Zwelitsha, 19 November 2003). 
 
There is too much laissez-faire attitude in terms of managers and this 
is not just from our observations, but from the IMT as well, which 
came in. One of the stronger points that they make in terms of general 
administrative issues is that managers are not willing to take up their 
responsibilities. There is too much of an attitude of passing the buck 
and not wanting to own up to the fact that this is my responsibility and 
I needed to put in place mechanisms that will see to it that things are 
done properly. So it is a ……. you don’t want to say it is endemic, but 
it is certainly a very serious problem. It is a very worrisome problem 
that supervision is not done. Managers are to some extent not hands 
off, they are too aloof from the issues and in terms of permeating and 
reaching into the very core of the operations of the department, I don’t 
think they have got a feel for it (Interview V, Grahamstown, 19 May 
2004). 
 
Traditionally, the world of management and supervision assumes that managers 
know what their roles and responsibilities are as these are usually tied to the 
vertical hierarchical responsibilities in the organisation. Managerial tasks and 
responsibilities range from direct control of subordinates’ work to different 
facilitative processes that involve empowerment and capacity development. 
However, the difficulty with the ECDE is not just managers refusing to take 
responsibility for supervision, but that they themselves have unclear roles and 
responsibilities as a result of the constant change of different organisational 
structures, as indicated in Chapter Five. Theoretically, this lack of stability over 
basic structural function confuses the organisation, but more importantly, the 
constant revolving shifts at the top remove authority and responsibility from 
middle management to direct what needs to be done as they are also constantly 
caught in shifting spaces. 
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There is some sympathy for the situation in which the department found itself, 
where it also lacked physical space to accommodate its employees, which made 
supervision impossible. For instance, while in principle there was a new 
provincial department of education located in Bisho, in reality it was dispersed all 
over Bisho and King Williams Town because the initial building allocated to it 
was small and could not accommodate all the staff. Other divisions moved to 
rented homes in and around King Williams Town. In retrospect, this made co-
ordination, communication and supervision almost impossible. As one 
interviewee stated: 
…we occupied at that time nine different buildings. We were 
provided with a set of offices in the main centre in Bisho which could 
accommodate less than half of the staff complement and the rest of the 
staff was scattered in rented houses, warehouses, private homes, 
scattered across Bisho, KWT, Zwelitsha, a complete hotchpotch. You 
can imagine that made effective management and supervision very 
difficult. You will have a chief director sitting in an office in Bisho 
where the directorates for whom he/she is responsible are in a house 
in KWT and another one is in a warehouse with inappropriate 
ventilation and unsafe buildings. I mean, just a nightmare. So one of 
the things we did initially was argue that this was untenable, I spent a 
long time fighting with Public Works about trying to get more office 
space assigned so that we could consolidate. You can imagine its not 
just the office space but we have had to have six or seven different 
telephone lines and fax addresses and [it was] impossible to put 
everybody on the same e-mail system (Interview J, East London, 18 
November 2003). 
 
Since 2003, however, the department has renovated and moved into a former 
Ciskei building in Zwelitsha, a township approximately 10 kilometres outside 
Bisho. Almost all the departments are now operating under the same roof. The 
point is that with the existing fragmentations the department could not afford 
further differentiations because theoretically such differentiations held the 
potential to isolate, marginalise and ghettoise particular projects and their 
managers. But more importantly the differentiated physical spaces could easily 
resemble platforms to negotiate the newly set values and norms of the 
transformation. This is due to the fact that spaces by their nature determine what 
gets translated and what discarded, depending on who is communicating what to 
whom.  
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Poor work cultures and practices 
Amongst the many complexities of leadership and the lack of supervision, the 
change from hierarchical, secretive, rigid and rules-bound apartheid bureaucracy 
to the democratic, consultative, citizen-oriented bureaucratic systems favoured a 
more humane, public-oriented and team-based organisation. This was not an 
automatic switch from one cultural orientation to another. Instead this 
department’s cultural orientations progressed with the different organisational 
orientations adopted, as discussed in Chapter Five. For instance, with the initial 
changes that saw a partial integration of the six regions into one department, there 
was very little cultural integration. Instead, as the organisation got thrown into 
crisis and confusion due to the lack of direction of the transformation project, it 
danced between Riggs (1964) descriptions of the sala type of bureaucracy found 
in most developing countries which tends to lack ground rules and Offe’s notion 
of ‘excessive’ liberalism (Offe, 1996:209). As usually happens with all new 
bureaucracies, there were significant breakaways from the past which were 
communicated through symbolic factors like the change of the dress code. The 
early 1995 transitions also saw the era of formal suits and ties replaced by the new 
political elite who came to work in African prints and with the then popular 
‘Madiba’ shirts. Through such symbols the stereotypes of the traditional 
bureaucrat were consciously and unconsciously being deconstructed. This was not 
unique to the EC, of course, since President Mandela had started this genre of 
dress code and for many it was interpreted in the way they wanted. One thing that 
was clear from one of the interviewees is that these types of symbolic gestures 
unsettled the long-serving conservatives, who subsequently took advantage of the 
severance packages being offered and left the system, knowing that a different era 
had begun. But more importantly, the erosion of the old conservative culture had 
no immediate substitutes. Instead, the new democratic culture became 
misinterpreted as a lack of application of rules and regulations.  
 
Without any formal regulations on institutional performance in place the central, 
regional and district offices became authority to themselves without any clear 
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ground rules in place. This opened opportunities for lassies faire attitude to work 
as productivity became reduced to individual conscience and choice. Hence all the 
officials interviewed were unhappy about the levels of work ethic at all levels of 
management, as many managers stated in different ways:  
You know you go to salaries and ask for help on a particular thing or a 
particular aspect they would say: ‘so and so is on leave and may not 
be back for the next two weeks’. And when you ask: who can help me 
in her absence? They would say: ‘Nobody, uyabona nawe [Nobody! 
You can see as well]’. Sometimes you come in and its teatime. They 
tell you ‘hayi bhuti yi-tea time khawuhambe wethu [Sir it’s tea time, 
please go]’. So those kinds of situations, the attitude, the commitment, 
I don’t think they know what this process is all about and my sense is 
that the very framework has not changed. The vision is not there and 
you talking about people who are dealing with peoples lives. If a 
person dies for two years there is no pension, no gratuity [payouts]. 
Their response is Ndisalindele i-approval, ilindele i-authorisation 
[Translation] [I am waiting for approval and for authorisation]. What 
do we expect, there is no sense of urgency and my sense was that you 
don’t only need a change in [sic] strategy but you need a shock 
treatment and for me you just expel all of them and employ them 
afresh or outsource the whole of that function (Interview R, Zwelitsha, 
19 November 2003). 
 
Just work ethic – to have a workforce that is not ready to work, and 
not willing to work. There was a phrase that was used in these 
homelands ‘umcimbi uphethwe’ [Translation] [the matter is still under 
review]. When you ask about a work application or benefits that 
needed to come to you, if you ask, where is my money? when am I 
being interviewed? ‘Hayi umcimbi uphethwe, umcimbi usezandleni] 
[translation reads as above]. So, there was no sense of urgency, unless 
you could pay a bribe (Interview To, Bisho, 19 May 2004). 
 
The biggest difficulty is the work ethic is not there. Your work ethic 
has a serious impact, the lack of it, has serious impact on your 
turnaround time. You want this done today; it comes back to you a 
month later. By that time you may have been embarrassed in a 
situation or you may have been embarrassed at the legislature where 
you have to deliver. Or the quality of the work given to you is so poor, 
such that you are a laughing stock there (Interview S, Port Elizabeth, 
18 May 2004). 
 
Otherwise there is too much relaxation, there is too much relaxation. 
Umntu wenza lo nto afuna ukuyenza ngexesha afuna ukuyenza ngalo. 
Ayikho la nto yokuba Yhu! I’m going to meet I-deadline. Umntu 
uqhutywa sisazela sakhe ne-commitment yakhe. The standing 
committee guy demands a document and it never comes, so (i) chain 
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ihamba iphuka somewhere. [Translation] People tend to do things 
when they want at their own time. There is no sense of urgency to 
meet deadlines. You are persuaded by your own conscience and 
commitment. The standing committee demands a document and it 
never comes, so the chain keeps breaking somewhere (Interview Be, 
Zwelitsha, 20 May 2004a). 
 
Although work ethics were a problem at all levels of management, they seemed 
worse in the lower levels as most complaints were targeted to this group. While 
this may be the bias of the managers interviewed, it was still no surprise that they 
took the most blame as they are at the coalface of the organisation and are 
responsible for greater output as they interact with the general public. This makes 
them more susceptible to complaints than any other group. But the most 
interesting aspect of this group is that they were assimilated from the Ciskei civil 
service. In terms of Figure 6.1 they make up the bottom rung of the diagram. 
Already a lot is written about the homelands and their lack of work ethic (Picard, 
2002). Their assimilation into the new department was equally a transposition of 
the Ciskei practices. The point is that with the fluidity of the transformation many 
questionable practices found a fertile ground to germinate in a system that did not 
define work expectations, performance and accountability. Equally the ECDE had 
no definitions of roles and expectations. Instead, as Interview P (King William’s 
Town, 20 November 2003) indicated, there was an element of being ‘democrazy 
in approach’ and ‘nobody defined responsibilities for these people and ensured 
that they were properly integrated in terms of a very clear strategy’. This was 
because management was preoccupied with other crises in the early 
transformation. A consequence of this was that people created their own 
definitions of work in the new democracy.  
 
Interestingly, none of the managers interviewed gave any indication of possibly 
resolving these issues, or addressing the deficient work ethic. This was despite 
labour relations, which provide guidelines on how to get rid of under-performing 
staff. In the meantime, the casual and impolite attitudes continued to entrench 
themselves as the norm, exhibited by staff at all levels, and personally 
experienced by the writer. This gives rise to speculation that the same culture of 
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lethargy is what schools experience, given the consistently disastrous Matric 
results in this province. Table 6.2 reflects rounded off performances in various 
years.   
 
Table 6.2:  The Eastern Cape Matric Examination Results, 1994-2003 
 
Year Candidates Total Pass % Total Fail % 
1994 73 728 41 881 57 31 847 43 
1996 66 809 32 639 49 34 170 51 
1998 82 517 37 206 45 45 311 55 
1999 79 749 32 029 40 47 720 60 
2000 74 505 37 118 50 37 387 50 
2001 63 204 28 825 46 34 350 54 
2002 64 257 33 286 52 30 968 48 
2003 62 457 37 468 60 24 985 40 
Source: The Education Foundation - Examination Results 
 
While there will always be the argument that Matric results are not the sole 
indicator for success, they are difficult to ignore in a context where performance 
and service delivery are points of contention, since such school performances are 
symptomatic of broad organisational inefficiencies. Without getting into much 
discussion about these results, the quotations on work ethics confirm Riggs’ 
observation of the sala where the bureaucracy lays its terms for survival (Riggs, 
1964). In this case, without any regulatory policies in force, the bureaucracy 
defined its terms of continuity as it dictated its work routines and speed for 
service delivery. The consequence of this was a cultural milieu infested with 
administrative inefficiency.  
 
6.6 Living on the margins of managerialist tendencies: The post-1999 
period    
As indicated in the previous chapter, the ECDE has, since 2000, joined the reform 
bandwagon. At the centre of the change has been the general introduction of 
regulatory Acts like Batho Pele (1997) and the Public Finance Management Act 
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(1999), that are tighter and policy implementation-oriented. Accompanying this 
has been the introduction of the Senior Management Services (SMS). The SMS 
provides new policy guidelines for the professionalisation of management in the 
public sector. It addresses basic managerial responsibilities, conditions of 
employment and competencies required at this level. Its basic thesis is that 
improved service delivery cannot happen without a capable, committed, strong 
leadership and management. In recognition of this, it has changed management 
incentives to closely match those of the private sector. A basic interpretation of 
this is an act to retain good managers but also to create influence, credibility and 
legitimacy for public sector managers who are constantly compared to their 
private sector counterparts. In tandem with this glossy image, managers are 
expected to be custodians of performance and accountability in the public sector. 
The concept of SMS is not new to South Africa, and is practiced in both the 
United States and Australia (Ingraham, 1997). Linked to the South African SMS 
is the notion of a developmental performance appraisal system that is reviewed 
quarterly and annually. Although these reforms were still new at the time of 
conducting this research, this study maintains that while their introduction is a 
positive step towards shifting the existing culture of inefficiency, they remain 
another added layer of reforms in a context of frequent leadership change and 
inherent fragmentations.   
 
The current reforms tend to have a managerialist orientation, possibly with the 
expectation that managers and their organisations will be inspired by them, but, if 
anything, as Paine (1999) states, these managerialist reforms assume that 
managers ‘know what it takes to get things done’. Unfortunately, this is not 
always the case. Rather, the question of organisational readiness tends to scream 
louder in other contexts than others, and where it does, the adopted reforms 
become an added burden within the complexity that exists. Actually, the ECDE 
officials are the first to acknowledge their inability to catch up on the reform 
process. For instance, the former MEC of the department commented on the 
reforms in the following way: 
[The] ANC policies are much ahead of the systems that we have in 
place in the bureaucracies; that is why you are unable to move as fast 
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as you want to. When it comes to education, education takes much 
longer to change than the other areas. The legal system and education 
take ages before they change because it consists of set norms and 
values (Interview S, Port Elizabeth, 18 May 2004).  
 
Although one may argue that there is no formula for transformation, it is indeed 
true that the reform programme has been fast-paced, highly sophisticated and 
even confusing for less developed bureaucracies with several mandates. 
Education bureaucracies are not only pursuing their own sectoral goals but have 
to conform to other national reform programmes as well. This undoubtedly 
stretches their capacity to respond and perform effectively. Unfortunately, 
managerialism does not accommodate multi-mandates and competing interests as 
discussed in Chapter Four, as its focus tends to be inward-looking and 
organisationally based. In the process, it ignores the external influences and their 
demands. It was no surprise, therefore, to hear these senior officials talking of 
reforms as an artificial exercise. A case in point has been the introduction of 
performance management contracts and evaluations. A former Director General 
commented:  
When you introduce reform here it is entirely a synthetic exercise. It’s 
a game you play with people and there is no provision that says well 
we are not implementing this in the EC at the moment. The processes 
roll out exactly the same as anywhere else. We all sign performance 
agreements that we are going to do one, two, three, four, five, six, 
seven. We have no idea whether we will be able to do those things 
because we have no idea of what they are.  The whole process of 
planning activity and budgeting accordingly and then measuring 
performance against your plan is completely undermined. It becomes 
an artificial exercise and what it does is undermine entirely in the 
heads of the civil servants this notion of planning, budgeting and 
accounting for the resources and reporting on performance. It 
becomes whatever you were doing, what did we get last year, what 
can we ask for in addition and what did we actually spend? So what I 
am saying is, as a result of that process the implementation of some of 
those really important reforms in the public service that have enabled 
other provinces to move forward significantly in terms of the 
performance of their managers, say at DDG, Chief Director and 
Director level, this simply hasn’t been possible here and I think there 
is a real danger that you have done long-term damage in developing a 
culture in which people don’t take seriously public service reforms. It 
becomes a thing that you do, you perform, you know. We participate 
in the process, we won’t talk about it, we sign the performance 
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agreements because you need to in order to get your salary increase or 
whatever the case may be. We even go through a performance 
assessment process but it is all artificial. There is the real danger of 
undermining very severely what you are trying to achieve and that is 
one of the downsides that is coming out (Interview J, East London, 18 
November 2003). 
 
Similarly, a former Deputy Director General who has since moved to the districts 
highlighted that the difficulty with performance management systems is that they 
are not integrated into the individual and organisational plans. His comments were 
based on the intervention by the IMT which tried to institutionalise these 
performance management requirements. He went on to say:  
They have prepared for us performance contracts…and you can’t do 
that. You can’t prepare for me a performance contract and expect me 
to do A B C D E and you just tell me sign here. One of the problems 
of that strategy is that its not built as part of the organisation. I am 
saying it is good, but you can see people interpret it that this thing is 
being pushed down our throats in a very bad manner and so there is no 
buy-in the organisation. But people are doing it for compliance and 
the problem with compliance is that if you want the report in three 
days, I will give you the report and continue to do what I was doing 
without taking cognisance of what is in the report. That is your 
business because you wanted the report because the things you put in 
the performance contract and monitoring and evaluation you have not 
explained. You have not built into the plan of the organisation. So 
there is a plan this side to turn things around, but there is another 
culture which is running its own way. Yonke into endala ihamba 
ngohlobo lwayo [Translation] [Everything continues to work the usual 
way]. But you come with the new thing but yonke enye into ihamba 
ngohlobo lwayo [things continue they way they do]. That then instils 
anxiety and fear into the employees and they are going to under-
perform. Once your strategy is to instil fear and anxiety they are going 
to comply and not work and you will interpret that compliance as 
performance because in their corner they talk their language but in 
front of you they appease you (Interview Ng, Johannesburg, 10 
November 2005).  
 
Both quotations show the struggle of keeping up appearances in the new 
managerialist reforms of efficiency. Generally performance management aims to 
enforce individual and organisational accountability while maximising goal 
efficiency. Townley wrote about the politics of performance appraisals in 
organisations. Without getting into the debate about its value, what is clear from 
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these officials is that it is a problem tool that they are not prepared to engage with. 
If anything, even for them as senior managers, it is nothing but a conformity tool. 
To some extent, these managers reveal the downside of this tool. Usually 
managerialist tools tend to be applied in an unquestioned way, but what one sees 
here is that the usually acclaimed added value is perhaps presumptuous rather 
than real. The fact that they promote superficial behaviours is another point not 
usually debated in the management literature. Riggs (1964) warns against these 
formalistic tendencies in bureaucracies where actions depicted resemble fiction 
rather than reality. This is because with such actions one can never find the real 
essence or the heart of the organisation. Given the leadership fragmentation and 
culture that exists, it is not the quantity of efficiency programmes introduced that 
will create long-term and sustainable change here, largely because such 
programmes rely on intensive monitoring. Instead, in a context where leadership 
is unstable and even weak, it seems logical to target such leadership for change. 
Part of this will be to develop their capacity and ability to support change. 
 
6.7  Conclusion 
This chapter explored the ECDE’s internal organisational dynamics. It argued that 
unless the department works on the existing fragmentations, instability and 
capacity problems, it will continue to experience the efficiencies inherent in it. To 
support this argument it explored how the organisation functions through 
networks of coalitions and the subsequent consequences of lack of cohesiveness. 
Given that professional organisations rely on intellectual capital to survive, it 
looked at how skills are organised and how they influence the organisation and its 
effectiveness. Between these two themes, it emerged that organisational change is 
equally a matter of organisational unity and support without which the 
organisation becomes vulnerable to multi-interests which are likely to pull it in 
different directions depending on the powers that dominate. It also became clear 
that any affirmative action and equity programmes that are not accompanied by 
intensive capacity development equate to disempowerment. The ECDE is one of 
the organisations that followed these equity regulations but to its own detriment. 
It remains paralysed by internal lack of ability and competence to conceptualize 
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and translate the transformation project into a meaningful exercise. As a result, 
the organisational change project has been reduced to unending battles of power 
and politics which do little to enhance organisational performance. Instead, these 
battles exacerbate the differences and fragmentations that are a consequence of 
the apartheid ideology, seriously affecting co-operation and teamwork. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSION 
 
TOWARDS A RELATIONAL AND NETWORK ANALYSIS OF 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND EFFICIENCY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to explore how and why the ECDE had arrived at a situation 
of inefficiency and poor service delivery. To recap, inefficiency in this thesis 
refers to the ECDE’s inability to maximise on its organisational goals. Poor 
service delivery refers to the lack of institutional processes and practices to 
support the provision of services to the targeted stakeholders within the 
specified time period. Since this is a qualitative study, none of the goals was 
subjected to a particular testing; rather the thesis explored how the notion of 
organisational change had been used and managed in this context to support 
and facilitate service delivery. The point is that the department – like all others 
in the public sector – had undergone transformation to merge its six 
departments of education. The critical issue is that, compared to other recently 
structured departments of education, it was perceived as highly inefficient and 
unable to deliver the mandated services to schools and to its stakeholders. The 
key questions then were how and why the department was experiencing a crisis 
of poor service delivery and inefficiency? 
  
The overarching observation is that the ECDE reflects the complexities of the 
transformation of the public sector in South Africa. Some of the complexities 
known about this process is that it was a rapid exercise, based on generic 
policies that lacked a broad based understanding of the types of bureaucracies 
that exist. Instead bureaucracies were treated in a homogeneous way. Such a 
lack of understanding had meant that while the transformation policies were 
highly modern and fitted well into international debates and trends they were 
highly advanced for some of the diversified South African context. The 
consequences of which have been mixed results of patchy performances and 
 217 
poor service delivery across the different  provinces. The key illumination from 
this study is that the way public sector reform happened, it assumed capacity 
and resources where they did not exist but more important it assumed that the 
nature of the bureaucracies that existed were highly matured to absorb and act 
on the speed of the transformation required. Seemingly, this could happen in 
other contexts like Gauteng and the Western Cape that have highly developed 
economies. However, the story reads different for poor contexts which hardly 
had the basic infrastructure to support the change. Instead the observation made 
about the ECDE is that, as the rapid transformation made demands on the 
existing structures, it could hardly cope with the change due to weak internal 
systems and lack of capacity. This led to different forms of dysfunctionality and 
structural inertia. The result of which is that the organisation still struggle to 
retain acceptable levels of performance and service delivery.  
 
The key issue of course resides with the nature of change itself. The change that 
informed the bureaucratic reforms in South Africa was multifaceted, 
uncoordinated and fast paced. This lack of coordination thus meant 
organisations had to learn quickly about how to respond to the pressure for 
change. Many organisations like the ECDE seemingly, lacked the capacity to 
respond and align with the changes that were emanating from their external 
environment. As a result the department got pulled in different directions, 
without any systematic plan in place. This led to different forms of 
‘haemorrhaging’, if one were to use the words of a former commissioner 
(Interview I, Hogsback, 17 May 2004). While the haemorrhaging has been 
controlled in many areas over the years, the department still struggles to close 
all the gaps as a result it continuous to be the focus of poor performance and 
service delivery. Nonetheless, what follows are reflections on doing this 
project, particularly reflecting on the theory used, the key implications that can 
be draw from this study, the limitations of the study and the directions for 
future research.   
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The usefulness of the theory adopted 
Sometimes conducting studies like these, it is better to stick with tradition and 
what is known to save one from the pain of uncertainty. This is said in the 
context where one literally set out to do an exploratory type of research in a 
new field of knowledge and research. This did not just turn out to be challenge 
in terms of understanding the content and the field itself, the process became 
time consuming and exhausting. The first point of exhaustion came with the 
realisation that organisational change research had not developed far 
theoretically. Instead it relied on rational and managerial approaches as the 
basis to explore and analyse change managerialist approaches, as indicated in 
Chapter two, tends to subscribe to principle-based conceptions of organisations. 
While such theories are useful to some extent, they hardly deal with issues of 
rapid and radical transformations. This meant that one could not just rely on 
such theories to unravel the complexities of the departments like the ECDE as 
their changes had hardly any rational planning attached to it. Their changes 
were outside the frame of stability and order that is usually addressed by such 
research. Secondly, the choice to study organisational change in a system 
characterised by dysfunctionality and poor performance became another 
challenge, as there was limited research to learn from. As a result, the research 
process remained experimental rather than definite. But also studying 
dysfunctionality tends to be difficult as people tend to be less confident to 
speak to an outsider. Besides, even where they agree to speak to you, issues of 
poor performance tend to be emotional issues, and thus one has to always try to 
balance between different feelings of inadequacy, victimhood and possible 
exaggerated accounts of what happened for sympathy or heroism.    
 
Nonetheless, in the long search for a relevant theory thus, a combination of 
theories informed the research. In the beginning there was a concentration on 
development administration which seemed to provide the necessary knowledge 
base to understand the dynamics of public management in developing context. 
Hence Riggs’s theory of prismatic societies was seen at first as the answer in a 
broad theoretical vacuum that existed. But even so, it became clear as one hit 
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the field that such a theory would hardly work as the context of ECDE was 
different. Besides, the environment became too sensitive to explore some of his 
propositions. Contending with this is that the change itself was too rapid to rely 
on a specific theory. This on its own changed any pre-planned ideas of a neat 
theory and a neat research process.    
 
Without any specific theory dominating the patterns of the research, research 
data became highly instrumental in shaping the direction of the study. For 
instance as the new themes emerged from the data, they got used to explore 
additional theories and frameworks for better interpretation and analysis. Hence 
there is no single theory that dominates instead the study used theory in an 
eclectic way. One of the theories that is used then is institutional theory. 
Institutional theory is predominantly used to study how a group of 
organisations within a particular field responds to different contextual changes 
at a given time. Although this study focused only on one organisation, it found 
some of the theoretical levers used by institutional theory relevant in this case 
as well particularly where one had to understand the nature of normative forces 
that directed the change.  
 
By using institutional theory thus the study revealed the structural regulatory 
opportunities and challenges that have influenced South Africa’s new public 
sector transformation. For instance, chapters four and five gave an account of 
the different macro and micro contextual factors that had a bearing on the 
department. At the macro level, it highlighted the basic parameters of the 
negotiated settlement and the subsequent re-organisation of the public sector to 
reflect the new democratic ethos of equity, redress and access. At the micro 
level it paid attention to how the new ECDE bureaucracy got to be 
conceptualised in the broad context of policy formulation and change. It got to 
illuminate on how the mergers of different departments came about and the 
subsequent challenges brought by such a process. But also it helped clarify why 
organisations at times hardly focus on their own core competencies as they 
chase nationally set political agendas. This was evident through the officials’ 
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account of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was 
poorly integrated and executed by the department. But more important in many 
ways, institutional theory gave insights into why public organisations, including 
the ECDE, tend to adopt similar structural templates despite their inherent 
differences. In this case it became evident that the ECDE was following 
national trends. National policies as such dictated both the trajectory and the 
pattern for change.   
 
While this theory helped to explain the external and contextual dynamics, it 
lacked good analytical levers to examine the internal organisational dynamics. 
Again this is largely because its focus in general is on exogenous than 
endogenous factors of organisational change. Despite this, the study still found 
Greenwood and Hinings’ (2002) notion of ‘capacity for action’ interesting as it 
points to the organisations ability to manage the transition process from one 
template to another. An interest in this had come out of the realisation that the 
change itself had been externally determined and negotiated. But more 
important is that the official’s themselves reflected on the organisation’s 
inability to recruit competent individuals. Again this was largely due to the 
transformation’s emphasis on redress and equity and its subsequent unintended 
consequences which saw loyalty take precedence over competence in a divided 
and highly fragmented society.   
 
The concept of capacity for action had suggested that radical change cannot 
occur unless there was (i) a sufficient understanding of the new conceptual 
destination, (ii) skills and competencies to support the change and (iii) an 
organisational ability to manage how to reach the new change (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996). In an almost consistent way data had confirmed that the ECDE 
had lacked broadly in the three dimensions mentioned. Already the 
consequences of this have been illuminated to include instability, discontinuity 
and unpredictability. But more important the use of the ‘concept of capacity for 
action’ has revealed is that compared to the western modernised bureaucracy, 
the South African bureaucracies were still under reconstruction. They are 
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evolving bureaucracies with identities that are constantly being revised by the 
broad South African transformation and transition. They are thus organisations 
in transition. Of course one understands that some organisations have handled 
such transition better than others.  
 
Notwithstanding, an organisation like the ECDE has shown that it is one of the 
organisations struggling to move from the old pre-1994 to the new post-1994 
identity. Rather it is caught in various dualities of the pre 1994 homeland and 
apartheid era and its multifaceted cultural and political identities and the post 
1994 transition. For instance while the post 1994 era has emphasised a 
reconciliatory agenda and stresses the need for the modernisation of the 
bureaucracies through newly adopted western models of public sector reform, 
this organisation is struggling to shed the inherited homeland practices, 
particularly the Ciskei practices. This is said for two reasons, one has to do with 
the choice of the capital Bisho which by its nature saw the Ciskeian cultural 
practices being imbued into the newly formed organisation. Again this is taken 
from the literature that identifies the significance of organisational 
embeddedness in a particular context. By its nature the concept of 
organisational embeddedness implies transference of norms and values between 
the organisation and its context. Two, the assimilation of the Ciskei civil 
servants at the operational core gave the organisation an added Ciskei identity. 
Already a number of scholars have commented on the history of public 
administration in the homelands which were based on patronage, clientelism 
and poor service ethic. This dominance of the Ciskei practices in particular was 
bound to have its own consequences for the organisation. Amongst such 
consequences is the known inability to create and sustain organisational change. 
Instead change tends to be faced with resistance as the dominant forces want to 
retain their power of influence and continuity. Of course the study revealed that 
while the Ciskeian civil servants form the largest group, there are other 
contending forces that have also formed their dominant coalitions to protect 
their interests in the broad context of resource competition and survival. Chapter 
six referred to such dominant coalitions. These coalitions remain as minorities. 
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Overall then the theory used has helped to explore both the external and the 
internal dynamics of organisational change. However unlike the mainstream 
management theory that looks at the broad generic principles of organisational 
change, the use of empirically based case study analysis has helped to 
illuminate on the cultural and political intricacies of organisational change. 
Actually, the eclectic nature in which the theory was used has helped identify 
that organisations are part of their own complex network of social political and 
cultural systems. They are often led and influenced by such systems. 
Unfortunately, this system has been made complex in South Africa by the shift 
from the apartheid state to a democratic state creating different bipolarities 
about the change. Such bipolarities thus found their way to the organisation as 
well. The organisation had inherited, as indicated earlier, a Ciskei type of social 
and cultural bureaucratic systems which was influenced by different norms and 
values. Mostly such norms were based on the mythical identity inscriptions of 
the Sebe regime that proscribed exclusion. But also they were bureaucratic 
systems that were known to serve the political interests of those in power 
perpetuating patronage and corruption. The tension thus is in how does this 
bureaucracy move from this history to become a new inclusive, collaborative 
and efficient bureaucracy that responds to its stakeholders. 
 
Beyond these social and cultural issues, there are technical issues as well. The 
inherited bureaucracy hardly had any technical capacity to serve the Ciskei 
homeland pre 1994. It was almost a huge expectation to think it would provide 
better service delivery post 1994 when the organisation had grown from a few 
thousand Ciskei employees to a 70 000 workforce and 6 500 schools. This 
expansion of the bureaucracy created challenges in terms of skills and 
resources. Literally, without any resource expansion it lacked the  capacities to 
serve the new emerging interests. Instead it suffered from a huge systems 
collapse that got riddled with corruption and opportunism.   
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To some extent this tells us something about the nature of the bureaucracy in 
general. Particularly, this study revealed that the notion of generic bureaucracies 
does not exist as managerialism tends to assume. Rather organisations experience 
different realities and thus are bound to be different and unique pending what acts 
on them. Implicitly, this would determine how they perform. For instance, in the 
most simplistic way, if one uses the number line scale of 1-10 as an indicator of 
good and poor performance, where 1 represents poor performance and 10 is for 
good performance, organisations are likely to spread within that continuum of 1-
10.  If this is not acknowledged, however, managerial technologies will continue 
to dominate as they assume generic organisational development levels. Their 
‘one-fits-all’ approaches will hardly benefit organisations like the ECDE, since 
organisations like these lack basic skills, infrastructure and resources to run a 
functional bureaucracy.  
 
On the contrary the pressure to perform means that such organisations are 
caught in a constant duality to build basic administration systems necessary for 
a functional bureaucracy while also they have to reflect themselves as highly 
modernised structures that understand the managerial trends suggested by 
policy. The consequences of this are smokescreen performances that result in 
poor service delivery. To understand these bureaucracies thus, it is important to 
focus on the micro analysis of such organisations and their contexts for a better 
understanding of organisations and their behaviour as they undergo change and 
transformation. For instance, some micro revelation from this study is that 
although the South African bureaucracies are guided by similar policy 
guidelines, they respond differently to them. But more importantly it revealed 
that organisational inefficiencies were not just a consequence of bad policy 
implementation and execution but were a product of a complex network of 
factors that resonate internally and externally to the organisation. 
 
Juxtaposed to these structural limitations, there are bureaucrats themselves who 
are responsible to make the organisation work. Taking clues from the data thus, 
it became essential to find the nature of capacity that existed. Generally, 
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western theories do not engage with issues of skills and they take them as 
given. What this study revealed then is that the organisation lacked the capacity 
and skills to effect the change. Already, compromises were made with the 
assimilation of the Ciskei civil servants at the lower levels who lacked skills 
due to years of isolation and lack of investment in education and training in the 
homelands. Equally, the strategic positions had become burning spaces for 
various reasons leading to constant leadership flights. Unfortunately such 
instability contributed to the many discontinuities and inconsistencies in the 
reform programme. But also the officials themselves commented on the flaws 
of recruitment that saw recruitment and appointments made through loyalty 
rather than competence. 
 
Broadly then the theory used helped to explore both the external and internal 
dynamics that had a bearing on the ECDE. In reality there is very little 
organisational change research that analyses both components. This is despite the 
calls made by researchers like Pettigrew (2001) who advocate for analysis of both 
the context and process of change. Without much progress in that direction, 
organisational change research continues to be imbued in technical rationality. 
But also there are still very few studies that are based on empirical investigations 
of organisations and how they work especially in South Africa. By incorporating 
both the external and internal factors as points of analysis thus, the theory 
illuminated that organisational change is a complex political and social 
phenomenon that is driven by both the technical aspirations of modernisation and 
by internal political interests inherent within the organisation. Of course the issue 
of political interests although they have since taken a back seat in current 
organisational research they are what old institutionalism through researchers like 
Selznick focused on in the 1960s’ and what Riggs (1964) tried to address in his 
prismatic theory. This study thus validates their significance as well. 
 
The key question then is: to what extent has the use of theory answered the 
student concerns about the use and relevance of western models in interpreting 
change in transitional African contexts. The answer to this is unfortunately 
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limited by lack of African scholarship in general. Because of the lack of such 
scholarship, organisations remain influenced by western theories and 
unfortunately these remain insufficient to unravel the complexities of working 
in developing contexts.  This is in the sense that while western theories provide 
good analytical bases on how organisational bureaucracies function, they 
remain devoid of context. Instead they draw general principles as observed from 
highly developed administrative contexts. While such information is helpful to 
understand the broad contextual debates about organisational change it is 
limited to macro and sometimes generic perspectives of change. Also such 
theories tend to use highly modernised organisations as their point of reference 
and analysis. Unfortunately such organisations remain scarce in developing 
contexts. Even in South Africa, bureaucracies are unevenly developed and 
mostly they are at a developmental stage. To understand their dynamics thus 
means there is a need for combination of both the macro and micro analysis of 
these bureaucracies and their behaviour. 
 
Overall then, while the western theories of organisational change are useful they 
are  limited as well as they originate in stable and predictable environments and 
thus have limited analytical lenses for unstable, fluid and unpredictable 
contexts. Despite that, they helped illuminate on the different features of the 
ECDE. For instance, one understands that due to the unstable nature of context, 
this organisation was equally unlikely to find stability due to the revolving 
nature of the process of transition. But more important, the theory helped one 
understand that organisational efficiency and performance are a consequence of 
complex factors that cannot rely on simple managerial solutions but require 
multi-pronged strategies. In tandem this means that organisational analysis has 
to go beyond technical rationality to look at the micro politics that drive these 
organisations to illuminate on both their cultural and discursive practices which 
inform their social realities. For instance one of the key issues to emerge was 
the issue of poor relations that exist which are a result of the inherited social and 
political fragmentations. Of course whenever one speaks of relational politics, 
there is usually a question about what is unique in the ECDE compared to other 
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departments that have gone through the mergers of different ethnic and racial 
groups. While this question needs further empirical investigation beyond the 
scope of this study, there is no doubt that the depth of such politics differed with 
each region and territory. Unfortunately the Transkei and Ciskei identity battles 
had been stronger compared to other homelands. These at times resulted in 
different forms of violence. While these battles are no longer in the public 
domain, they cannot be assumed to have disappeared either. Rather they could 
have assumed a different sophistication that complicates the relational politics at 
this current juncture.  
 
To make any theoretical propositions thus, this study sees the need to look at 
organisational change in a relational way. The concept of relational analysis is 
not new as there are few researchers that address it. For instance, Clegg et al 
(2002) recommends it for the study of organisational paradoxes, while Mutch et 
al (2006) apply it in the study of organisational action. The basis of a relational 
approach draws the need to see relations ‘between units as pre-eminently 
dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties 
amongst inert substances’ (Emirbayer, 1997:289, quoted by Mutch et al, 
2006:613). For instance, while the ECDE can be seen to be inefficient, such 
inefficiency is a result of a conglomerate of factors that give a particular 
character to the organisation. To unravel, these factors thus, it is perhaps 
important to broaden organisational change analysis to include Bourdieu’s 
concept of the field. Bourdieu (1990b) quoted by Everett (2002:60) defines a 
field as: 
networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions 
within which struggles or maneuvers take place over resources, 
stakes and access (Bourdieu, 1990b, quoted by Everett, 2002:60).  
 
Of course such struggles as shown by this case exist at both the macro and micro 
levels, externally and internally. The critical theoretical gap for organisational 
theory thus is to develop a theory of change that recognises that public 
bureaucracies function beyond the assumed technical rationality. They are a 
product of various political, social and cultural networks of relations that exist 
which are defined by various interests and ideologies.  
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The key contribution of this research is in the identification of the structural and 
political networks that exist in South African public sector organisations. Various 
researchers have looked at the significance of these networks in different ways by 
analysing their structural patterns, the processes inherent in them and their 
political dynamics (Harrison, Laplante and St-Cyr 2001; De Wever, Martens and 
Vandenbempt 2005; Swan and Scarbrough 2005; Ho, Rousseau and Lesque 2006; 
Tagliaventi and Mattarelli 2006 and Antcliff, Saundry and Stuart 2007). For 
instance Swan and Scarbrough identified the co-ordination of networks as 
essential in networked innovation. Broadly this study also confirms the role of 
networks in organisations. It identified that their roles and influences extend inside 
and outside the organisation. Of course this study did not look at the intricacies of 
the ECDE coalition of networks per se, due to the limitations highlighted in 
chapter three. However, the identification of such networks contributes to the 
theory of organisational change and service delivery in South Africa by 
identifying that; 
(a) Organisational change is not just a hierarchical top-down exercise it is 
conditional to the nature of coalitions and networks that exist which may 
support or mitigate the change.  
(b) The more fragmented the networks of coalition are, the less likely the 
organisation is able to extend service delivery due to poor collaboration 
and divergent values and interests.  
(c) The traditional Weberian bureaucracy is a misnomer in politically and 
ideologically fragmented environments. With South African bureaucracies 
demonstrating fragmented tendencies there is a need to theorise the public 
sector change beyond the traditional rational managerial conceptions to 
include the notion of networked bureaucracies and their consequences on 
service delivery. It is thus important to understand how networks internal 
and external operate and their consequences on service delivery.  
(d) There is a need to look at how public organisations can move beyond the 
familiar bonded political, ethnic, racial and genderised networks to include 
the internal and external excluded sources of information and knowledge 
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which can enhance organisational performance. For instance how can 
public organisations create extended ‘networks of practice’ (Tagliaventi 
and Mattarelli 2006) outside their limited and possible saturated familiar 
network zones. Networks of practice are presumed to be organised around 
knowledge and resources more than loyalty ties.  
 
Of course, networks of practice require open networked organisations that are able 
to trust the unknown and the unfamiliar. They require what Putnam (2000) calls 
the ‘bridging capital’ which is the ability to link beyond the known groups. As 
Antcliff (2007:23) states ‘while the bonding capital is good for ‘getting by’ 
bridging capital is necessary for ‘getting ahead’’. The question is: To what extent 
are South African public sector organisations ready to extend their bridging capital 
to enhance the quality of work they do? An exploration of these type of issues and 
questions will give insight into how we manage South African complexities of 
service delivery moving forward.  
 
Implications for policy and practice 
Although this study looked at a single case study, there are a few implications 
that can be drawn for policy and practice. To manage the discussion though, I 
organised the discussion around the same themes that were used in the study 
namely context, internal organisational design and the challenges and 
complexities of skills and capacity. 
 
Context 
The observation made is that the ECDE operates in a context that is rapidly 
changing. The key issue though is that it struggles to create an alignment between 
what is happening externally and its broad organisational goals. As a result it 
finds itself always having to respond to government regulations without any 
considerations to streamline and control what it takes on. Partly, this is a result of 
the long history of an uneven relationship between the national and provincial 
systems of governance where the former always gives directives and cascades 
what needs to be implemented at each level down the hierarchy without any 
 229 
thought about the consequences. For instance, at the time of conducting the 
research the ECDE was immersed in various programmes most of which were 
initiated outside the provincial department itself. While organisational responses 
to external initiatives are applauded, there is no doubt that such externally 
agendas reduce the ownership of the reform programme and even organisational 
accountability.   
 
While talking about externally driven agendas, the study showed the unresolved 
tensions that exist between policy formulation and implementation. The reality is 
that South Africa’s transformation has had to deal with the policy processes that 
were highly contested and interest-driven. But more important is that the policy 
process had multiple points of entry and exit that resulted in incompatible, 
contradictory and competing policy expectations. Partly, this was due to the fact 
that the policy processes were hardly informed by reality as they lacked adequate 
information systems that could inform them. But also as a task team- and 
consultant-based elite exercise the processes remained highly exploratory and 
resulting in the adoption of policies that were highly advanced in the context of 
local conditions, which had limited capital, infrastructure, resources and capacity 
to implement them. With very little knowledge of the challenges that beset policy 
implementation, there was a tendency to ignore the complex organisational 
arrangements that needed to be in place for any policy to be processed. The 
evidence in this case thus points to the need to interrogate the policy management 
chain.  
 
Currently, policies formulators assume that there is ready-made capacity and 
resources that are always available in all organisations which are set aside for 
abrupt policy emergencies, which is hardly the reality of many organisations. 
Also they assume that policy implementation is the burden of decentralised 
regional systems hence their pronouncements are never accompanied by 
resources. Instead the organisations affected are expected to mobilise and shift 
their own internal budgetary arrangements to accommodate the new interests. The 
view of the thesis is that this disjuncture between policy formulation and 
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implementation is one of the major elements that affect service delivery. Partly, 
because this type of arrangement tends to decentralise responsibility and 
accountability while it holds on to the resources and other forms of capital that 
could assist the implementation process. Consequently, this does not only 
overburden the exhausted organisations, it also detracts them from their plans and 
goals.  For the practitioner thus it might be better to suspend policies have no 
resources attached to them for better control and streamlining.  
 
At a research level, the observation is that organisational change research does 
not really speak to policy. Instead, policy debates are relegated to policy 
disciplines. In this study it seemed difficult to ignore the contending policy goals 
that organisations have to deal with. This lack of analysis of policy goals and 
outcomes makes it difficult to understand the holist nature of public sector 
performance and efficiency. It also masks the fact that other contexts hardly have 
the competencies to conceptualise the competing policy goals that are cascaded as 
part of policy implementation. Partly, this is because the efficiency logic tends to 
assume implementation to be a straightforward exercise. On the contrary, 
organisations are sometimes unclear which goals matter for their effectiveness, as 
internal goals tend to compete with other external government agendas like 
poverty alleviation and other social and economic including HIV programmes. 
Indeed, as this thesis demonstrated in Chapter Four, the RDP was one example 
where social goals took precedence over other professional goals in the ECDE. In 
the process, the department found itself chasing elusive targets that had nothing to 
do with educational goals. Simply put, the study illuminated that where the policy 
environment is the driver of organisational change this could complicate the 
internal organisational goals, especially that policy goals tend to be value-based 
and fuzzier due to their political embeddeness. To enhance service delivery thus 
organisations need to empower themselves to negotiate with their sponsors and 
principals on what they are able to do at a given time. Juxtaposed to this is the 
need for flexibility as key to organisational change and educational reforms in 
general.   
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Organisational Design 
One of the key issues in organisational studies is organisational design which 
speaks to issues of coordination and organisational alignment. With the current 
dominance of rational work practices, education bureaucracies, like other public 
sector organisations, are expected to implement managerialist tendencies for 
greater efficiency and effectiveness. While this means is left to the creativity of 
organisation. The major trend though around design is decentralisation of 
responsibility to the lower levels. Within the South African context this has 
happened at both the political and administrative levels. For instance, politically 
there are provincial structures that oversee similar responsibilities as the national 
offices.  Administratively, organisations like the case study presented would also 
decentralise further. For instance the ECDE functions with the central office 
Bisho and about forty two districts. These districts had come as a result of a 
recent configuration that saw the middle layer of regions removed. While the 
logic for decentralisation is an international phenomenon, there is very little sense 
of what it has to achieve. Instead organisations are seen to implement as either for 
political reasons or as a managerial fashion trend. This is said in the context that 
decentralisation had been introduced in the department as partly to enhance 
service delivery, efficiency and for local empowerment. There is very little 
evidence that this happens as the centre Bisho also struggles with such mandates. 
Hence it continues to pull the authority and responsibility of these decentralised 
structures back and forth pending the nature of crisis at play. What this thesis has 
illuminated thus is that while decentralisation works well in other contexts 
especially in the developed worlds, it has struggled to create any fundamental 
change in this context. Hence the study sees it important to relook at the 
decentralisation theory by examining its purpose and its relevance in a context of 
poor resources allocation, adverse poverty, poor skills, poor competences and 
poor education and training. 
 
Added to this is a need clarify issues of national interest which need to be 
separated from provincial mandates. For example, the building of school 
infrastructure cannot be the sole jurisdiction of provinces. This is one area where 
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the national department of education could help level the playing fields in 
resource allocation, especially in highly deprived contexts which are excluded by 
the efficiency logic. In any event, it is assumed that the involvement of the 
national department of education may enhance shared accountability and 
responsibility between the two levels of education. In many instances, this may 
help advance equity and redress and close the inequalities that exist between 
schools per province. The point is that without any clearly defined national 
mandates, some provinces left to create equitable societies, will always lag behind 
or even operate in the margins as they struggle to make sense of where to start 
and how, because of the overwhelming nature of the inherited apartheid debts and 
backlogs and the confusion of the transitional period. Usually, this affects the 
marginal societies as they depend on the state for their functional existence and 
improvement of their living conditions. 
 
Besides issues of design, the study also illuminated that organisations like the 
ECDE are caught in a dual tension of servicing their professional mandates while 
responding to managerialist demands. For instance it became clear that this 
organisation has brought into the project based work programmes that outline 
quantifiable outputs and key performance areas as shown by the strategic 
documents. However, this reconfiguration and organisation of work practices 
cannot be the only way that organisations plan their work. This is largely because 
educational bureaucracies like hospitals, deal with additional qualitative and 
intangible factors as part their goals. This stress on the measurable thus may 
encourage a focus on only what counts thus relegating all the qualitative aspects 
of  curriculum development,  teacher development and school improvement to the 
margins. There is therefore a need to create a balance as certain sections of the 
work get quantified for accountability purposes while the organisation is left with 
the space to contribute in other ways based on its knowledge of context. What the 
thesis says thus this method of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) may create a 
new selfish culture and practices where the bureaucrats refuse to extend 
themselves beyond what is calculated.  
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Building working collaborative cultures 
One of the major illuminations of this study is that organisations with fragmented 
cultures tend to be dysfunctional. These fragmented cultures were a result of the 
reconciliatory agenda that was initiated in 1994 which saw different departments 
of education merged into a single department of education. While this made 
political and administrative sense to save cots and enforced integration, there is 
no doubt such integration has remained a cultural nightmare as organisation 
struggle to create cultural cohesions and collaborative practices. Undoubtedly, 
there are many explanations for this some ranging from the leadership inability to 
change organisations to the dominance of personal interests that refute attempts of 
integration. To increase cultural co-operations thus may require more than the 
disciplinary processes of financial accountability and performance management to 
include ways to manage the cultural politics of interaction as these dictate the 
patterns by which work is arranged and gets done.  
 
For instance, the revelation in this case study is that the ECDE is organised 
around strong identifies that make it difficult for the organisation to perform as 
expected. These strong and consolidated identities are a result of a general poor 
conceptualisation of the 1994 reconciliatory agenda that never took cognisance of 
the consequences of assimilation and the adoption of representative 
bureaucracies. To date the organisations suffers form consolidated network 
arrangements and coalition whose interests are incompatible to organisational 
goals. Hence it is no surprise that the leadership in this organisation struggles to 
create working communities that are based on trust and collaborative practices.  
Changing such organisations thus is equally a case of the eradication of these 
fragmented cultural spaces that create further differences than collaboration.  
 
The significance of resources 
This thesis has shown that organisational efficiency is equally conditional to the 
resource capacities that exist. This means that while it is possible to 
institutionalise programmes like the Public Finance Management Act and its 
budget-based planning cycles, these have to contend with the unequal 
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development in bureaucratic systems, which in this case were due to homeland 
disparities. As it is, places like the EC had very little resources on the table at the 
time of change, having previously inherited the arid homelands that had been 
excluded from development through almost thirty years of independence as part 
of the apartheid project.  To close this gap thus, needs a call beyond the adoption 
of sophisticated managerial techniques that are seen to be of help in modernised 
organisations. The point is that the ECDE still lacks basic infrastructure, which 
makes it imperative therefore to introduce basic functional systems rather than 
rush for the new technocratic type of modernisation propagated by New Public 
Management and other similar management concepts. In retrospect, this thesis 
advocates for prioritisation based on contextual needs and also the staggering of 
the reform programme to accommodate resource limitations.  
 
By advocating the need for resources, it equally acknowledges the current 
mismanagement and the corruption that is embedded within the system due to the 
inherited patronage practices. Nevertheless, it still contends that to create an 
effective change there is need for a clear consideration of local conditions and the 
struggles inherent in them. Where such consideration is a reality, this may help 
the policy planning cycles as well as organisations are helped to respond only to 
relevant local needs. Again this calls for variation and flexibility to accommodate 
the differentiations that exist in the country. Put differently, it is important that 
organisations have the autonomy to choose programmes they are able to 
implement in accordance with their particular contexts and resource capacities, 
rather than pursue generic tendencies across all provinces. The point is that public 
organisations in South Africa are too diverse for anyone to make any generic 
assumptions about them.  
 
The significance of skills 
The South African public organisations in general contend with issues of skills 
and capacity. Unfortunately, organisational change research tends to put this in 
the margins, unless one examines the human resources type of literature. For 
instance, even NPM, a popular ideology in the public sector, never questions the 
 235 
issue of skills and competencies. Rather, it assumes managers have the training 
and the required competencies to lead and direct change. This makes such 
theories difficult to translate in conditions where skills are limited, as was the case 
in the ECDE.  The issues of skills and competencies are in fact contentious issues 
in South Africa, partly because the politics of the negotiated settlement have led 
to schizophrenic types of organisations that depict high levels of mistrust of the 
unknown and marginalisation of the unfamiliar. By this, one refers to the complex 
politics of race and ethnicity inherited from the past, which still dominate most 
organisations; this may be why some organisations, including the ECDE, easily 
divert from their goals as the workforce becomes preoccupied with consolidating 
their positions and specific interests. The ECDE is an example of an organisation 
where the politics of reconciliation and compromise have remained superficial as 
it over-emphasised the politics of affiliation over skills and competence, leading 
to the marginalisation and exclusion of competent personnel.  
 
This is not unique, as most organisations function within such a binary where 
either politics or skills and competence are used to staff the organisation. 
Unfortunately, such binaries tend to have race, ethnicity, gender and political 
connotations to them. While this may prove to be an advantage in consolidating 
managerial and personal loyalties, it is also be a platform that breeds other 
organisational dysfunctionalities, like corruption and patronage. Nonetheless, the 
lesson that can be derived in this case study is that loyalty-based organisations 
tend to do poorly, especially if loyalty is championed at the expense of skills and 
competence.   
 
To change such systems, managers cannot have absolute liberty to determine the 
direction of public organisations based on stereotyped binaries without any 
recourse regarding their actions or even accountability. Such actions enhance 
organisational tensions, conflicts and intolerance amongst the workforce. This 
means that, besides the national programmes, there is a need for internal 
mechanisms that help to foster the necessary objectivity. To date, the national 
systems of accountability remain weak, with the result that the state struggles to 
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monitor policy compliance in general. Consequently, many organisations assume 
that individual ethics and conscience will be able to drive the national interest. On 
the contrary, however, the ECDE has shown that individuals do not necessarily 
identify themselves with national issues or organisational interests. Instead, self-
interests tend to dominate. This means that in the context of weak national and 
provincial systems, it becomes imperative to create organisational processes that 
will institutionalise ethical managerial and governing principles that promote 
organisational goals and interests while they curb self-interest.  
 
7.2 Directions for future research 
This study contributes to the debate and research on organisational change in the 
following ways: 
Firstly, through empirical research and an in depth case analysis it has shown the 
complexities that public organisations in South Africa face at the time of 
transition. Secondly, it has also shown that organisational change debates in South 
Africa need to go beyond the generic technical assumptions to include an analysis 
of internal and external networks and their micro cultural politics which may 
influence notions of service delivery. Thirdly, it has illuminated on the 
differentiated nature of the South African bureaucracy in a way that suggests the 
need to re-look at these bureaucracies as unique and complex entities than as 
generic single model institutions that require generic solutions of change. 
Fourthly, it has shown that there is a consistency in the flow of relations between 
the context, organizational configuration and its outcomes. This implies that it is 
insufficient to analyse organisations as entities separate from their environments. 
Rather, it is important to understand the nature of context, the structural 
limitations it brings and the type of agency that exists internally and externally, 
which all contribute to what gets negotiated and gets done.  
 
With regard to future research, it may be interesting to: 
• Theorise the networked bureaucracies and their consequences on change 
and service delivery.  
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• Conduct comparative studies to see how other public organisations in 
similar contexts manage change.  
• Explore a range of successful organisations to see what makes them 
successful. 
• Explore the concept of decentralisation and its relevance with the aim to 
examine ways to increase service delivery. 
• Examine the emerging organisational cultures of the post 1994 
bureaucracies.  
• Examine the role played by unions in the reform programme. 
• Explore how Batho Pele principles are understood and implemented to 
advance service delivery. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
INTERVIEWEES 
 
No. Name Position Department/ 
Organisation 
Date & Place 
of Interview 
1. Mr S. 
Xhoseka 
Director: Human Resource 
Development 
ECDE 11/11/2003 
Zwelitsha 
 
2. Mr C. 
Mangcu 
Director: Early Childhood 
Development 
ECDE 11/11/2003 
Zwelitsha 
 
3. Mr  J. Godden Former Director-General, 
ECDE and former co-
ordinator of Imbewu Project 
 
Independent 
Consultant 
18/11/2003 
East London 
4. Mr B.T.M  
Mfenyana  
 
Chief Director - District 
Development  
ECDE 19/11/2003 
Zwelitsha and 
10/05/2004 
 
5. Mr. R 
Tywakadi 
Chief Director: Curriculum 
Management 
ECDE 19/11/2003 
Zwelitsha 
 
6. Mr. P. 
Mfenyana 
Director: Quality Assurance, 
assessment and examinations 
ECDE 20/11/2003 
King 
Williams 
Town 
 
7. Dr S. Muthwa Director Fort Hare Institute 
of Government 
20/11/2003 
Bisho 
 
8. Mr Mandla 
Mphahlwa 
Chairman: Education 
Portfolio Committee 
Member 
Provincial 
Legislature, Bisho 
 
11/05/2004 
Bisho 
 
 
9. Mr X. Manzi Junior Manager EC Provincial 
Treasury 
11/05/2004 
Bisho 
 
10. Mrs B. 
Maneli  
Director Department of 
Public Works, 
Bisho 
11/05/2004 
Bisho 
 
11. Rev. A. 
Fetsha 
Educational Development 
Officer 
District Office: 
Grahamstown 
15/05/2004 
East London 
 
12. Mr. Khaya 
Ngaso 
Chief Director: Human 
Resources 
ECDE 15/05/2004 
Zwelitsha 
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13. Mr J. Bartlet  Director ECDE: Imbewu 
Project 
15/05/2004 
Zwelitsha 
 
14. Mr I. Wear Former Provincial 
Commissioner 
Independent 
Consultant  
17/05/2004 
Hogsback 
 
 
15. Mr Stone 
Sizani 
Former MEC of the ECDE 
2001/2 
ANC: Port 
Elizabeth 
18/05/2004 
Port Elizabeth 
 
16. Mr. G. M. 
Naidoo 
District Manager District Office: 
Grahamstown 
19/05/2004 
Grahamstown 
 
17. Mr. V. 
Tetyana 
Researcher: Public Service 
Accountability Monitor 
(PSAM) 
Rhodes University 19/05/2004 
Grahamstown 
18. Dr M. Tom Director General Office of the 
Premier, Bisho 
19/05/2004 
Bisho 
 
19. Mrs B. 
Kamana 
Assistant Director: Human 
Resource Management and 
NEHAWU representative 
 
ECDE 20/05/2004 
Zwelitsha 
20. Mr. E. Fray Director: EMIS and Physical 
Resource Planning 
ECDE 20/05/2004 
Zwelitsha 
 
21. Mr. E. Harris Deputy Director General ECDE 21/05/2004 
Zwelitsha 
 
22. Mr. M. 
Ngonzo 
District Manager Cofimvaba 10/11/2005 
Johannesburg 
 
23. Mr R. Kali District Manager Queenstown 15/11/2005 
Telephone 
interview 
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APPENDIX THREE  
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
 
A: Interview Schedule for the Department of Education Provincial 
Officials. 
 
1.  History of Organisational Change in the Provincial Department 
The Department has undergone through various transformational changes 
in the past eight years, can you share your experiences of the nature of 
changes that have taken place. 
a) What has changed and how?  
 
2.  Perceptions about the Eastern Cape Department of Education 
The department is currently perceived as the one of the inefficient public 
organisations to date.  
b) Is this a perception or reality? Explain 
c) What are the challenges that you have experienced in changing this 
organisation in the past eight years? 
 
3.  The Interim Management Task Team Intervention 
The department is currently going through a change intervention through 
the Interim Management Task Team. 
d) What are your views about this type of intervention? 
e) Is the department in a state where it warrants an outside intervention? 
 
4.  Managing the Merger, Change and Culture 
In any merger of different organisations there are always challenges that 
relate to creating a single vision and culture.  
f) Can you comment on the management practices and culture of the 
organisation. 
g) What have been the challenges of the merger? 
h) How has the department managed them? 
 
5.   Challenges of the department  
i) What do you consider to be the challenges for the department going 
forward?  
 
6.   Lessons about change  
j) What lessons have you learnt over the years about managing change?  
 
 
B.  Interview Schedule for other researchers/ consultants/ departments 
 
1.  Experiences on working with the department 
Generally, can you share your experiences on working with the department 
of education. 
(a) how long have you worked with department? and 
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(b) in what role? Explain 
(c) what has been the experience like? 
 
2.   The Interim Management Task Team Intervention 
The department is currently going through a change intervention 
programme through the Interim Management Task Team. 
(d) What are your views about this type of intervention? 
(e) Is the department in a state where it warrants an outside 
intervention? 
 
3. Challenges of the department  
(f) What do you consider to be the challenges for the department 
going forward  
 
4.    Lessons about change  
(g) What lessons have you learnt over the years about managing 
change in the public sector?  
 
 
 
